From Bipolar Detente to Asymmetric Interdependence: Theoretical Lessons for Managing Twenty-First-Century U.S.–China Rivalry

Abstract

This article provides a comprehensive comparative examination of great-power tension management by juxtaposing the Cold War-era détente between the United States and the Soviet Union with the contemporary strategic rivalry between the United States and China. While the Cold War détente emerged from a highly structured bipolar order characterized by nuclear parity, ideological confrontation, and relatively limited economic interdependence, today’s U.S.–China relationship unfolds within a vastly more complex environment shaped by deep economic entanglement, technological interdependence, multipolar dynamics, and regionally distributed flashpoints. Against this backdrop, the article evaluates whether the conceptual logic, institutional mechanisms, and strategic lessons of détente retain analytical relevance for managing twenty-first-century great-power tensions.

The study argues that although historical analogies offer valuable insights, the structural conditions underpinning Cold War détente differ fundamentally from those shaping U.S.–China relations. Nevertheless, détente’s foundational principles—strategic communication, mutual recognition of core interests, institutionalized crisis management, and rules-based competition—remain essential for preventing escalation in the current geopolitical landscape. Through a qualitative, theory-informed comparative analysis, the article demonstrates that a modernized form of détente may be possible but would require innovative frameworks that accommodate asymmetric interdependence, technological rivalry, cyber competition, and the evolving norms of global governance.

Ultimately, the findings contribute to broader scholarly debates about great-power politics, strategic stability, and the prospects for peaceful coexistence in an era defined by systemic rivalry. The article concludes that while Cold War détente cannot be replicated in its original form, its conceptual lessons can inform the development of new models of great-power management capable of reducing risks in an increasingly interconnected and contested global order.