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NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY OF GEORGIA**

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№ 2



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GORI, 2023

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Content

Europe's Grand Strategy (The Common Security and Defence Policy) Brigadier General Mamia Balakhadze	7
Historical, Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Conflicts Tinatin Kropadze, Ketevan Kveselava	24
Regulation of Oxygen Balance in The Process of Synthesis of Explosives Merab Nadirashvili, Grigol Tsulukidze	29
Healthy Body is a Guarantee of a Healthy Mind Kaltamze Melkadze, Nino Okreshidze	35
Strengthening The Eu's Defence Cooperation Title Natali Gvalia, Tamar Khaduri	39
Effects of Psycho-Cultural Factors on Adopting Changes in Defense Giorgi Dolidze, Rusudan Kuntchulia	44
The New EU Energy Security Reality And Its Impact on The Wider Black Sea Region Colonel Murtaz Gujejian	51
The Role of Leadership in Policy Towards Domestic Decisions And its Influencing the Formulation of Foreign Policy Retired Lieutenant-Colonel Besik Jajanidze	58
Turkey's Role in South Caucasus Nikoloz Esitashvili	66
Using Linear Regression in the Context of Military Power Enhancement Ivan Okromtchedlishvili	75
The Challenging Path of Georgia towards NATO Membership Giorgi Iakobishvili	84
Communications in the Nuclear Age Lela Abdushelishvili	93
Unveiling Quishing: The Dark Side Of Qr Codes In Cyber Attacks Avtandili Bichnigauri, Ioseb Kartvelishvili, Luka Shonia, Daviti Bichnigauri, Otar Gudadze	96

Europe's Grand Strategy (The Common Security and Defence Policy)

Brigadier General Mamia Balakhadze¹

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Abstract

The paper explores the security challenges, national interests, and defense policy development of modern European countries, namely Great Britain, France, and Germany. Great Britain recently exited the European Union on February 1, 2020. Over the years, Britain has played an active role in the EU's security and defense policy. Therefore, we cannot overlook the significance of Great Britain, and while discussing it, we will first focus on the period before Brexit (until 2020) and then review the period after Brexit.

The aforementioned states are major players in shaping Europe's security architecture today. Working together and developing a common strategy is crucial for the security of the continent. The European security policy that was established after World War II is based on the theory of interdependence. I conducted the research using discourse analysis to examine the internal national security strategies of these states, as well as their relationships with one another and with international organizations such as NATO and the European Union.

Keywords:

security, Europe's grand strategy, NATO, European Union, and politics.

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Introduction

Germany, France, and Great Britain are the main and most influential states in the European Union's security and defense policy. They are the leaders of the European security system. While Britain and France played important roles in shaping security policies, Germany was able to cooperate and partner with both of them and showed a willingness to lead, both politically and economically, which became a turning point in the formation of the security policies. These three countries jointly launched several security and defense initiatives, which were crucial in forming the European Union's Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

In the current global scenario, European countries avoid conducting military interventions independently. Instead, their military operations and missions are closely tied to the collective defense and security policies of NATO and the European Union, and they operate in a multinational environment. It appears that the era of unilateral (individual) military interventions and operations in contemporary international politics is a thing of the past for European nations.

It should be noted that the Russian Federation is an exception, although it is not included in our discussion this time, since Russia applies an expansive policy in the neighboring region while we focus on the EU member states and Great Britain and directly on the European security architecture. The aggressive and expansive policy of Russia is a subject of separate discussion. Russia's foreign policy goals, tasks, and ways to achieve them do not align with the political and security issues that modern European states face.²

The second argument for why the EU member states and Great Britain no longer refer to independent military missions and operations is that today, war is now considered an existential issue for states. Europe has experienced several wars in the past, which resulted in significant losses. And waging wars is an expensive and risky affair that involves high economic costs. In the aftermath of the Cold War, European countries have been working together to strengthen their security and defense policies in collaboration with their allies. This is because if a national government makes a mistake that affects the security of Europe, the Allies step in to identify the risks and economic costs involved.³

It can be said that Germany, France, and Italy are also betting on the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and NATO. Their military missions and operations are aimed at resolving crises and strengthening the EU's position. The situation is similar to NATO. States aim to bolster their position in the organization while also supporting it. Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain are all working towards safeguarding their own national interests and security policies while at the same time being mindful of the interests of the other member states and the European Union as a whole. In the event of any issues, a series of negotiations and discussions on security matters are initiated.⁴

Germany, France, and Italy are key actors in the development of policies and the management of missions related to the EU's common security and defense policy. They hold significant influence in civil-military operations, including the distribution of resources. The UK played a vital role in the development and execution of the CSDP until 2020. Even after 2020, the UK remains the primary security partner of the EU and works closely with NATO. It's unlikely that any military or civilian operation of the European Union would take place without the participation of the UK, Germany, Italy, and France. Therefore, these countries work together to align their national interests and identify common goals and objectives. The agreement reached on this issue is crucial for the success of any EU military or civilian mission. In addition, Germany plays an important role in political affairs, both in its relations with third countries and within the European Union. Since the time of Chancellor Merkel, Germany has actively sought to take a leading role in the EU and NATO by finding political solutions to military and civilian crises.

Main Part

The EU-NATO relationship is viewed by researchers and political scientists as a partnership and competition. This dynamic is driven by both formal and structural reasons. The formal reason for this is due to the political deadlock between the Turks and the Cypriots, which is a classic diplomatic impasse.

Another important issue is that the presence of two rapid reaction forces raises concerns about resource duplication, and this prompts the question of where the military forces of NATO and the European Union should be located. Moreover, institutional rivalry is a constant feature of international diplomacy. As Simon Lunn, Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, points out, "Whenever a new crisis emerges, there is always a sense of rivalry and competition."⁵

2 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics in the New National Interest* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 97-134.

3 *Ib.* 105.

4 *Ib.* 106.

5 Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford University Press, 2008), 27-44.

However, it is important to recognize that in the current political situation, the development of the security and defense policy of the European Union without NATO is unimaginable. NATO has played a crucial role in maintaining Europe's security since World War II. In this competition, the primary European military actors, France and Great Britain are attempting to advance their strategic interests and opinions on how to establish the relationship between the state, the European Union, and NATO.⁶

France is advocating for the EU to be an autonomous military actor internationally. On the other hand, French leaders are proposing that Europe should have a consistent and permanent military force (armed forces/defense forces). Great Britain, however, believes that the EU should be involved in military missions and operations only in areas where NATO's capabilities are limited. According to the UK's strategic reasoning, NATO should remain the predominant security and defense organization in Europe, and it should be NATO that decides when EU military forces should participate in a particular crisis.⁷

The Kosovo crisis had a significant impact on the development of European security. Throughout the crisis, the US military power and political influence were dominant in resolving the issue. After the experience of the crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo, Germany, France, and Great Britain recognized the need for a quicker modernization of the security and defense policy of the European Union and the European forces, both from political and military perspectives. As an initiative,⁸ Germany proposed the development of military power across Europe, not just in leading states, therefore, both Britain and France were involved in the general modernization process throughout the continent.⁹

The European Union is currently facing a significant historical situation due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and Russia's aggressive and expansive policies in Eastern Europe and Georgia. This has led to a change in the existing European security architecture, causing serious concerns for France, Germany, Italy, and Poland. These countries are now focused on improving EU military capabilities and security policies. In this article, we will discuss the security dilemmas, national interests, and defense policy development of France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy in relation to the European Union.

France (French Republic)

In security policy, France is guided by the specific model of the European Union, which implies the creation of a militarily autonomous and powerful Europe. During an interview with Europe 1 radio, French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the need for a sovereign army of the European Union to counter the "Russian threat" and ensure European safety. Macron stated that Europe cannot fully protect itself until it has a self-sufficient army, independent of the United States. He also expressed concern about the growing populism and extremist nationalism in Europe that is dividing the continent. Therefore, a stronger and more united Europe is needed to counter these challenges.¹⁰

French Defense Minister Hervé Morin addressed the Security Policy Conference in Munich, calling for "L'Europe de la Défense" and highlighting the necessity of shifting towards European Realpolitik. He emphasized that the European Union cannot remain entirely reliant on NATO and urged Europe to mature beyond its military 'infancy' and take on the responsibilities of a global actor.

Without proper military support, Europe cannot play any role globally. However, Europe needs to prioritize the development of its military capabilities to modernize the army and reflect strategic ambition. In this regard, France's strategic security view is more aligned with the British view than with that of other European countries.¹¹

France is working actively to leverage all the opportunities provided by the terms of the Lisbon Treaty to bolster the common security and defense policy of the European Union through concrete actions. It is also collaborating with member states to develop crisis management capabilities. Given the impact of the flow of migrants from North Africa on the security of France and Europe, France is playing an active role in resolving crises in Africa. The French defense minister has emphasized that protecting common interests requires a collective effort from states and populations.¹²

The same message was in an article by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in March 2008, where he stated: "Les Européens devaient avoir les moyens militaires pour leurs ambitions poli-

6 Bart M. J. Szewczyk, *Europe's Grand Strategy Navigating a New World Order* (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2021), 16-20.

7 *ib.*,

8 Laura Chappell, *Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy Converging Security and Defence Perspectives in an Enlarged EU* (University of Surrey, UK, 2012), 1-35.

9 *ib.*,

10 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest* (palgrave macmillan, 2009), 97-134.

11 The French White Paper on defence and national security - <https://media.nti.org/pdfs/15-Fr.pdf> (10.30.2022)

12 Security, Disarmament and Non-proliferation - <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/> (10.30.2022)

tiques” (Europeans need to have military means for their political ambitions). His article also emphasized the idea that Europe lacked adequate military capabilities to defend itself and that France wanted to be a full member of all NATO structures. The main concept of French strategic thinking is that the European Union must have autonomous military capabilities.

Enhancing Europe’s military capabilities is a common transatlantic interest. Given that the EU already has a foreign policy, it is important to acknowledge the need for a more active security policy that includes the establishment of a unified military force. The current situation presents France with a political platform to promote their vision of L’Europe de defense, which aims to bolster the EU’s military capabilities and increase its role in foreign policy.

In France, General de Gaulle formulated a French security strategy aimed at France’s position as a European and global player. After World War II, the fear of German domination shaped French political views regarding the construction of the European Union.

In the aftermath of World War II, France aimed to establish a united European army and a supranational defense community. This was intended to balance Germany, as they would no longer be able to form a military as powerful as the Wehrmacht. However, given the pressing need to contain the Soviet Union led by Stalin, NATO became the primary security organization in post-war Europe, and the idea of a French-European army was temporarily delayed.¹³

The post-Cold War international order made it impossible for France to maintain great power status in a completely new security environment. NATO’s increased involvement made it clear that the French forces in international operations were not only commanded by the Americans but they were subject to the political decisions of the European states. In the 1990s, France returned to NATO’s military structure as it felt that its influence in Europe was gradually weakening. Additionally, the unification of Germany led to the emergence of a stronger German economy in Europe.¹⁴

French strategic thinking tried to adapt to the existing international order in such a way as to shift its own security priorities and goals. The strategy consisted of three specific issues: a) France should use its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council more actively for UN peacekeeping operations, b) it should integrate and be involved in NATO missions as much as possible; c) An Atlantic security structure should be established through the European Union. French strategic thinking still follows de Gaulle’s vision, “France must become a global security player. But the way to achieve it must be adapted to the circumstances.”

France aims to expand its political influence through military missions. Its participation in multi-lateral missions is driven by a desire for influence in NATO and the EU. It can be assumed that France will continue to play an active role in these organizations using military instruments.¹⁵

Since the end of the Cold War, the approach to military operations and peacekeeping missions has changed significantly. In the past, it was possible for nations to carry out military missions independently, but this approach has become less common. Nowadays, great powers tend to seek specific partners for peacekeeping missions and military operations. This strategy adds more legitimacy to the mission and helps to reduce risks. France is a good example of this change. Before 1990, France conducted its military missions in Africa individually, often in a semi-covert fashion. However, after the end of the Cold War, France had to look for a partner state to join them in their interventions.¹⁶

In 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy was elected as the President of France. During his presidency, he renegotiated military cooperation with NATO and the European Union. The focus was mainly on the former French colonies in Africa, where Sarkozy acknowledged that the presence of the French military was still based on agreements made after the end of colonialism. He also recognized that the French political, military, and economic involvement in Africa was perceived by many as a neo-colonial intervention.

French strategic thinking is heavily focused on the African continent. For many years, France pursued a highly secretive policy in Africa, but today this has changed, and their actions are more transparent. France is trying to legitimize its military missions in Africa by involving the European Union. Former French President Chirac had a clear strategy in mind - he believed that France needed to make some sacrifices in terms of national sovereignty in order to gain permanent influence on the African continent.¹⁷

13 Defence and National Security Strategic Review - <https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Defence-and-National-Security-Strategic-Review-1890> (10.30.2022)

14 Post-cold War Security in and for Europe - <https://www.sipri.org/publications/1984/sipri-fact-sheets/post-cold-war-security-and-europe> (10.30.2022)

15 France’s National Security Strategy - <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/work-document/frances-national-security-strategy-wp/> (10.1.2022)

16 A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade - <https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/press-release-a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/> (10.1.2022)

17 The French Strategy In Africa:France’s Role On The Continent - <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/75199> (10.11.2022)

After the end of the Cold War, European states have reduced their national defense budgets by about 30%. This reduction has led to a greater degree of interdependence among these states, as the Great powers can no longer implement their security policies alone. To address this, there is a need for military cooperation organized and united by the European Union. In the past, French strategic thinking was focused on achieving greatness and maintaining sovereignty. However, presently, the emphasis is on multilateral cooperation within organizations like the European Union and NATO to ensure Europe's security. Furthermore, the belief that the French should avoid all international initiatives that they cannot control is now outdated. Instead, the French are striving to take on leadership roles in these organizations.¹⁸

Since 2008, France has become significantly more active in NATO. In his first foreign policy speech, Sarkozy pointed out that NATO was not a competitor for the common security and defense policy of the European Union.

During the Cold War, France's security interests and strategic plan were focused on giving more autonomy to the military capabilities of the European Union. However, in the modern period, the concept of de Gaulle's sovereignty has disappeared, and France is now establishing pragmatic and close military cooperation with the US and NATO in terms of international peacekeeping missions and military operations with the European Union. It is noticeable that whenever an international crisis arises, French officials still emphasize the idea that Europe needs an autonomous military force. France supports a multipolar environment in the international system and opposes unilateral systems.

France's shift in security strategy can be traced back to the 1980s when it decided to fully integrate into the defense structures of the European Union. Since then, France has actively participated in multinational operations under NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. Of all the international organizations, the European Union holds the highest priority for France as it is committed to creating an integrated European defense structure and maintaining a common foreign and security policy.

France is aligned with both the EU and NATO in their security policy development but is primarily focused on the EU. Some researchers have questioned whether France is one of the strongest states in terms of security and defense. The answer is quite simple: Yes. France is gradually increasing its defense budget and working to develop its own armed forces, both technically and intellectually. What's more, it enjoys a high level of legitimacy from its population, with 80% of French citizens in favor of an increase in military capabilities.¹⁹

The Defense White Book, *Le loi de programmation militaire*²⁰, which was published in 1994, emphasized the importance of multilateralism, as European countries moved towards greater cooperation on security issues over the long term. It is worth remembering that France has a nuclear arsenal, which makes it an important player in ensuring the security and defense of the European Union.

France's strategic vision emphasizes that French and European security goals are identical. France also wants to be more involved in EU crisis management. "This allows France to increase its political and military weight in Europe."

France places great importance on the comprehensive approach of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in its strategic security tactics. This approach involves the integration of military and civilian instruments. However, unlike the Nordic countries and Great Britain, France has not yet adopted a similar approach towards NATO.²¹

In the past few years, France has shifted its focus in terms of security policy. For almost half a century, the backbone of the EU and European security relied on French-German relations. However, in 2007, Sarkozy initiated a unilateral approach to the "EU-Mediterranean union", which caused Merkel to be irritated.

There were disagreements over security policy as Germany refused to join EU forces in Darfur. The views of sovereignty and integration differ more between France and Germany than between France and Britain. The latter two states aim to establish robust intergovernmental European military alliances. On the other hand, Germany wants an integrated European Union without special emphasis on military capabilities.²² Despite the withdrawal of Great Britain from the European Union, it remains France's main partner in strategic thinking, as their strategic visions coincide.

18 Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the U.S., and the Atlantic Alliance - <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2001-05-01/two-strategies-europe-de-gaulle-us-and-atlantic-alliance> (10.11.2022)

19 A Strategic Compass to strengthen the security and defence of the European Union by 2030 - <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/european-defence-63008/article/a-strategic-compass-to-strengthen-the-security-and-defence-of-the-european> (10.25.2022)

20 Politique de défense française - <https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/defense/lpm1995.htm> (10.25.2022)

21 Common Security and Defence Policy as France's Winning Strategy - <https://journals.lka.lt/journal/lasr/article/599/info> (10.20.2022)

22 France and Germany Towards Security and Defence Integration: Same Goal, Different Approaches - <https://finabel.org/france-and-germany-towards-security-and-defence-integration-same-goal-different-approaches/> (10.30.2022)

Great Britain (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Britain has never aimed to develop the EU's security policy or strategy to fit its interests. However, 1998 was a turning point when France and Britain presented a bilateral declaration. The declaration emphasized the need to develop autonomous military capabilities within the EU, leading to some tactical changes in British policy. In the first part of this discussion, I will focus on the situation before Brexit (until 2020), and in the second part, I will review the post-Brexit period.

In 2002, Britain conducted a review of its security and defense policy, prompted by the inadequacy of European military capabilities during the Kosovo operation. However, unlike France, Great Britain has a closer political and military partnership with the USA, which made it impossible for Britain to ignore the USA's strategic plans for Europe. Therefore, Britain's approach to the EU is intriguing.

According to the researchers, the British government used the political and security structures of the EU to lead its policies in different ways. "The British government utilized EU structures for political and security leadership, and to obtain financial benefits for national policies." Although this statement may seem exaggerated, it has logical arguments to support it. The British government utilized EU structures for political and security leadership, and to obtain financial benefits for national policies.²³

Britain adopts a pragmatic approach towards its security policy with the EU. If the EU aims to enhance military cooperation, then it can work in collaboration with France, and if the goal is to strengthen security policy, then Britain can cooperate with Germany. Britain analyzes the specific objectives of continental European countries and the EU, and based on that, it formulates action plans.²⁴

From a strategic perspective, Britain has a special relationship with the US and it remains a key security partner. In addition, Britain is striving to prevent the EU from confronting NATO and to maintain balance in Europe. During the negotiations, Britain constantly tries to balance the interests of the member states while also maintaining a "special relationship" with the USA. This balancing act serves as a "connecting bridge" in Europe-US relations. The reason behind this balanced behavior is quite clear: the stronger Britain is in terms of security in Europe, the more attractive it is to the United States, and therefore, the more leverage it can gain from its relationship with the United States.²⁵

Tony Blair (Anthony Charles Lynton Blair - Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007) proposed a new world order for British security, which he called "The Doctrine of the International Community". According to Blair, this doctrine was focused on human rights and democracy, which he believed to be the primary pillars of sovereignty.

The concept laid the groundwork for a Western values agenda that aligned with the EU's human rights and security principles. However, Britain's new pro-European stance, in response to globalization, caused domestic unrest. Blair's confidence in British political life dropped significantly due to the Iraq war, leading to his resignation. It is worth noting Blair's stance on the Kosovo conflict. He believed that member states should intervene with military capabilities instead of relying solely on Washington. On the other hand, the Bosnian war was not seen as a threat to national interests, and the only significant decision was the implementation of humanitarian missions.²⁶

Great Britain officially left the European Union on February 1, 2020. Subsequently, negotiations have been launched between the UK and the EU member states in the areas of foreign, security, and defense policy. Both parties are working towards understanding the framework for future cooperation and taking into account the unique characteristics of their partnership.

It's important for the United Kingdom to decide on its level of involvement in the foreign and security policies developed by the European Union and how much it can pursue national policies that differ from the existing EU policy portfolio. There are three possible scenarios for future foreign, security, and defense relations between the UK and the EU: integrated player, associated partner, and observer.²⁷

Integrated player (actor) - After leaving the EU, the United Kingdom is no longer a member of the Foreign Relations Council, the Council of Europe, the Political and Security Committee, and the working groups. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom can still participate, with a special status, in the process of developing the EU's foreign and security policy, for example, in the form of the EU+1 agreement. Great Britain has the opportunity to participate in the Council on Foreign Relations on the

23 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest* (palgrave macmillan, 2009), 97-134.

24 Never-ending divorce: The role of UK-EU security cooperation after Brexit - <https://ecfr.eu/article/never-ending-divorce-the-role-of-uk-eu-security-cooperation-after-brexit/> (10.23.2022)

25 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom Security in an interdependent world - https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228539/7291.pdf (10.30.2022)

26 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009 Security for the Next Generation - https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229001/7590.pdf (10.30.2022)

27 A Secure Brexit? UK Security and Defense and the Decision to Leave the European Union - <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/secure-brexit-uk-security-and-defense-and-decision-leave-european-union-0> (10.30.2022)

relevant issues of the agenda (with the precedent of the participation of the US Secretary of State and the UN Secretary General), in the work of the PSC and its working groups.²⁸

The United Kingdom will continue to meet its existing commitments to ongoing CSDP military and civilian operations and will participate in future missions. It will also maintain its existing obligation to provide a battle group to the EU. The United Kingdom may also have associate membership status of the European Defense Agency; participate in projects in a specific case; be granted observer status in the agency’s governing board. Under this agreement, the UK’s diplomatic and military capabilities will be integrated with the EU’s foreign and security policy and common security and defense policy for mutual benefit.²⁹

Associated partner - The concept of an associated partner relationship with the EU’s foreign and security policy can be exemplified by Norway’s case. In this type of agreement, the UK would be invited by the EU to participate in developing policy declarations and join in various areas of action, such as sanctions. Cooperation in security policy will be carried out through “dialogues” that will take place between ministers, directors, and working groups. Additionally, the UK has the option to participate in CSDP operations and sign an Administrative Agreement with the European Defense Agency (EDA) to enable its participation in EDA initiatives. Furthermore, like Norway, the United Kingdom may also participate in the EU battlegroup.

Observer – According to this model, the UK would be separate from the EU’s foreign and security policy both politically and organizationally. If Great Britain chooses to continue relations with the status of an “observer,” it will be formally disconnected from the foreign and security policy of the European Union. However, the UK may still benefit from bilateral cooperation with EU member states. In the area of Common Security and Defense (CSDP), the UK may adopt the practices of the US. While the US has not taken part in EU military missions, it has been collaborating on crisis management with the EU since 2011 through its signature.

	<i>Battlegroups</i>	<i>European Defense Agency</i>	<i>Working groups</i>	<i>Policy and Security Committee</i>	<i>Military and Civil Operations</i>	<i>Membership of the Foreign Affairs Council</i>
Integrated	Yes	Association Member	No	Special Status	Yes	Special Status
Associate Partner	Invited Participant	According to the agreement	No	No	According to the agreement	No
Observer	No	No	No	No	Civil only	No

Table N 1.

After leaving the European Union, Great Britain actively started negotiations with the European Union on defense and security policy issues. The European Union and Great Britain signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) to establish a new relationship between them. The agreement covers various policy areas such as energy, transport, and fishing, but foreign policy and security were excluded from the negotiations at the request of the UK government. As a result, the existing legal framework considers any UK involvement or participation in the EU’s defense and security structures as that of a “third party”. The negotiations in February 2020 did not include any cooperation or discussion on foreign security and defense policy. The negotiating directives clearly stated that such areas “do not require an institutionalized relationship”.³⁰

The UK is planning to shift its approach, moving away from its previous focus on maintaining the post-Cold War rules-based international order. The country has bigger plans and goals in mind. According to British strategic thinking, the European Union institutions have bound Britain and prevent-

28 Brexit: defence, security and immigration - <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/eu-referendum/defence-security-and-immigration/> (10.30.2022)

29 ib.,

30 Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+ - <https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Dahrendorf/Dahrendorf-Martill-Sus-BJPIR.pdf> (10.22.2022)

ed it from playing an important role in the world, as it has in the past centuries. Therefore, Britain's 2030 strategic goals emphasize the protection of democracy, human rights, and global security, both in Europe and worldwide.³¹

This new strategy suggests that Britain will likely rebalance its security efforts towards national security and international obligations. However, the country remains committed to safeguarding European security and strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is the basis of UK defense policy.

The United Kingdom is actively involved in frequent military exercises with its European allies and key NATO partners in Eastern Europe such as Ukraine and Georgia. It also has significant bilateral defense treaties with specific European countries, with its most significant treaty being the one with France. The Franco-British Joint Expeditionary Force is a result of this bilateral agreement and it allows for a wide range of joint Franco-British intervention scenarios.

During the UK's membership in the EU, it agreed to certain commitments regarding the EU's common foreign and security policy. The October 2019 Political Declaration, which accompanied the Withdrawal Agreement, outlined the UK and the EU's views on supporting ambitious, close, and long-term security cooperation while acknowledging that any future cooperation must respect the "strategic and security interests" of both parties. It remains unclear how the UK plans to develop cooperation in the field of security and defense.

Great Britain has expressed its willingness to participate in security programs and instruments developed by the European Union which are directly related to British security interests. One example of such cooperation is Britain's active collaboration with the European Union in enhancing the military and economic capabilities of Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that Britain calls on the European Union and its member states to increase their support and take more action towards strengthening Ukraine's military and economic resources.

Having a set of formal agreements enabling relevant coordination is a necessity for British defense and security cooperation. Such a relationship would be underpinned by regular consultation and coordination between the UK and the EU on all aspects of foreign policy and security.

In the field of defense and security cooperation, the EU has established robust legal frameworks, programs, and assets such as economic sanctions, legal cooperation, and law enforcement. However, the UK has declined to accept this legally and instead prefers formal agreements. Despite no longer being a member of the European Council, the UK and the EU are expected to have shared interests in various aspects of their foreign and security policies.³²

The United Kingdom is highly interested in maintaining close cooperation with other European countries, especially France and Germany, regarding foreign and security issues. One of Britain's primary objectives is to establish strong collaboration in security and defense matters with EU member states and European allies. For Britain, it is crucial to ensure security on the European continent and assert its leadership role in this process, which is also significant on the global stage.

NATO remains a central pillar of UK defense policy but Britain is also eager to see the EU's common security and defense policy focused on strengthening the European pillar within NATO and building a European defense identity around that pillar.

The United Kingdom is committed to collaborating with European countries on security and defense matters in special coalitions that operate outside Europe. Although the UK is willing to participate in meaningful foreign policy cooperation, its leaders are likely to be hesitant about proposals for a new comprehensive institutional framework, and they will resist any initiatives that threaten existing cooperation, especially with NATO. In general, the UK will work together with the EU on security and defense issues, but only if it is in its national interest.

Germany (Federal Republic of Germany)

"Germany's foreign and security policy over the last few decades has been characterized by stability, continuity, and pragmatism, it is a reliable and predictable process involving high-ranking politicians, and most importantly, foreign and security policy is related to the values and interests of the German population, however it is not static. Germany's foreign and security policy always reacts to important issues in the international environment" - Guido Westerwelle

For almost five decades, Guido Westerwelle's explanation of German Foreign and Security Policy has been a reflection of its nature and ambitions. Since the time of Bismarck, tactical combinations and stability have been the hallmarks of German foreign and security policy. This policy greatly influences the EU's foreign and security policy standards. Germany is responsible not only for the transformation

31 National Security Strategy - <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-security-strategy> (10.22.2022)

32 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy - https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf (10.22.2022)

of member states' foreign and security policies but also for how they represent and identify their preferences and interests. Germany has integrated its international security policy identity into the European security framework, establishing shared values and norms of behavior. Notably, Germany seeks to connect its national security interests with the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations. In recent years, Germany has taken a prominent role in shaping security in Europe. The EU's CSDP serves as the primary security platform for Germany to implement specific preferences.³³

Germany's emergence as a significant player in foreign and security policies is of great interest due to its historical behavior in this context. After World War II and the Cold War, Germany's commitment to European integration was based on reconciliation with former enemies and the consolidation of a strong European Union (EU) for political and economic integration on the continent. Since then, German leaders have used the EU as the primary political and economic platform through which Germany plays a significant role in international relations.

During the early and mid-1990s, German foreign policy was aimed at promoting the integration of Eastern Europe into the European Union. According to analysts, Germany's foreign and security policy was an attempt to suppress its reputation and fears resulting from the aftermath of World War II. Germany took on great responsibility for the integration and development of the EU and made efforts to resolve various political and economic crises.

Germany wanted to convince its neighbors and partners that unification would not threaten the peace and stability of Europe, and the trajectory of change in Germany in the post-unification period was dramatic. Germany also tried together with the EU member states to solve the main security challenges on the European continent, which arose as a result of the breakup of Yugoslavia and then Russia's aggressive and expansionist policy in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, 2022). In the past, Russia has initiated large-scale hostilities with both Georgia and Ukraine, resulting in the loss of many innocent lives and the occupation of additional territories. In response to the unstable security environment created in Eastern Europe, Germany has taken on a mediating role in negotiations with Russia. Germany's involvement and activism in the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) have been crucial in institutional development and effectiveness.³⁴

Germany has also created a space for security maneuvers in Europe for member states that can reconcile national interests and EU views and develop a common security strategic plan. Germany has also called on member states to support the EU's deployment of military forces abroad, a decision that highlights the most interesting aspect of the evolution of German foreign policy over the past two decades. Germany's default position remains a multilateralist and partnership-based approach to foreign policy aimed at developing a security and defense policy.

According to some analysts, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (German Chancellor from October 27, 1998 to November 22, 2005) was eager to align the security and defense interests of the EU and Germany and develop a unified strategic plan. Merkel (Germany's first female chancellor from November 22, 2005, to December 8, 2021) has continued this trend, and she has also shown a willingness for Germany to play a more active security role in Europe.³⁵

German and EU security policy under Merkel reflects a strong enthusiasm for EU enlargement and a fair amount of skepticism about several aspects of European market integration. Germany, however, supports deeper European integration in security fields and was a strong proponent of the proposed EU constitutional treaty. German leaders have been actively promoting the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Germany has played an important role in Middle East politics, working closely with the USA, and has served as a mediator in various crises. Germany has also been instrumental in developing relations with Russia while providing financial and political assistance to Eastern European states. Additionally, Germany has cooperated in security issues, making significant contributions to the overall stability of the region.³⁶

The Russian Federation plays an important role in the European Union's security strategy. However, the Ukraine-Russia war of 2022 demonstrated that Russia remains a threat to the Eastern European states. Therefore, the European Union needs to take more effective steps to address this issue. Germany has already increased its defense budget by 100 billion euros, and it is crucial for the EU to have a state that can play a significant role in negotiating with Russia. Germany is an ideal candidate for this role as it constantly strives to ensure that the European Union does not feel threatened by Russia

33 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest* (palgrave macmillan, 2009), 138-165

34 Laura Chappell, *Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy Converging Security and Defence Perspectives in an Enlarged EU* (University of Surrey, UK, 2012), 35-40.

35 National Security Strategy - <https://www.bmvg.de/en/national-security-policy> (10.30.2022)

36 Towards the National Security Strategy - the process - <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/nationale-sicherheitsstrategie> (10.22.2022)

during negotiations. However, negotiations have stopped recently, and Russia is issuing ultimatums and calling on the West to make certain concessions, which greatly undermines the EU's security strategy.³⁷

Angela Merkel's security strategy was centered around fostering close bilateral relationships with Eastern European countries in the military, economic, and political spheres. She also sought to assure Eastern European states that Germany's cordial relationship with Russia did not pose a threat to European unity and security. In addition to its ties with Russia, Germany also provided critical financial assistance to Eastern European countries, enabling them to become competitive powers in the region and avoid falling under Russia's sphere of influence. (For instance, Germany aided Georgia and Ukraine in their efforts to join NATO and the European Union by creating specific formats and programs that provided these countries with valuable assistance both economically and politically.)

Negotiating a new EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement was one of Germany's main goals during its EU presidency in early 2007. However, Merkel interrupted the negotiations in a certain process, because Russia's demands and views gradually contradicted the EU's security policy. Some observers and Eastern European leaders saw it as an important confirmation of Merkel's commitment to European unity in foreign policy.

Olaf Scholz assumed the position of Chancellor of Germany on December 8, 2021, succeeding Angela Merkel. However, just two months after taking office, on February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine. Within minutes, air and missile strikes began across Ukraine, including in the capital city of Kyiv. This was followed by a ground invasion from multiple directions, marking another aggressive and expansionist policy by Russia towards Ukraine. Despite this, Russian propaganda media continues to refer to it as a "special military operation". Given the difficult situation that Scholz inherited³⁸, it's challenging to assess his policy and approach towards Russia. Nonetheless, it's worth noting some of Scholz's comments and evaluations regarding the Russia-Ukraine war.³⁹

During a pre-election meeting of the Social Democratic Party in Essen, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Russia has damaged the entire world by attacking Ukraine. He further added that the ongoing war worsens the global economic and social problems that have arisen due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Scholz emphasized that the destruction caused by this conflict transcends beyond the borders of Russia and Ukraine, potentially impacting the future of the entire world.⁴⁰

As the chancellor pointed out, Putin is following the imperialist vision of previous centuries, but he has miscalculated. Scholz, in a recent statement, mentioned that Ukraine will receive aid now as well as in the future. He also highlighted that the democratic countries swiftly reacted by imposing strict sanctions on Russia. Scholz pointed out that the actions of the Russian President not only bring chaos to Ukraine but also threaten the future of Russia. According to him, President Putin is making a grave mistake. Additionally, Scholz promised that every possible measure would be taken to end the war and restore peace in Europe, where borders will be respected and never violated again.⁴¹

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz accused Russia of waging an "imperialist" war against Ukraine and pledged "strong" support for Kiev to defend its sovereignty. Olaf Scholz, who addressed the Crimean Platform summit via video conference, said that the Ukrainian people had shown extraordinary courage to defend their country.⁴²

"Ukrainians are appreciated all over the world for their tenacity and courage. They reject a world where the word of the strong goes, not of law, where big powers can swallow up small states if they want." German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said, emphasizing that Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and recent attempts to occupy more Ukrainian territory are a clear violation of international law, adding: "We want to reiterate that the international community will never accept Russia's illegal, imperialist annexation of Ukrainian territory."

During the meeting, Scholz expressed Germany's condemnation of Russia's attempt to integrate parts of Ukraine's territory forcefully. He emphasized that "any fake referendum or other attempt to change the status of parts of Ukraine's territory will never be recognized." Scholz also assured the authorities in Kyiv that "the German government will continue to provide financial and military assis-

37 National Security Strategy The National Security Strategy: providing guidance in the face of current and foreseeable security challenges - <https://www.bmvg.de/en/national-security-policy> (10.22.2022)

38 EUROPE POLITICS Putin must recognize he cannot win Ukraine war, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz says at UN - <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/21/putin-must-recognize-he-cannot-win-ukraine-war-olaf-scholz-says-at-un.html> (10.22.2022)

39 German foreign and security policy after Merkel - <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/german-foreign-and-security-policy-after-merkel> (10.22.2022)

40 Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz faces growing criticism over handling of Ukraine war - <https://www.euronews.com/2022/04/22/germany-s-chancellor-olaf-scholz-faces-growing-criticism-over-handling-of-ukraine-war> (10.22.2022)

41 Scholz: Putin started war for 'completely absurd' reasons - <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-scholz-says-putin-started-war-for-completely-absurd-reasons/a-62880926> (10.22.2022)

42 Ukraine war: Olaf Scholz says Vladimir Putin does not see war as mistake - <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62907923> (10.22.2022)

tance to Ukraine”. He stated that Germany would continue to supply weapons, including modern air defense systems, missile launchers, new anti-drone weapons, and tons of ammunition.⁴³

The new Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, holds a more rigid and direct policy towards Russia compared to his predecessors. He has highlighted important issues and is expected to pursue a more pragmatic and firm policy towards Russia. However, it is too early to make assumptions, and only time will tell. The Russia-Ukraine war has also affected Germany’s internal politics, as Scholz has approved a new budget for the Bundeswehr, which has significantly increased compared to previous years. He has also initiated the modernization and improvement of the defense forces. Previously, pro-Russian politicians had dominated the German political elite, but the results and course of the war have brought changes. After the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, Germany will most likely increase its efforts to strengthen the security and defense policy of the European Union, both economically and politically as well as militarily.⁴⁴

Since the unification, Germany has emerged as the main supporter of the common security and defense policy of the European Union. This has been possible due to international events and the political situation within Europe. Germany aimed to develop a security policy that would allow member states to work together on security issues and pool their defense resources. To achieve this, the EU needed a strong state partner that could play the role of a mediator in member states. Germany has been able to represent this kind of state. The country holds significant political power within the European Union, which is essential for the development of security and defense policy. Ultimately, it can be said that the European Union has placed its hopes on Germany for the development of a common security and defense policy.⁴⁵

The turning point for Germany was the Balkan military conflicts in Europe, where the ineffectiveness of the security of the European Union and European states was highlighted. Germany’s involvement in security and defense policy has intensified since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, due to the development of civilian and military crisis management capabilities and the refinement of police training. Germany actively participates in EU military and civilian missions: in Bosnia, Kosovo, the coast of Somalia, and Afghanistan. It has also carried out four police operations, which are currently supervised by the European Union. Germany is particularly cautious about military operations between the EU and NATO. Germany’s goal is for the common security and defense policy of the European Union to be a “complement” to NATO, not a “substitute.” To this end, Germany supports formal agreements between NATO and the EU aimed at avoiding duplication of NATO structures, such as the so-called “Berlin Plus” agreement, which allows the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities for operations conducted by the EU.⁴⁶

Germany is a well-organized democratic state where decision-making and developing security policies is a challenging process. German democracy is characterized by strong democratic control and legitimacy of security and defense policies. It is crucial to obtain this legitimacy from Germany’s domestic political institutions during all phases of military and civilian operations. Democratic control of the military apparatus is strongly emphasized in Germany, as the country has a historical heritage based on the experience of the period from 1933-1941.⁴⁷

The German Parliament has a unique system in Europe, where it has the right to approve the sending of military personnel to a mission. The Parliament not only issues a mandate for the start of military operations but also checks the legitimacy of a particular military operation. The Parliament has the authority to approve the mandate and mission procedures beforehand, as well as implement control mechanisms during the operation’s implementation. The German Constitution prohibits the sending of German military personnel abroad and engaging in any military operation, which requires the German government to take authority from the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court. The court decides whether the government’s request to send German troops abroad is legitimate or not.⁴⁸

To summarize, German foreign and security policy can be divided into two main directions: pre- and post-Russo-Ukraine war. It is difficult to analyze the ongoing war, but it is clear that Ukraine will become a strong actor in the creation of Eastern European security architecture once the war ends.

43 Macron, Scholz and Draghi meet Zelenskyy in Kyiv during historic visit - <https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-scholz-draghi-kyiv-visit-zelenskyy-ukraine/> (10.22.2022)

44 Germany’s new national security strategy - <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/germanys-new-national-security-strategy/> (10.22.2022)

45 A Security Strategy for Germany - https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/90089/Security_Strategy_Germany.pdf (10.25.2022)

46 Arm for the storm: Germany’s new security strategy - <https://ecfr.eu/article/arm-for-the-storm-germanys-new-security-strategy/> (10.25.2022)

47 German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications - <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL34199.pdf> (10.25.2022)

48 Germany’s security strategy in the making - <https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/germanys-security-strategy-making> (10.25.2022)

According to the current situation, it is best to consider the ongoing process and official comments and decisions of the German Chancellor to conclude what role Germany will play in the future security of Europe. On August 10, 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Berlin had provided Kiev with highly effective weapons that have changed the fighting situation in Eastern Ukraine. He made this announcement at a joint conference with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid in Berlin.

In the ongoing battle in the east, Ukraine is relying on weapons such as howitzers and others to make advancements, as per Scholz. Additionally, Germany has agreed to provide Ukraine with more Iris-T air defence systems. While Kiev has been requesting modern battle tanks from its Western allies, German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht has declined to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Lambrecht stated during the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) National Security Strategy Panel that no Western country has provided infantry fighting vehicles or tanks to Ukraine.⁴⁹

According to Scholz, Germany will continue to support Ukraine in collaboration with its partners. Initially, Germany was very cautious and restrained during the first weeks of the war. However, its position toward security changed dramatically as the war progressed. Along with the USA, Germany became the main supporter of Ukraine. Therefore, it can be said that Germany will play a significant role in Europe's security post-war, including creating and protecting its architecture. Germany has taken responsibility for the direction of security in Europe and is one of the main leaders, alongside Britain, in Europe.⁵⁰

Olaf Scholz delivered a highly interesting speech at the German Bundestag in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. He referred to the situation as a "Zeitenwende", or historical turning point, and announced that his government would significantly increase military spending, a departure from Germany's prior cautious defense policy. Scholz's speech was met with positive reactions from both German and international politicians and was also supported by opposition leader Friedrich Merz. As per Patrick Wintour, Scholz declared a "180-degree turn of course" in defense and security policy.⁵¹

Germany is poised to become a significant player in the process of creating and implementing the European Union and European security due to the Zeitenwende. According to Germany's strategic security thinking, the conflict with Russia is already occurring in the geopolitical environment of Europe. This environment is characterized by great power competition and systemic rivalry between the USA and Russia-China. The emergence of rival blocs poses an existential challenge for Germany, as its export-oriented economy is highly dependent on ongoing globalization. In the first stage, Germany will have to abandon certain cautious policies and principles that it has long defended. This includes, first of all, the idea of the so-called European peace dividend. Another principle is based on the belief in the beneficial and democratizing effects of economic interdependence with autocracies such as Russia and China. The massive energy crisis is showing Germans how dangerous it is to rely on just one actor in a strategically important area. Russia has turned this dependence into a means of hybrid warfare.

The purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and the establishment of a powerful air base signify a significant shift in Germany's defense policy. Until recently, many researchers and politicians thought this was impossible. However, these measures should only serve as the beginning of a comprehensive process to define Germany's security role in Europe and the world. Germany should determine what it can do and how it can contribute to the development of European and international security in this new reality. Germany recognizes that it is the strongest country in Europe in terms of security. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock argues that the national security strategy should be based on a comprehensive understanding of security. Previous strategic documents, such as the 2016 White Paper and the 2017 Guidelines titled "Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management, Peace Promotion," rely on a broad concept of security that encompasses not only politics and the military but also human, economic, and environmental factors.⁵²

At the national security strategy development launch event at the Federal Foreign Office on March 18, 2022, Baerbock emphasized the need for a concrete, clear, and comprehensive security strategy. Defining the priorities of the strategy is the main challenge. Without a strong Bundeswehr, Germany cannot be trusted to provide security. Therefore, one of the top priorities should be the modern-

49 Scholz joins Ukrainian soldiers training in Germany German chancellor pledges continued military support for Ukraine in war against Russia - <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/scholz-joins-ukrainian-soldiers-training-in-germany/2669352> (10.25.2022)

50 The service members are in Germany for training on Gepard tanks. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has vowed to send even more heavy weapons to Ukraine in the coming months. - <https://www.dw.com/en/scholz-meets-ukrainian-soldiers-training-in-germany/a-62927402> (10.25.2022)

51 Turn of phrase: Germany's Zeitenwende Scholz's Zeitenwende speech was widely viewed as a major adjustment to Germany's foreign and security policy. But, six months on, it is unclear whether the country is up to the task. - <https://ecfr.eu/article/turn-of-phrase-germanys-zeitenwende/> (10.25.2022)

52 Germany to buy 35 Lockheed F-35 fighter jets from U.S. amid Ukraine crisis - <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-decides-principle-buy-f-35-fighter-jet-government-source-2022-03-14/> (10.25.2022)

ization and increase of the Bundeswehr budget to enable it to play a leading role in the security and defense policy of both NATO and the European Union. A strong Bundeswehr is crucial for defense in the EU.⁵³

The idea of European and EU sovereignty must guide the strategy process. Germany's ruling parties have made this principle a part of their coalition agreement. According to their interpretation, European sovereignty involves creating and maintaining the military capabilities of Europe and the EU, as well as acting independently to protect their interests and values. Germany also wants to enable the EU to make its own decisions within an interdependent international system and implement them in a more competitive geopolitical environment, even when faced with opposition.⁵⁴

It is becoming increasingly clear that the European Union and its member states are not equipped to deal with crises and conflicts using only conventional military force, especially when faced with a formidable adversary like Russia. However, there is an understanding that interdependent relationships between European states can be leveraged to create a strong security and defense policy in coordination with the EU.

It is finally time for Germany to take the lead in securing Europe. As the country with the largest population and the strongest economy at the heart of the continent, Germany's armed forces must play a central role in Europe's conventional defense. They should be equipped with the best technology and resources available, making them the most capable force in Europe.⁵⁵

Conclusion

The most influential countries in the European Union's security and defense policy are Germany, France, and Britain. They lead the European security system. While Britain and France played a vital role in establishing security, Germany was the key player who cooperated and partnered with both. Germany showed willingness for shared leadership, both politically and economically, which became a turning point in the establishment of security. Together, the three countries launched joint security and defense initiatives that were significant from the beginning to the formation of the European Union Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).⁵⁶

In 1999, Germany played a crucial role in the formation of the ESDP/CSDP after the St. Malo meeting. Over the years, the most high-profile collaboration has been the E3+3 negotiation process with Iran regarding its nuclear program. This negotiation led to the formation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Officials believed that if the Big Three (Britain, France, Germany) reached an agreement among themselves, the chances of success would be high." The process of negotiations and agreement has become more complicated since Britain is no longer a member state of the European Union. National interests play a vital role in the development of security policy, making the process even more difficult. It is easier to reach an agreement with one partner than with two partners simultaneously, especially if they are equally powerful. While it may be easier to agree with Luxembourg on some issues, it is more challenging to reach a consensus between France and Germany on certain matters.⁵⁷

Cooperation and partnership between countries depend largely on frequent and intensive contacts between their foreign and defense ministries, as well as at the highest levels of government. There are institutionalized and semi-institutionalized formats of interaction, such as the Franco-German Security Policy Council, which was announced in February 2014 after the first deployment of Franco-German brigade elements to the EU mission.⁵⁸

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been successful in fostering cooperation and partnership, particularly between France, Germany, and the other big players. The establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the EU Battlegroups were important steps in achieving this cooperation, as was the inclusion of the Mechanism for Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of Defense (PESCO) in the Treaty of Lisbon. The concept of the battle group was first introduced in 2003 after a small EU force was deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Operation Ar-

53 Towards the National Security Strategy - the process - <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/nationale-sicherheitsstrategie> (10.25.2022)

54 Drafting the National Security Strategy: Conclusion of the citizens' forum in Erfurt with Foreign Minister Baerbock - <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/national-security-strategy/2554354> (10.25.2022)

55 Germany presents new national security strategy: The German government has pledged a one-off investment of €100 billion to modernize its armed forces following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. - <https://www.dw.com/en/german-foreign-minister-annalena-baerbock-presents-germanys-national-security-strategy/a-61169197> (10.25.2022)

56 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest (palgrave macmillan, 2009), 130-145.*

57 Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State (Oxford University Press, 2008), 55-60*

58 Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State (Oxford University Press, 2008), 60-70*

temis).⁵⁹

The joint initiative aimed to create a small and easily deployable rapid response force that can operate autonomously during crisis management operations. The objective was to improve the effectiveness of the EU in defense and security, with the development of battlegroups serving as a tool for achieving wider goals. These examples demonstrate how Germany, France, and Britain are collaborating to promote specific initiatives or policy objectives in the CSDP, particularly in the areas of security and defense.⁶⁰

Small EU member states often face resource constraints that limit their participation in the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) working groups and committees. Germany and France benefit from relatively rich resources, including qualified personnel and access to information, which provide them with certain structural advantages. They are able to fully represent and articulate their views and perspectives⁶¹ in all policy and issue areas. Germany, in particular, is adept at supporting and accommodating the security interests of small states. Meanwhile, France is highly focused on enhancing the EU's role and significance in security and defense matters. Therefore, the support and involvement of Germany in EU security and defense policy is crucial for the Eastern European states.⁶²

The "Big Three" countries within the EU have different approaches to security and defense. France wants to strengthen the EU's military resources and increase its autonomy, while Britain, as a non-member state, wants to work with NATO to create a security and defense architecture in Europe. Germany, as the country with the largest population and economic power, is willing to take the lead in securing the continent. It sees its armed forces as the cornerstone of Europe's conventional defense and aims to have the best-equipped force in the region.⁶³

The guiding principle of the strategy process should be centered around the idea of European and EU sovereignty, which has been made a part of the coalition agreement of Germany's ruling parties. According to their interpretation, European sovereignty means creating and maintaining military capabilities, as well as acting independently to protect the interests and values of Europe and the EU. It is crucial to align the security interests of EU member states and the EU, and Germany's security and defense policy should be interconnected with the EU to act in unison. However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has revealed that Russia remains the primary threat to the European continent. The Russian governing body considers it acceptable to engage in military conflict with another sovereign country to achieve its goals. As such, the primary threat to the European Union and Europe is Russia. The next question that arises is who should act as a mediator from the EU in the negotiations with Russia.⁶⁴

The role of a mediator, based on multilateralism and protection of the interests of small states, is exemplified by Germany. The concept of Germany as a mediator has been explored in various contexts. For instance, Adomite (2000) developed the notion of a mediator or "bridge" in his study of German-Russian relations. In matters of foreign and security policy, EU decision-making is built around consensus-building, which is particularly useful to consider. Additionally, this policy area has traditionally been dominated by two states, France and Germany. As another "big" state, Germany feels ideally suited to play the role of mediator or balance. A member of the German Bundestag stated in Berlin that "we always respect the security policies of small states and protect their interests, making us natural mediators."⁶⁵

After the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, it is evident that the EU will face a significant loss of power in various aspects, including potential security and defense policy benefits. Although Great Britain is no longer part of the EU institutionally, it still maintains security relationships with EU member states. With the UK's departure, military cooperation with France and Germany could become one of the most constructive areas of collaboration between the UK and the EU. Following Britain's withdrawal from the EU, representatives of the 27 governments made specific commitments to enhance the security and defense policy of the European Union. EU foreign and defense ministers approved new proposals for EU security and defense policy based on practical Franco-German

59 Extraterritorial Collective Security: The European Union and Operation ARTEMIS - <https://academic.oup.com/book/2909/chapter-abstract/143547787?redirectedFrom=fulltext> (10.25.2022)

60 *ib.*,

61 German-French cooperation Article In terms of cooperation among the 27 EU member states, the German-French partnership holds a particularly prominent position because of its history, intensity and special institutional architecture. - <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europe/cooperation-in-europe/german-french-cooperation/228748> (10.25.2022)

62 Franco-German Defence and Security Cooperation - <https://academic.oup.com/book/34803/chapter-abstract/297656164?redirectedFrom=fulltext> (10.25.2022)


63 The United Kingdom's Joint Delegation to NATO is the link between the UK government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. - <https://www.gov.uk/world/uk-joint-delegation-to-nato> (10.25.2022)

64 Germany takes a new security and defence policy course together with its partners in the EU and NATO. - <https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/politics/security-and-defence-germany-eu-and-nato> (10.25.2020)

65 Germany and European Security and Defence Cooperation: The Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies? - <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26299640> (10.22.2022)

proposals. Currently, Britain is among the EU's main security and defense policy partners, and Franco-German relations are a significant pillar within the union. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council on nuclear weapons, France has a unique sense of responsibility for global security and is willing to act unilaterally if necessary. Germany, on the other hand, acts only in coalition with others.⁶⁶

France prioritizes making the EU security and defense policy more intergovernmental rather than focusing on symbolic integration in the future. The reason behind this is that for Paris, the EU is the ideal platform for carrying out military operations and missions. Strong collaboration between France and the UK is crucial for European security. This is not only due to their combined military power but also because it enables Europeans to contribute more to NATO, which is a priority for the UK, and act autonomously when necessary, which is a priority for France. Please refer to the graph below for a visual representation of the German-French-British security and defense policy compass.⁶⁷



Graph N 1.

It is hoped by the British government that the member states of the European Union will fulfill their defense promises after leaving the EU. There are three reasons to support this argument. Firstly, some EU operations are effective in addressing the security challenges faced by Europe. Relying solely on NATO is not a feasible option for Europeans, not because NATO is unreliable, but because it has to deal with bigger challenges across the globe.⁶⁸

The EU has carried out military operations beyond its territory, covering a vast geographical area from the Western Balkans to the Indian Ocean. The purpose of these operations is to combat piracy, terrorism, and human trafficking.⁶⁹

To improve their military capabilities and make better use of their defense budgets, Europeans need to take certain measures. For instance, EU institutions in Brussels can offer financial assistance for defense research, allow access to protected national markets for military procurement, and provide incentives for more efficient multinational equipment programs. By implementing these measures, both taxpayers and the military will benefit.⁷⁰

Thirdly, the EU and NATO need to enhance their practical cooperation to establish and safeguard the European security framework. Through the collaborative efforts of these two organizations, the entire continent of Europe can be ensured of its security. The EU and NATO can establish connections between internal police and intelligence networks and external military operations, providing a comprehensive approach to security.

Following Britain's exit from the EU, there will be closer alignment of European security and military cooperation with the national priorities of Germany, France, and Britain, while EU and NATO work towards synchronization of their relations. In Europe, military cooperation is primarily led by national governments. Countries collaborate more closely through regional formats such as Baltic, Nordic, and Visegrad (Central Europe) cooperation. Ultimately, the Germany-France-Britain relationship

66 Strategic autonomy and European security after Brexit - <https://www.iris-france.org/135189-strategic-autonomy-and-european-security-after-brexit/> (10.22.2022)

67 France and the European Security and Defence Policy: A leadership role among equals, Vol. 19, No. 2, Themenschwerpunkt: Auf dem Weg zu einer Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) (2001), - <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24231260> (10.24.2022)

68 How France, Germany, and the UK can build a European pillar of NATO - <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/how-france-germany-and-the-uk-can-build-a-european-pillar-of-nato/> (10.22.2022)

69 Three's company? France, Germany, the UK and European defence post-Brexit - <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/threes-company-france-germany-the-uk-and-european-defence-post-brexit/> (10.22.2022)

70 French Security and a British 'Continental Commitment' after the First World War: a Reassessment - <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41238643> (10.22.2022)

still forms the basis of European security and military cooperation, regardless of whether it is under the auspices of the European Union or NATO. The EU finds it easier to develop a security and defence policy when the “Big Three” have already agreed on certain issues and then rise to the level of EU institutions.⁷¹

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Historical, Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of Conflicts

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Abstract

The present paper deals with the scientific assessment of the origin, prevention and regulation of conflicts as one of the challenging problems in the world.

It is common knowledge that conflicts are the concomitant phenomena of human relations and are defined by both subjective and objective attitudes. The study of conflicts dates back to ancient times. In Western science, it is also considered a means of development. Considering these facts, we have discussed and analyzed the opinions of the English philosophers and sociologists along with the standpoints of various scholars like R. Park, L. Coser, G. Simmel, R. Dahrendorf, A. Adler, Z. Freud, etc.

The present paper discusses the nature, types, and management techniques of conflict as well as the key influencing factors to be taken into account when diagnosing the conflict.

In addition, the papers emphasize the crucial importance of negotiations as the best means of communication and the contributing factor to conflict regulation, and draws a parallel between the two relationships - **conflict regulation** and **conflict elimination** (when talking about the ways of conflict resolution) that may lay the foundation for a new conflict in the future.

The paper provides examples of the development of violent conflict in a non-communicative, unstable, unjust, frightening and extremely negative emotional background that causes severe mental trauma and pain and is passed on to the next generation (For example, the Civil War in Georgia, Conflicts of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia, Russo-Georgian War in August, 2008, etc.).

Within the framework of the paper, we considered it necessary to analyze **peace** as the opposite event of conflict and discussed the concept of “dynamic stability” based on the example of August War in Georgia. When approaching the issue of a conflict situation, we identified four types of attitudes: conflict management, resolution, transformation and complete elimination, where the specific conflict situation and environment must be taken into account (For example, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 that was an open conflict resulted in the death and displacement of lots of people). We have noted that such conflicts require both settlement and resolution.

Thus, scientific assessment of the conflict helps to identify optimal management options. Considering the situational analysis is an important factor for eliminating the local conflicts, so that it does not spiral into a conflict of systemic nature.

Keywords:

conflict, violence, regulation, elimination, transformation, peace.

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Introduction

Conflict is the disruption caused by differing thoughts, wants or ideas. This can be good or bad depending on the type of conflict. Conflict can be broken down into four types: interpersonal, intrapersonal, intergroup and intragroup³. These four types of conflict fit into two general fields: internal and external conflict.

The study of conflicts dates back to ancient times, and conflict as such is frequently considered a tool for development. For example, some of the English philosophers and sociologists regarded conflict as a phenomenon that contributed to the social development of society. In addition, both positive and negative role of conflict in society was identified.

We find the attempts of rational generalization of conflicts in the works of ancient and old-time scholars. Scholars of all times were interested in studying the conflict situations. Despite a long history of such interest and research, the process of “conflict” has not yet been fully studied and understood. The authors of the modern Chicago School of human relations believe that it is necessary to avoid conflicts and here, they emphasize the role of a manager as the principal resource of eliminating tensions between different groups. They also hold that effective organizational management and building healthy relationships prevent conflicts from spreading.

Main Part

One of the founders of the Chicago School and the author of the Social Psychology textbook **Robert Park** discusses the conflict among the basic forms of social interaction. American sociologist **Lewis Coser** considers conflict as an ideological manifestation. He is also the author of the theory of Positive Function of Conflict⁴.

In this regard, one should mention the work of **Georg Simmel** as the author of the functional theory of conflicts. In the 60s of the 20th century, the German scientist **Ralf Dahrendorf** came up with a discussion of social conflicts, which was later called the “Conflict Models in Society”.

Scholars distinguish between conflict and violence. In 1908, **Alfred Adler** formulated the theory of “aggression drive”. **Sigmund Freud** who also devoted his works to this issue later analyzed the “dual-nature” of human being and came to the conclusion that the individual combined two instincts - life and death instincts, i.e. love and destruction, aggression and violence.

After building the tribal and communal system along with the state formation, the manifestation of violence and aggression became stronger – in addition to subsistence needs, the need for leadership, power, etc. came into existence for human. In most cases, he fulfilled these needs by using forceful methods. A vivid example for this is considered to be the Spanish dynastic or Carlist Wars in the 19th century between the Spanish Bourbon dynasties.

Some of the scientists believed, that man was not considered an aggressor, but the concern for existence to fulfill his needs made him an aggressor. Over time, the population growth could not stand against this demand. Proceeding from this provision, conflict and aggression are inevitable concomitants of development. We can neither run away from nor avoid it. Hence, the main thing is to learn the techniques of how to manage, transform and turn it from a negative side into a positive one.

Conflict research is conducted deeply and thoroughly using the knowledge of various fields: politics, history, pedagogy, law, psychology, sociology, philosophy, military science, etc. Accordingly, there are several methods of conflict resolution: philosophical and social, organizational and social, individual, psychological, and so on.

When it comes to the conflict, the question of diagnosing it, i.e. which stage it belongs to, comes to the fore. Diagnosis involves sources of conflict, subjective and objective experiences of the parties, “fighting” methods, showing resistance, needs of contacts, interests, and so on. In conflict situations, crises are turning points since conflict develops and progresses. Conflict may involve a person, group or a system as a whole. The opposing parties can resolve the conflict themselves according to their hopes, expectations, and terms. It may be provoked by the party with a subjective reason that maintains the tension.

When defining the nature of a conflict situation, understanding the problem adequately by each party helps to eliminate this confrontation. When diagnosing a conflict, it is quite difficult to have a subjective factor involved. Here the main thing is to determine the key factors such as defining and identifying the conflict and its participants, interests, background, positions and their role in the emergence and development of the conflict as well as conducting the negotiations.

At the initial stage, it is important to take the nature of conflict emergence into consideration. It

³ <https://study.com/learn/lesson/what-is-conflict-sources-types.html>

⁴ Summary of “The Functions of Social Conflict”, <https://www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/coser-functions>

is not necessarily significant for it to be related to the basic essence of the problem. At the second stage, the key participants of the conflict are identified, including the entire groups or organizations, political party, government, opposition, outside forces, state, etc. In situations like this, negotiation is of crucial importance as the best means of communication and helps to handle the conflict since it covers many areas.

Scholars also talk about various methods of managing conflicts, and therefore there are many ways and methods to resolve them. Among them, we can identify intrapersonal, structural, personal and other methods that are used to resolve individual, social, ethno-political, military and other types of conflicts.

It is obvious that the problem of analysis comes first in this situation. In terms of emergence and development of the conflict, which incorporates a combination of political, economic, inter-ethnic, territorial and other interests, it may start from a regional level and, in individual cases, spiral into a global one. Accordingly, hidden, superficial and open conflicts are identified. The best example of this was Abkhazia, which, historically, was not a conflict-free region and was characterized by all the aspects mentioned above.

Hidden conflict may have deep historical roots. That is why it is essential to find its causes and prevent and avoid its external manifestations.

Superficial conflict is not the one characterized by destructive effects. It can be caused by misunderstanding of the goals. In such cases, the solution depends on the effectiveness of communication.

When we talk about the ways of conflict resolution, it is necessary to draw a parallel between two relationships: a) **conflict regulation** that involves a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the conflict, and b) **conflict elimination** that may lay the foundation for a new conflict in the future. A conflict situation implies the emergence of new, serious problems as much as it implies its resolution.

Violent conflict evolves in a non-communicative, unstable, unjust, frightening and extremely negative emotional background that causes severe mental trauma and pain and is passed on to the next generation. It is characterized by the Boomerang Principle (For example, the Civil War in Georgia, Conflicts of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia, Russo-Georgian War in August, 2008, etc.).

Suppressing the conflict by violent ways prevents the members of society from thinking properly, establishing relationships and pursuing activities. For example, let's consider the conflict between Russia and Georgia. The majority of social groups believe that historically Russia has always treated Georgia illegally, oppressing and devastating the country. Similar precedents still exist today. Such injustice cannot be easily forgotten as it is determined by the psychological factor: fear and the will to take revenge. When such factors impede conflict resolution and the confrontation moves from the individual scale to the national one, force is likely to be used. Suppressed conflicts often provide fertile ground to different types of policy makers and adventurers. They try to use the support of the oppressed to gain influence.

There are some exceptions as well when suppression of the conflict is necessary if provoked by a certain group and threatens the national identity, the state constitution and the interests of wider population.

The use of force, without doing harm to people, is only justified to liberate them from authoritarian and repressive regimes. It is there where torture of people and restriction of rights take place. There are some social groups who believe that the use of force is not admissible in any situation. For example, the exiled Tibetan leaders who follow Dalai Lama are committed to the principle of the non-use of force and are thus adapting to China's occupation of Tibet. A similar situation takes place in an armed confrontation between Palestine and Israel where force is often used against people despite being seen as supporters. It is difficult to fully protect human life in a hostile environment, in spite of many international agreements.

The use of total force and total non-violence are both extremes. There is also a golden ratio between them - non-violent but active demonstrations: movements for human rights, women's rights, religious minorities, anti-nuclear, anti-global, environmental protection, etc.

As far as we are aware, peace is the opposite to force. In fact, there is no such thing as absolute peace. Various social, economic, and political changes are constantly taking place. Peace becomes valuable once we lose it. Conflict can take violent and non-violent forms, and in order to denote the latter the Oxfam (international development and aid organization in the United Kingdom) office established the concept of 'dynamic stability'⁵. Everyone ranging from the individual to the highest authorities of the government should try to keep, maintain and build peace. For example, in August 2008, various international and government organizations were involved to help the local government in building the houses for the population displaced as a result of the war. They were able to engage the population affected by the conflict into joint activities and contribute to peace building (ownership and maintenance of the houses).

⁵ <https://www.oxfam.org/en/what-we-do/issues/conflicts-and-disasters>

When approaching the issue of a conflict situation, we can identify four types of attitudes towards it: conflict management, resolution, transformation and complete elimination.

Out of the four types of approaches to the conflict listed above, the one will be considered effective if it takes into account the national, historical and current situation. **Conflict management** involves weakening the power and emphasizing and promoting the positive actions of the conflict parties. This is a kind of prevention to avoid similar conflicts in the future or to make it a long and manageable process.

Conflict resolution involves finding and likely eliminating the root causes of the conflict, showing each cause to the opposite parties and making them understand these sources. This process helps to resolve the conflict and establish long-term and desirable relationships. Essentially, it is associated with open conflicts.

Conflict transformation involves turning negative attitudes into positive changes, which requires long-term diplomatic efforts.

Complete elimination of the conflict is actually impossible. A specific conflict situation and environment should be taken into account here. After reconciling the positions and ascertaining the truth, the conflict may disappear completely. This type of conflict is primarily manifested in interpersonal relationships. For example, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 was an open conflict resulted in the death and displacement of lots of people. Such conflicts require both settlement and resolution. After the end of the Kosovo War, the transformation of the conflict continued through long-term investments. This fact confirms that conflict regulation addresses different types of attitudes.

The causes of the conflict may be identity, public attitude, religious belief, culture, etc. In order to eliminate this kind of conflict, we'd like to address different theoretical approaches such as methods of communication and negotiations. It is preferable not to use any specific theory but to create a general combination. Conflict transformation is advisable for negative attitude if any. It is about building long-term relationships and improving mutual trust. It is desirable that culture and human relations should be widely involved in it.

When analyzing the conflict, it is necessary to identify objective and neutral attitudes. Here, personal experiences are of great importance and it is advisable to use them when developing the methods of conflict analysis. Conflict analysis helps us identify optimal management options. Considering the situational analysis is an important factor for liquidating the local conflicts, so that they do not spiral into a conflict of systemic nature. The development of situational analysis is significantly related to the study of methodological issues of the conflicts. Systemic approach is preferable to be used to regulate the conflicts. It is the way to effectively achieve your goal.

There are theories on conflict resolution in which the authors talk about the levers and factors that can lead to the resolution of conflicts and various types of confrontations. Among these theories, Johan Galtung's Positive and Negative Peace is an interesting one. It was first voiced in 1964 by the author claiming that there is negative peace, which is the absence of direct violence, the absence of war, and positive peace that implies the integration of humane society. According to this theory, examples of negative peace include multilateralism, arms control, international conventions, strategies for balance of power, etc., while examples of positive peace are the improvement of human relations through communication, peace education, cooperation, arbitrage, conflict management and so on⁶.

Admittedly, the theory of international conflicts identifies other effective methods of influencing the conflict parties, among which the following can be found:

- Humanitarian operations;
- Economic sanctions;
- Information operations;
- Settlement of the conflict by a peaceful political-diplomatic way with the involvement of a third party interested in conflict settlement;
- Conflict resolution by military intervention, etc.

Conclusion

Thus, the events throughout the world are rapidly changing, but the essential nature of politics remains the same. The struggle for order and justice as well as for power keeps going on.

In general terms, due to the nature of the conflict, its resolution and suppression is complicated by the fact that each party involved perceives the same problem in a different way. This is where a valid strategy should be developed to identify how the country should be engaged in order to prevent anticipated threats and conflicts. When developing a strategy, it is of paramount importance to involve qualified specialists to provide relevant recommendations.

It goes without saying that diplomacy played an important role in the development of the conflict

⁶ https://buildingpeaceforum.com/no/fred/Positive_Negative_peace.pdf

resolution strategy. In this case it was significant not to worry about the elimination of the conflict in general, but to find the root causes and prevent the conflict situation that reached peak level and entered a deadlocked state due to the failure of diplomacy.

Historically, diplomacy has never been a means of providing total victory or defeat. However, diplomatic course involves patience to win the hard-fought victory⁷.

Obviously, the political, economic and cultural changes in the world launched in the middle of the 20th century are the object of judgment by scientists, historians, political scientists, economists, sociologists, lawyers, philosophers and representatives of other disciplines. In this regard, special emphasis should be laid on the monographs, books, textbooks, letters, articles, etc. by the outstanding figures such as H. Kissinger, Z. Brzezinski, A. Giddens, J. Norberg, U. Beck, S. Helmer, P. Moreau, J. Rosenau, S. Huntington, H. Martin, I. Vasilenko, I. Wallerstein, F. Fukuyama, etc.

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Regulation of Oxygen Balance in The Process of Synthesis of Explosives

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Abstract

The role of explosives in the modern world is immeasurable, both in wartime and in peacetime. Accordingly, the optimization of their main blasting characteristics is of great importance, such as, detonation speed, workability, brisance, etc. They include the quantitative ratio of the chemical elements that make up these substances and its influence on the energy and ecology of the explosion, which is defined by „oxygen balance”.

Generally, the elemental composition and „architecture” of the molecules of substances, i.e. chemical structure, are the main determining factors of their physico-chemical characteristics. The same reasoning applies to explosives: basically, these two factors are the determinants of the energy of the explosion.

The article is about the possibilities of approaching zero oxygen balance in the process of synthesis of explosives. Examples of well-known poly nitro aromatic compounds and transformation products synthesized by us from them – CT compounds are discussed, as well as formulas of compounds with zero oxygen balance unknown in the literature and the procedure for their composition. It can be said with conviction that the specificity of organic synthesis and a wide scope of operation allow purposeful creation of explosive substances with zero oxygen balance. The article proposes the possibility of creating two such real methodologies.

Keywords:

explosives, oxidation, oxygen balance, „fuel” elements, endogenous oxygen, CT compounds, nitrates...

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Introduction

Explosion is an exclusive property of a certain group of substances, which is accompanied by the instantaneous release of „time-concentrated” energy. The main attribute of one of the types of this complex physical-chemical process - **chemical explosion**, is the fastest transformation of an **explosive** into gas products with high temperature and pressure, capable of performing certain work...

The elemental composition of explosive molecules and their „architecture”, that is, **chemical structure**, largely determines the peculiarities of the explosion course and its energy. These molecules usually contain carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen atoms. It is established that when blasting, the “fuel” elements - **carbon** and **hydrogen** are oxidized without interference of the atmospheric oxygen, by the “oxidizing element” - the **endogenous oxygen** contained in the explosive molecule. The quantitative ratio of the elements mentioned has the greatest impact on the economic and ecological sides of the explosion processes. **When this ratio is stoichiometric, then the energy of the explosion is maximum, and the ecology of the environment - protected.** At this time, **higher oxides** are obtained from the „fuel” elements - **carbon dioxide** and **water** (CO₂ and H₂O), and nitrogen is released in free form (N₂). None of them are poisonous³. The criterion for evaluating the above ratio is one of the most important parameters of the explosion - Oxygen Balance⁴.

Main Part

Essence of Oxygen Balance

Oxygen Balance (OB) generally is the **sufficient, excess or loss** amounts of endogenous oxygen required for complete oxidation of „fuel elements” in explosive molecules. It can be mathematically calculated for explosive of the CcHhNnOo composition by the formula:

$$\text{OB} = \frac{\left[o - \left(2c + \frac{h}{2} \right) \right] \cdot 8}{12c + h + 14n + 16o} \cdot 100\%$$

Where, c, h, n, o are the number of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen atoms in the explosive molecule. Accordingly, 2c is the number of oxygen atoms in CO₂, h/2 - the same number in H₂O, 16 is the molar mass of atomic oxygen in g/moles. The denominator of the fraction figures the molar mass of explosive in g/mol.

In the stoichiometric content of elements in the explosive molecule, the image in round brackets is equal to the amount of endogenous oxygen. Because of this, the numerator of the fraction, and therefore OB, becomes zero. When the endogenous oxygen is more (**positive OB**) or less (**negative OB**) than the stoichiometric amount, the explosion is accompanied by the release of poisonous gases such as NO₂, NO, N₂O₄, CO, etc.

Only a small species of explosive are found in nature. They are produced by **chemical synthesis**. The vast majority of synthetic explosive are characterized by **highly negative OB** values. Therefore, when used in industry, they try to prepare such **mixture compositions**, the total OB of which will be close to zero. Earlier, we described in quite detail the mathematical methods of calculating OB, both for individual explosives and for mixtures⁵.

Currently, we want to ask a question: Is there a possibility that the regulation of OB, its approach to zero, will occur purposefully, not in the mixture explosive compositions, but in concrete, individual explosives, in the process of their synthesis? Let's consider this problem, on the example, using well-known explosive poly nitro aromatic compounds i.e. **PNA compounds**, and synthesized from them “Charge Transfer Compounds” i.e. **CT compounds**.


PNA compounds

As examples of PNA compounds, we give the well-known explosives: trotyl, picric acid, styphnic acid, hexa nitrobenzene, etc. Let's compare trotyl (TNT) and picric acid (TNP):


3 E.O. Mindeli, “Destruction of rocks”, Moscow, “NEDRA”, 1974, pp. 130-134 (in Russian).

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
Trotyl (TNT)




Picric acid (TNP)

A fairly high negative OB of TNT (-74,0), in picric acid (-45,4), decreases by about 30 units, which is due to the only difference between the molecules: These are groups with the first carbon atom of the benzene nucleus (C-atoms are attached on the vertices of the hexagon), methyl (CH₃) – in TNT and hydroxyl (OH) – in picric acid. For synthesise of picric acid from TNT, we need to „remove” methylene (CH₂) from the methyl group and „insert” oxygen (O) instead, i.e., replace CH₂ with O. Only the CH₂ group of TNT requires three endogenous oxygen atoms to oxidize: Carbon - two (C+O₂ → CO₂) and two hydrogens - one (H₂ + O → H₂O). Picric acid, not only does not need these three oxygen, on the contrary, its molecule has one more oxygen than TNT. Differently, if compare, the picric acid molecule, with TNT, due to the peculiarity of its structure, the last one has a four-oxygen „deficiency”, which leads to its rather high negative OB.

Now, consider three rows of other known explosives that show two various **gradational increase** in endogenous oxygen. In the first row, adding each nitro group gives us a **two-oxygen** increase:



The second and third rows reflect single-oxygen gradational growth. In I-V-VI-VII, this occurs by adding one hydroxyl (OH) group each, and then, in VII-VIII-IX-IV, hydroxyls are replaced by nitro groups:




The values of OB are given in parentheses.

The first and third rows end in a hexanitrobenzene with zero OB, which is the strongest and at the same time environmentally pure explosive, as can be seen from its conversion reaction:




Hexanitrobenzene



Octanitrocubane

Zero OB has one of the strongest explosive - octanitrocubane, synthesized in the USA at the end of the XX century⁶:

Here are some more examples of explosives with zero OB and their explosive transformations:



Dinitroethyl glycol



Di nitro acetaldehyde




1,1,3,3, - tetranitropropane

None of the five explosive conversion products are poisonous.


Similar examples give a positive answer to the question asked above. Also, the possibility of purposeful synthesis of new explosives with zero oxygen balance is clearly confirmed, specifically:

A chemist can draw up a molecular formula in which there will be two oxygen atoms for every carbon atom, and only one for a pair of hydrogen atoms. After, is required „only” successful synthesis...


Here are some chemical formulas compiled by the above principle:




Tetra nitro pyrimidine



Dodeca nitro diphenylhydrazine



**N-(nitro oxymethyl)-
Tetra nitropyrol**




Deca nitro dicyclopentadienyli

6 A.M. Astakhov, R.S. Stepanov and A.Yu. Babushkin, On the detonation parameters of octanitrocubane, Combustion, Explosion and Shock Waves, Volume 34, pages 85-87(1998).

If we can synthesize these and other substances of similar structure, due to the „ordered” ratio of C, H, O, N-elements, we will get high-energy and ecologically pure explosives with zero OB...

CT compounds

Regulation of oxygen balance, “adjusting” it to zero, is relatively easy when synthesizing CT compounds from PNA compounds. The mechanism of this process is as follows: the presence of nitro groups in the molecule of PNA compounds impoverishes the π -electronic system of the aromatic nucleus and gives these substances a strong **electron-acceptor** property. Consequently, their molecules develop the ability to push the electrons of **electron-donor** molecules towards themselves. Electrostatic attraction appears, resulting in bimolecular chemical structures - CT compounds with molar ratio of components 1:1⁷. This, on the example of picric acid and toluene, can be expressed as follows:




As for the formula's „morphology”, it is similar in appearance to the formula of some other chemical compounds. Such are, double salts, for example, silvinit - $\text{KCl} \bullet \text{NaCl}$, a compound of electron-donor ammonia with electron-acceptor boron tri fluoride $\text{H}_3\text{N} \bullet \text{BF}_3$.

The synthesis reactions of CT compounds take place under rather “soft” conditions, with a high yield of practically pure products of the reaction. These substances usually retain a fairly strong explosive ability⁸, and often, even surpass the initial reagents - PNA compounds in this characteristic⁹.

From picric acid and TNT, more than 20 CT compounds have been synthesized by US. Organic as well as mineral compounds are used as electron-donor „visavi” substances. Of the first, toluene turned out to be the most effective. The testing of the corresponding CT compounds ($\text{TNP} \bullet \text{Toluene}$ and $\text{TNT} \bullet \text{Toluene}$) on the explosion is **complete**, accompanied by maximum fragmentation of the steel tube with explosive.

As for mineral compounds (NH_4NO_3 , NaNO_3 , $\text{K}_2\text{Cr}_2\text{O}_7$, KNO_3 , etc.), for synthesized CT compounds, the results of their explosion are similar. Give us a synthesis reaction of one of them:



The so-called „Trautzel sampling” proved that the **working capacity (fugacity)** of this CT compound is 39% higher than the same one of picric acid.

The use of aromatic compounds with high negative OB (such as benzene, toluene, naphthalene) as electron-donor „visavi” substances in CT compounds will obviously not balance the strongly negative OB of electron-acceptor PNA compounds towards zero. Therefore, for this purpose, it is better to use oxygen-containing mineral salts with positive OB, such as nitrates, chlorates, sulfates, phosphates...

7 A.N. Nesmeyanov, N.A. Nesmeyanov, The beginnings of organic chemistry. Book II, ed., 'Chemistry', Moscow, 1970. pp.94, 120-121 (in Russian).


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Based on what has been said, we give OB-s of six inorganic nitrates and five well-known explosive PNA compounds (OB-s of CT compounds are given above in rows I-III):

Inorganic nitrates					
NH ₄ NO ₃	NaNO ₃	KNO ₃	Mg(NO ₃) ₂	Ca(NO ₃) ₂	Ba(NO ₃) ₂
+20,0	+47,0	+39,6	+54,1	+48,1	+30,7
PNA compounds					
TNT	Picric acid	Styphnic acid	Trinitrofloroglucin	Hexanitrobenzene	
-74,0	-45,4	-36,0	-27,6	0	

As already is mentioned, the regulation of oxygen balance is relatively easy in the synthesis of CT compounds from PNA compounds. **Both components of these bimolecular structures, must be chosen in such a way that the negative OB of one and the positive OB of the other, will be as close to each other as possible in absolute values.** OB of synthesized CT compounds, will be received by the algebraic sum of the OB-s of the components. For example, the oxygen balances of CT compounds synthesized from picric acid and sodium nitrate, picric acid and calcium nitrate, 1,3,5-trinitrobenzene and magnesium nitrate, tetra nitrobenzene and barium nitrate are, respectively: +1,6; +2,7; -2,2; and -0,3:



When testing on explosion, of all possible variants of CT compounds, the majority exhibit considerable power. The gases released of them, during the explosion of the last four CT compounds will necessarily turn out to be environmentally friendly.

Conclusion

Thus, our targeted synthesis of explosive PNA compounds, as well as CT compounds from them, is to offer two real methods of obtaining explosives with OB-s close to zero. Obviously, in the synthetic chemistry diversity, other methods, also, can be found...

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Healthy Body is a Guarantee of a Healthy Mind

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Abstract

School, family, and social environment play equally important role in establishing healthy lifestyle among young children. All the important skills should be developed from an early age. In order to achieve the third goal of sustainability “providing healthy lifestyle and well-being”, it is essential to have encouragement from the government as well as from society; total continuity of education; integration of modern scientific achievements in order to develop ecologically stable social patterns; coordination of teaching and upbringing; positive relationships between teachers and pupils.

A healthy lifestyle is a guarantee of increasing life expectancy and avoiding various diseases. Physical activities make positive influence on receptor and intellectual processes. Those students who are involved in physical activities at school, are characterized by high level of physical development. Their central neurological system functions adequately. Their bodies have high abilities of adaptation. A diet should also be taken into consideration. It should include more vitamins and minerals and less fat and sugar. In most cases young people aren't aware of the importance of a healthy lifestyle. A lot depends on school and family environment, parents and teachers. They should encourage young people to keep a daily routine, eat rationally, do sport relevant to their age to be healthy and capable of working.

Keywords:

healthy lifestyle, sustainability, physical activities, social environment, eating habits.

¹ LEPL-Cadets Military Lyceum, Mentor Teacher

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Introduction

The General Assembly of UN got the resolution on 25 September 2015 – “Transformation of the universe; the agenda 2030 for sustainability, the inseparable part of which is 17 goals of sustainability and 169 tasks.”³ The assembly stated the list of indicators of these goals on 6 July 2017. The goals of sustainability unite the governments and population of different countries to perform such important tasks as eradication of poverty and starvation, improvement of health and education systems, to provide equality, fight against climate changes, to protect oceans and forests, to build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions.

Main Part

The term - sustainability originates from XVIII c. A German forest reference book was created in 1713, where the word “Nachhaltigkeit” was first used, later it was translated in English as “sustained yield.” The third goal of sustainability will be discussed in the article – Guaranteeing healthy lifestyle and well-being.

Body paragraph: a philosopher Alkman gave us the earliest definition of the word – health (in the 5th c. BC). Health is a harmony of mutually opposed forces. Tsitseron described the term “health” as a proper coordination of spiritual condition. According to the definition given by German philosopher and psychic Karl Iasper, health is a means of realization of humans’ natural potential.

Modern educational standards imply equipping students with knowledge, which enables them to follow the rapid progress of mankind. The youth doesn’t have appropriate skills which will help them to develop a healthy and effective lifestyle. School is an excellent place for a healthy start.

World health care regulations say that health is not just having physical defects, but a complete social and spiritual well-being. “Health means to prolong the process of social activity, also psychological and physiological development⁴.”

Being healthy includes several factors, among them are:

- Hereditary factor
- Social-economic
- Ecological
- Effectiveness of health-care system

World Health Organization (WHO) establishes the factors which make influence on human-health:

- Lifestyle - 50%
- Genetic factors - 20%
- Environmental factors - 20%
- Quality of medical service - 10%

As we can see, among the above-mentioned factors, the most important is a lifestyle. Scientists prove that normal physical activities with rational nutrition and lifestyle are effective means of increasing life expectancy and avoiding diseases. A healthy lifestyle is firmly connected with health. The formulation – “healthy lifestyle” itself doesn’t have a long history. It originates from the 1970s. Why was it so important to formulate the definition? The interest towards this issue relates to the following topics: how to prolong life expectancy; How to change living environment and humans themselves. The main aim of establishing a healthy lifestyle at school is to give them information about the essential components of a healthy lifestyle. To help them get used to a daily routine, private hygiene, physical activities, and appropriate nutritional habits.

Physical activities have a positive influence on receptor and intellectual processes. Those students who are actively involved in physical training during the day have a high level of physical development. The indicator of their cardiovascular and inhalant systems functions properly. Their bodies endure respiratory diseases much more easily. But we should also take into consideration that intense physical activities can impact negatively on an adolescent’s body. Intensive training can cause chronic problems of arthritis, it can also prevent adolescents from growing up.

In our article, we have discussed some points from the guide, published by the Ministry of Education and Science. “Young people in Georgia are in critical social-psychological condition. All the behavioral stereotypes are destroyed. New stereotypes and values are formed in a chaotic way; the youth don’t have skills which will help them to develop an effective and healthy lifestyle; their eating habits aren’t healthy, they prefer fast food. They spend most of their time in front of TV-s and computers, eating chips and drinking fizzy drinks. Such kinds of food are full of fat, sugar, and calories. They contain

³ UN Resolution, Goals of Sustainability

⁴ И.Н. Брехман. Валеология-наука о здоровье. М. 2002.

no important vitamins or minerals. Young people should be aware of the importance of a balanced diet to keep healthy and normal weight, to strengthen the immune system and reduce the risk of developing various diseases. Those children and adolescents, who are aware of healthy and high-quality diet, are much healthier and capable of working in their adulthood.” (Guide about healthy lifestyle”, Tbilisi, 2015.)⁵

Tamar Manjavidze carried out a national nutrition survey. “Half of the children in Georgia aged 10-17 lack food which is rich in vitamins and albumen. These minerals are very important for their physical and mental development. The ration with the shortage of micro and macro elements, creates the risk of albuminous deficiency. This is a quite serious problem which can cause retarded physical development (retarded growing process). The diversity of daily ration is on average level among children aged 10-17. The number of children consuming meat, fish, eggs or protein is quite low. Children eat less fat, vegetables, and dairy products than adults, but on the other hand, they eat more fruit.

There are several surveys related to these issues, among them is the study conducted by the public unity “Bemoni”, Telavi municipality. It is mentioned in the survey that healthy diet of adolescents, as well as physical training is a guarantee of good health in their adulthood. The problem of obesity is quite up to date in Georgia. According to the surveys 16.6% of adults suffer from obesity and 7.1% from obesity. The number of young people who get less than five portions of fruit or vegetables is quite low – 71.8% (boys -73.5% and girls – 69.8%).

It should be noted that adolescents are not able to follow a healthy lifestyle in most cases. They lead a passive way of life. So, a lot is dependent on family or school environment, parents, and teachers. Healthy lifestyle is incompatible with bad habits, such as: smoking, drinking alcohol or using drugs. Unhealthy habits often cause chronic diseases. It is also very important to improve hygienic habits, to keep daily routines, to alter physical and mental work and follow a regular, rational diet. Physical activity relevant to their age, enough sleep and private hygiene.

The research was conducted in November 2015 in Georgia. There were 190 participants, mainly young people aged 15-17. The above-mentioned survey covered the issues of using unhealthy substances such as alcohol, tobacco and drugs. The results of the survey are the following:

1. 43% of Georgian pupils consume tobacco.
2. 85% of pupils (boys - 86%, girls – 83%) mentioned that they consumed alcohol at least once.
3. 11% of students mentioned that they tried marijuana at least once.
4. 4% of pupils have tried ecstasy at least once.
5. 2% of students consumed cocaine at least once.

While working on the article we have decided to conduct a survey to present the situation we have today. We used anonymous questionnaires to make the results more reliable, the respondents' answers were frank and more trustworthy. The survey was carried out among cadets, teachers, parents, military and medical staff. We interviewed 100 people. The analysis of the data marked out the following research topics:

- What does a healthy lifestyle mean?
- What kind of nutrition do you prefer?
- How can we increase vitality?
- Identify unhealthy habits you have.
- Are you eager to get rid of bad habits?

The results of the survey are the following:

- 95% of cadets are aware of a healthy lifestyle.
- Most cadets mentioned that they weren't following a healthy lifestyle before entering the lyceum. Their diet at the lyceum is healthy, based on certain recommendations.
- 23% of cadets thought that alcohol helped them to raise vitality, but after becoming a cadet, their lifestyle has absolutely changed, and they spend most of their time doing physical or intellectual activities.
- 41% confessed that they have given up smoking.
- 48% consider that they got rid of unhealthy habits.

As we have already mentioned, parents also took part in the survey. The aim of the involvement in this process was to define their role in general. How much are they involved in forming the skills of healthy lifestyle of their children. Data analysis shows that 49% of parents think that it isn't dangerous that their children at an early age gained such bad habits as smoking, drinking alcohol, spending all their time on the internet, leading passive lifestyle in general. They can't also control how often children consume fast food, which has negative on their health.

Teachers, military, and medical staff also took part in the survey.

- 72% consider that school environment is an essential factor to form and develop the skills of

⁵ გაზამკველი „ჯანსაღი ცხოვრების წესის შესახებ, თბილისი, 2015.

healthy lifestyle among pupils.

- 28% think that family environment plays a vital role in the process of gaining good or bad habits.
- 68% reckon that it is important to raise their awareness about healthy lifestyle.
- 68% mention the negative influence of modern technologies.
- 32% mention that fast food is addictive, and it can cause various diseases.
- 75% think that bad, unhealthy habits prevent young people from achieving success in their profession.

Conclusion

school, family and public environment play equally important roles in establishing healthy lifestyle among young children. All the important skills should be developed from an early age. To achieve the third goal of sustainability “providing healthy lifestyle and well-being”, it is essential to have encouragement from the government as well as from society; total continuity of education; integration of modern scientific achievements to develop ecologically stable social patterns; coordination of teaching and upbringing. Positive relationships between teachers and pupils. Teaching process should be organized properly to help students to come to the right conclusions and persuade them and it is also essential to keep harmony between life and the environment they live in.

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Strengthening The Eu's Defence Cooperation Title

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Abstract

In an expeditiously changing world, security challenges have become more intricate, multifaceted and complex. The 21st century is an epoch of strategic competition and multisided relations. The influence and rate of occurrence of hybrid security threats are constantly rising and deepening. World is in era of transition, characterized by creating new dynamics by emerging players along with significant shift of geopolitical and economic power, and currently, global attention is drawn to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which is the consequent catalyst for the EU states, obligating them to take more responsibility and improve security and defence. Russia does not use force only to dominate on Ukraine, but this war aims to reverse and strike down western dominance - it is a big threat-economically, militarily, and politically. In an international competition, other powers are challenging the European countries' ability to protect their interests and values that was the motivation for the idea of collective security building called "strategic sovereignty". For this reason, both defence and security fields are essentially important for the European Union. The EU leaders have long been trying to improve common defence policy - the European Union External Action Service in 2011, and later in 2016, the EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker called for a common defence fund, a "European headquarters." In March 2022, the EU council approved the Strategic Compass. The Compass gives the European Union an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030 (EU, 2022). French President Emmanuel Macron urged Europe to invest in its own collective security framework in the face of Russian military moves on the bloc's doorstep - "Europe needs to finally build its own collective security framework on our continent." We argue about the prospects of collective security and the fact that it may now be time for the EU member States to take the necessary decisions.

Keywords:

security challenges, hybrid security threats, collective security, strategic sovereignty, defence policy, the Strategic Compass.

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Introduction

We, human beings, tend to over-rationalize the past, over-dramatize the present and underestimate the future. Now if you look at the post-cold war era, we will see that in the beginning it was unipolar, which was driven by the undisputed superpower of the world - the United States, and at the same time, it was partially ideology-driven as well as identity-driven. That was the time when Francis Fukuyama, one of the greatest academics and intellectuals, coined the phrase at the end of history - a belief that all 200 nation-states in the world would start transitioning towards the best combination of governance that is liberal democracy, the social market economy, and globalization, and this was a genuine belief. That's why there is increasing acceptance that the European Union is becoming an important factor in foreign and security matters³. A significant factor in the rising importance of the EU security activities derived from the Russian-Ukrainian war⁴. Inside the EU, they also have to accept to pay a price to stop this outrageous and unprovoked war: the future of European security and their democracies depends on it. The price to pay is the price of freedom.

The EU's toolkit for maintaining international security and peace includes diplomacy, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, human rights, climate action, economic support, and trade regulations. These various tools are put together in a certain way to match the unique circumstances of each crisis or emergency. The EU's so-called Integrated Approach, as outlined in the EU Global Strategy, is a customized, multifaceted strategy constantly updated to changing circumstances (European Union, 2016). When it comes to encouraging security and advancing European interests and values, all of these strengths -collectively known as Europe's soft power - are beneficial but Defence is a vital part of the EU's distinctive toolbox and is essential to safeguarding European interests both now and in the future. Because of this, a more stable basis has been created to further progress and reinforce Europe's defence cooperation.

When the UK, France and Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, the concept of a common defence policy for Europe first emerged. In 1948, the EU countries have been trying to improve security and defence, but crucial steps were taken when they were necessity. It was obvious that the EU needed to address its duties in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent wars in the Balkans (Brussels Treaty. Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 1948). It is essential to acknowledge that the EU has always been trying to enhance defence and security. The Western European Union Council had already approved the conditions for the deployment of military units in 1992, but the "Petersberg Tasks" was now included in the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam. For the Union to comment on foreign policy issues with "one face and one voice," the position of "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy" was established⁵.

After the Treaty of Amsterdam, there was another important moment in relations between the countries of the EU. Member States reiterated the Union's readiness to build autonomous action capabilities, supported by effective armed units during the 1999 European Council in Cologne. The "Berlin Plus Agreement," which granted the EU access to NATO resources and capabilities under specific restrictions, was a significant advance⁶. The Lisbon Treaty, which become valid in December 2009 and served as a fundamental factor in the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, is another significant treaty (CSDP) when it comes to the EU defence cooperation⁷.

Several years ago, in December 2017, when the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was established, it has brought defence cooperation between the participating European Union Member States to a different level. To create a more cohesive European capacity landscape, a collaboration between the participating EU Member States will gradually transition from isolated projects to plan and impact-based cooperative activities. It is a framework and systematic procedure for progressively strengthening defence cooperation to deliver the necessary capabilities in order to carry out both the most difficult missions and consequently increase security for the EU residents. There are two other crucial initiatives: the European Defence Fund, which will provide financial support for certain collaborative projects, and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which will assist Member States to better identify the opportunities for new collaborative initiatives⁸. The concept of a European army is as old as the European Union and the unity of European countries. The idea of developing European defence regularly appears in the discourse of European leaders as a result of increasing security issues either in the international arena or on the internal European political agenda, but the European

3 smith, hill and. 2005.

4 Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite. 2008. "European Security and Defence Policy." In An implementation Perspective.

5 Nicolaidis, Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypsos. 1999. "princeton.edu." march. Accessed 11 5, 2022.

6 1999. "europarl.europa.eu." june 3-4. Accessed 10 27, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm.

7 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon-2007>

8 www.pesco.europa.eu/about/ 2017

Union has still been hesitant to make risky international commitments.

According to economists, the war in Ukraine is the third asymmetric shock, experienced by UN in the last two decades after the 2008 financial and economic crisis and the following Eurozone crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine is indeed having a much greater impact on neighboring countries due to the influx of refugees and their heavy dependence on Russian gas. With the invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin is forcing the EU to urgently rethink many elements of their internal organization and worldview. They must rise to this challenge to defend their security and democratic values. To handle the wider impact of the war against Ukraine, the EU needs to bolster European economic resilience, end its energy dependence on Russia and further strengthen the European defence.

According to analyses by Eurobarometer, a large percentage of the EU residents desire increased security, stability, and a coordinated EU response towards the existing dangers. The EU citizens expect the EU to gradually reduce its dependence on Russian energy sources (87%), and they strongly support a common security and defence policy (81%). The survey also confirms the overwhelming support for the EU's response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine (59%)⁹. Along with their international partners' expectations that Europe should be able to respond to crises rapidly and effectively, the recently increased degree of desire to cooperate in the domain of defence is a clear answer to this demand by European citizens.

In other words, the European Union must be able to defend its security interests and shoulder its full amount of responsibility as a guarantor of international security. Among the current processes adopting the "Strategic Compass", which is a 2030 action plan to strengthen the EU's security and defence policy, it also responds to the requirements of the European Union residents. The work on the Strategic Compass began nearly two years ago, but due to the increased dynamics of security problems and the war in Ukraine, the working version of the document was significantly updated, highlighting the European Union's collective military ambitions.

The "Strategic Compass" is an overall assessment of the EU's strategic environment, including threats and challenges. For the first time in the EU history, concrete and practical proposals with a well-defined implementation schedule are documented aiming to strengthen the EU's ability to act decisively in crises as well as to protect both its security and citizens. The Compass encompasses all aspects of security and defence policy and is built on four pillars: act, invest, partner, and secure. When a crisis emerges, the EU should be prepared to respond quickly and forcefully, with partners or alone. The EU will establish a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises, will be ready to deploy 200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts within 30 days, including in complex environments, will conduct regular live exercises on land and at sea, and enhance military mobility¹⁰.

A variety of considerations influenced the Member States' decision to cross the Rubicon as well as gave the Union independent military capability. There is a revival of war in Europe, as well as a decreased American readiness to provide security and defence assurances to Europe, which is more essential in geopolitical terms than it was during the Cold War. Many continental European nations have sought to confirm the EU's role as a global political player¹¹.

In the new millennium, the EU has gained prominence in security and defence issues. The Member States provided the union with a new institutional framework and major operational capabilities by creating and expanding the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). Their goal in promoting international security and stability via preventative action and crisis management in civilian and military operations has been realized. To increase its capacities, the EU had been developing and implementing foreign and security policies¹².

The debate over European security and the role of the EU, as well as its strategic partners, is raging. The recent NATO summit in Madrid was a success for the Transatlantic Alliance in terms of both strategic unity and concrete decisions. The summit reemphasized NATO's collective defence mission, including plans to strengthen the alliance's presence on the eastern flank as well as to increase the overall number of high-readiness forces. All leaders underlined their determination to support Ukraine in defending itself against the Russian aggression, until full sovereignty is restored.

The debate over the division of geopolitical responsibility and burden between NATO and the EU has a long history. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been clear that the development of a long-term and effective security and defence relationship between NATO and the EU is as necessary as it is unavoidable. The two organizations are linked in many ways, including strategic vision, a sense of

9 2022. "Europa.eu." eurobarometer surveys. april-may. Accessed 10 25, 2022. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Key%20Challenges%20of%20our%20Times%20-%20The%20EU%20in%202022_526_Data_Annexes_EN.pdf.

10 2022. "Europa.eu." eurobarometer surveys. april-may. Accessed 10 25, 2022. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Key%20Challenges%20of%20our%20Times%20-%20The%20EU%20in%202022_526_Data_Annexes_EN.pdf.

11 Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite. 2008. "European Security and Defence Policy." In An implementation Perspective.

12 Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite. 2008. "European Security and Defence Policy." In An implementation Perspective.

responsibility, membership similarities, and vulnerability to security threats and challenges. Budgetary constraints bind NATO and the EU together; member governments cannot afford to maintain two separate security and defence organizations. It would also be counter-productive¹³. However, in terms of practical cooperation, the results are mixed, and the overall result is neither cooperation nor competition, but dysfunction.

Both defence and security policy are two of the most important aspects of sovereignty, and this notion has been perceived for centuries. The initial reluctance of the EU states to grant the EU such a powerful tool is surprising. We believe it is worthwhile to analyze the possibility of establishing a unified European army from today's perspective. The EU is rising as a significant security and defence actor. Russia's invasion of Ukraine with its widely spread devastation, tens of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees, possible war crimes, and narrowly avoided nuclear disaster is forcing European nations to rethink how to maintain their collective security. This makes the concept of European "strategic autonomy" and collective defence as important as it has never been since it refers to the EU's increased ability to operate independently and with preferred partners on defence and security issues. Between February and April, the European Council approved successive assistance measures under the European Peace Facility totaling €1.5 billion. The ability of the EU's 27 members to quickly agree on these key decisions demonstrates that when there is a shared understanding of the threat, the concept of European defence becomes concrete and effective¹⁴.

This situation creates all of the necessary conditions and the greatest environment for the formation of a European army. In the context of establishing a unified European army, in addition to the organizational and logistical difficulties that can be overcome in the future, it is vital to emphasize the political level, because it determines the goals and circumstances of using the army as a policy tool. In 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said: "We, Europeans, truly have to take our fate into our own hands." It is worth noting that the statements of European leaders, particularly of Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, are broad in scope. More specificity is required to gain support for the European army. In order to implement the idea we need to define the roles of the European army, the timeline, and other requirements that are necessary before the proposal can be put into practice. To deal with the challenges of today and the future, it is essential to define the political decision-making processes for the use of military force as well as to achieve agreement on the army's mission and functions. Furthermore, an agreement is required on whether a unified European military force will be used only in response to an attack on an EU Member State or preventive measures will be permitted as well. All of these are political questions, and considering the answers must necessarily precede the formation of the army because the possible and potential missions of the army must be taken into account during the organizational formation.

In the current geopolitical situation, the concept of a European army would be impractical, since Europeans would struggle to agree on a unified military leadership -especially France, not Germany, which is a nuclear power. France, unlike Germany, is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, because there is no "European country," the choice to send soldiers, who risk their lives is only feasible within the framework of a national decision. The EU and NATO have 27 and 30 member nations, respectively, of whom 21 are members of both, making the concept of an EU army extremely unrealistic. Parallel effort is required to bring together conflicting perspectives on geopolitical diagnosis, security perceptions, and identification of common interests in order to move on the road of tighter military cooperation. This would ultimately pave the door for a more in-depth discussion of European goals.

Conclusion

The challenge now is to improve the EU's strategic alliance with NATO and show how the EU can assume greater responsibility for its security. It is obvious that they are two different sides of the same coin, and three significant characteristics are appearing as we move forward:

1. They necessitate more deployable and interoperable troops capable of coping with a diverse set of threats and dangers. This means that Europeans should spend more on defence and, more crucially, spend better as a group. The EU Member States' statement that they will raise defence expenditure by around €200 billion is highly positive. However, there is a risk that much of the increased expenditure may be lost, unless the share spent on cooperative development and procurement grows. The defence investment gap study delivered to the EU leaders in May indicates both the magnitude of the problem and what may be done, as the Commission and the European Defence Agency aiding Member States are moving forward with joint procurement. One

¹³ Competition?, EU and NATO: Co-operation or. 2006. "EU and NATO: Co-operation or Competition?"

¹⁴ Lucia Retter Pezard, and Stephanie. 2022. www.rand.org. may 20. Accessed October 29, 2022. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/05/rethinking-the-eus-role-in-european-collective-defence.html>.

important example is the rebuilding of stocks depleted by the shipment of military equipment to Ukraine. Acquiring capabilities collaboratively not only benefits the EU's security and defence agenda, but it is also essential for NATO Allies to secure Europe from Russian threats.

2. Second, demonstrating a desire to employ the essential capabilities and serve as a security provider is just as vital as gaining them. Over the previous two decades, the EU has gathered substantial expertise in crisis management activities. What has begun in the Balkans has developed into a potent instrument, with the EU today conducting 18 missions and operations - 11 civilian and 7 militaries across three continents.
3. This gets us to the third factor: the EU's ability to adapt and learn from their mistakes. The velocity of change in the world frequently outpaces our ability to keep up. They must improve their agility and ability to apply lessons learned, including in the field of CSDP. The Strategic Compass is vitally pertinent to this debate, and it contains actual ideas as well as a timeframe enhancing their combined influence.

The overall point is simple: in a dangerous world, Europeans must assume their strategic responsibility, both within the EU and NATO and give themselves the means and agility to do so¹⁵.

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Effects of Psycho-Cultural Factors on Adopting Changes in Defense

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Abstract

There is a constant need for the defense/military institutions to undergo continuous development in order to adjust to modern standards and requirements, often necessitating systemic changes. As part of this development, since the end of the Cold War, defense organizations in many Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have endeavored to adopt advanced strategic management practices from their Western counterparts in terms of integration process into NATO and the EU.

However, these efforts have not always been successful. The attempt of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to adopt changes within their defense organizations, particularly in strategic defense planning area through institutionalizing Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) serves as such a case. Scholars often highlight factors altering this failure, focusing on the issues like centralized decision making, lack of understanding, resistance to change etc.

This paper analyzes other influencing factors, namely the importance of considering psycho-cultural factors while introducing changes within defense organizations and explains the main reasons for failure in successfully adopting PPBS. The study was conducted using qualitative methodology, primarily case study, to comprehensively analyze the topic.

Based on the findings, the authors conclude that in CEE countries psycho-cultural aspects significantly influence the implementation of changes in the defense sector in parallel with the factors mentioned above. In the case of CEE countries, these psycho-cultural factors are reinforced by the post-socialist legacy, which is characterized by a lack of creativity, collaboration, coordination, and consensus building, leading to reluctance and resistance to changes when it comes to adopting modern practices.

Overall, the findings validate the hypothesis proposed in the paper - disregarding psycho-cultural factors in the process of change implementation contribute to the failure.

The study also demonstrates the effectiveness of supporting the change implementation process through the utilization of Organizational Change Management (OCM) which is actively employed by Western organizations in the defense sector.

Keywords:

Defense, CEE, PPBS, organizational culture, resistance, change, OCM.

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Introduction

In an increasingly changing environment, defense institutions need to ensure continuous development in order to adapt to new requirements. The development process often involves changes that include transformation of established systems, patterns and practices in order to remain effective in the face of evolving challenges.

These alterations can impact various aspects, including organizational structure and/or strategic planning within an institution. An example of such an attempt has been the adoption of a new model for defense planning in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries - Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Despite of substantial efforts, these countries have been unable to effectively activate PPBS.³ Therefore, it is of significant relevance to explore the key factors influencing outcomes of implementing transformative changes in the defense sector.

As such, this paper aims to develop understanding of an area that has received limited scholarly attention so far – the effects of psycho-cultural factors on adopting changes in defense sector. From this perspective, throughout the paper the authors will analyze the case of institutionalizing PPBS in CEE countries. Particularly, the study is constructed around the following research question and hypothesis:

Research question: How do organizations' cultural values and psychological aspects affect implementation of major changes in defense sector?

Hypothesis: Disregarding psycho-cultural factors in the process of change implementation contribute to the failure.

The research was conducted using a qualitative methodology, primarily employing a case study approach that encompasses a comprehensive analysis of secondary data from academic works, scientific research, official documents, and online sources. This approach allows in-depth analysis of the complex issues presented in this paper.

Main Part

Case Of Adopting Change: Planning, Programming And Budgeting System In Central And Eastern European Countries

The strategic planning method, well known as the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) was created at the beginning of 1960's by Robert McNamara, the then US Secretary of Defense. With a new approach, McNamara aimed to improve the strategic management process within Department of Defense (DOD) by consolidating independent planning and budgetary processes of the services.

This concept was later interpreted by scholars and professionals. For example, in his definition Jack Rabin argues that the PPBS is more about long-term planning, rather than the short-term.⁴ According to one of the U.S government reports, "leading practices in capital decision-making include developing a long-term capital plan to guide implementation of organizational goals and objectives and help decision-makers establish priorities over the long-term".⁵

Decades after its introduction, many NATO states have attempted to adopt PPBS. The system was considered as an effective tool that could improve planning process both on vertical and horizontal levels.⁶ However, most of the Central and Eastern European countries - Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Albania, Czech Republic and Slovakia - have struggled to institutionalize it within their military institutions. Despite its necessity and widespread use amongst "new" NATO members, it is nearly impossible to find a case where PPBS has ever been successfully and effectively implemented in CEE countries.⁷

Thomas-Durell Young argues that the CEE countries with post-socialist legacy were unable to successfully adopt PPBS due to the existence of following problems: 1) Defense institutions lacked institutional memory and/or considered defense planning as a low priority; 2) they never had strong policy frameworks; 3) with respect to financial management, these institutions had highly centralised decision-making (reinforced by PPBS) along with a limited understanding of the actual Western concept of policy.⁸

3 Young Thomas-Durell, "Questioning the "Sanctity" of Long Term-Term Defense Planning as Practices in Central and Eastern Europe", *Defense Studies*, Routledge (2018), 18:3, p.360, p.p. 357-361

4 Jack Rabin, "PPBS: Theory, Structure, and Limitations - Public Budgeting and Finance, 4th ed.", *Marcel Dekker*, 1997, p. 490.

5 United States General Accounting Office, "Executive Guide – Leading Practices in Capital Decision-Making", (1998). <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-AIMD-99-32/pdf/GAOREPORTS-AIMD-99-32.pdf> 15.01.2023

6 Young Thomas-Durell, "Is the US's PPBS Applicable to European Post-Communist Defense Institutions?" *The Rusi Journal*, Vol. 161, 2016, p.66.

7 Young Thomas-Durell, "Questioning the "Sanctity" of Long-term Defense Planning as Practices in Central and Eastern Europe", *Defense Studies* (August, 2018), 18:3, p.360, p.p. 357-361

8 Young Thomas-Durell, "Is the US's PPBS Applicable to European Post-Communist Defense Institutions?" *The Rusi Journal*,

While Young's assessment hold relevance, it is essential to note, that CEE countries have received considerable advisory assistance from the West, they have been actively involved in NATO led programs such as Planning and Review Process (PARP) of Partnership for Peace (PFP) and additionally, have owned qualified personnel with Western education.⁹ Thus, they have failed in their attempts despite having necessary skills to understand, prioritize and effectively institutionalize PPBS. This article makes it clear that other factors, including the psycho-cultural aspects of organizations which are less discussed in Young's classification had significant negative effect on success of the reformation process.

Psycho-Cultural Aspects Behind Failure: Resistance To Adopt Changes

Similar to business processes, psycho-cultural aspects create overall organizational culture and play a significant role in the development of the defense sector.¹⁰ Nelson and Quick define organizational culture as “a pattern of basic assumptions that are considered valid and that are taught to new members as a way to perceive, think and feel in the organization”.¹¹ Psycho-cultural aspects encompass more than just a set of beliefs, as they also provide a general understanding of an organizations' historical context, traditions, patterns of behaviour, interests and most importantly, values. They take into consideration the major factors and narratives that strengthen these values. As a result, these aspects have a profound impact on personnel's behaviour, as they facilitate motivation of employees to coordinate their actions towards clearly defined objectives, with all members agreeing upon the common organizational goals.¹²

Notably, organizational changes in CEE countries are often related to adopting the best practices of the Western countries. However, Lang and Steger argue, that companies and organizations in CEE countries often struggle in accomplishing this mission as they mistakenly assume that the experience of the West can be implemented without any shortcomings. The challenges they encounter primarily stem from their own national and organizational cultures.¹³

For example, highly centralized decision-making system of CEE institutions, highlighted by Thomas-Durell Young, does not represent an isolated problem, but it has consequential effect, as significantly hinders development and institutionalization of essential elements relatable to Western organizational culture. These elements include creativity, collaboration, coordination, and consensus building.¹⁴

This postulate is supported by the research conducted by Alas and Vadi, which examined the impact of organizational culture on attitudes towards change in post-Socialist organizations. The study revealed that the employees of these organizations tend to exhibit less favorable attitudes towards change and face difficulties during the process of transformation. This is attributed to their previous work experiences, which have shaped a set of established working habits and attitudes toward organizational tasks.¹⁵ As a result, employees are more reluctant to step out of their comfort zone and embrace new approaches or practices, including new Western models like PPBS.

This reluctance is often regarded as resistance to change. Generally, the reasons behind employees' resistance vary, however, usually it derives from the fact that the goal of a change is not clearly defined causing low tolerance among personnel. Additionally, introducing a change without proper communication can create so called the “effect of surprise”, causing a disconnection between the change and the existing organizational culture. As a consequence, employees may develop negative attitudes, believing that the change will require them to undertake additional activities. Furthermore, personnel may lack self-confidence, fearing that they will not be able to meet new working requirements imposed by the change.¹⁶ From this perspective, the main reason for the inability to adopt PPBS in CEE coun-

Vol. 161, 2016, p.66.; 71-72.

9 Pallin Carolina Vendil and Westerlund Fredrik, “Russia's War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences”, *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 20/2 (June 2009), 400–424;

10 How Does Company Culture Actually Lead To Success? *Entrepreneur* (2015), <https://www.entrepreneur.com/growing-a-business/how-does-company-culture-actually-lead-to-success/254049> 17.01.2023

11 D.L. Nelson & J.C, Quick, *Organizational Behavior: Science, the Real World, and You* (8th ed.), *Mason, OH:South-Western Cengage Learning* (2013), p.592

12 How Does Company Culture Actually Lead To Success? *Entrepreneur* (2015), <https://www.entrepreneur.com/growing-a-business/how-does-company-culture-actually-lead-to-success/254049> 17.01.2023

13 Lang Rainhart and Steger Thomas, “The odyssey of management knowledge to transforming societies: A critical review of a theoretical alternative”, *Human Resource Development International*, 5(3).

14 McNab Robert M., “Implementing Program Budgeting in the Serbian Ministry of Defense”, *Public Budgeting and Finance* 31/2 (Summer 2011), 217; 221

15 Alas Ruth, and Vadi Maaja. “The Impact of Organisational Culture on Attitudes Concerning Change in Post-Soviet Organisations.” *Journal of East European Management Studies* 9, no. 1 (2004): 20–39.

16 Daniela Bradutanu, *Resistance to Change: A New Perspective*, Lulu Press (2015), pp.22-25

tries lies in the prevailing culture developed as part of the post-Socialist legacy.

The way PPBS was introduced to the young, underdeveloped military institutions of the Central and Eastern European countries has significantly hindered the creation of an effective planning system. The large-scale efforts to “export” the U.S. method of strategic planning led to an ambiguity, as critical cultural factors essential for the success of the change management process were often omitted. Therefore, the concept of PPBS was rarely understood by the recipient states, leading additional detrimental confusions within their defense organizations.¹⁷ As a result, instead of bringing improvement, the system became merely a continuation of the existing planning and financial management traditions developed during the Socialist era, failing to become a modern Western-type long-term strategic thinking tool.¹⁸

Therefore, while this whole process was backed by the necessary resources, tools, trainings and human capital, it lacked the proper management of change itself that impeded the smooth transitioning and hindered achievement of desired end states. The success could be supported by accompanying changes related to adopting PPBS with Organizational Change Management (OCM) framework.

Organizational Change Management (Ocm)

Organizational Change Management (OCM) refers to “the application of a structured process and set of tools for leading the people side of change to achieve a desired outcome”. OCM is both a process and a competency that involves assessing the existing organizational culture and enhancing personnel’s psychological readiness for the upcoming change.¹⁹

OCM, as a competency, involves having the necessary expertise and skills enabling organization to actually implement a change. In the case of adopting PPBS in CEE countries, this dimension of OCM has been more-less active considering the advisory assistance provided by leading Western experts.

As a process, OCM utilizes a range of holistic tools to ensure that the change becomes embedded in the existing organizational culture and produces repeatable patterns. This aspect of OCM heavily relies on understanding employees’ psychology and the prevailing organizational culture. The underlying concept is that the changes within organizations should be aligned with the thoughts and feelings of the personnel to increase the likelihood of their successful implementation. This particular aspect of OCM has merely been considered while exporting PPBS to CEE.

In this light, the research conducted by change management organization PROSCI (Professional Science) underscores the overall importance of OCM by showing that its application significantly increases the chances of effectively implementing changes. Specifically, PROSCI categorized the OCM efforts of organizations and measured their success in terms of achieving goals of the introduced changes. The research revealed that initiatives with excellent OCM practices are 6 times more likely to meet their objectives than those with poor change management.²⁰



Graph N 1 Source: PROSCI Research Hub

17 Manole Oana-Raluca, “PPBES Process Overview: Considerations Regarding its Implementation and Use”, in Maria Constantinescu (ed.), Bucharest: National Defense University ‘Carol I’ Publishing House (2010)

18 Fritz Antje, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I): Status”, in Philipp H. Fluri and Eden Cole (eds.), From Revolution to Reform: Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform (Vienna and Geneva, July 2005), 66–67.

19 T. Creasy, “An Introduction Guide to Change Management” (2018). www.prosci.com 15.01.2023


20 T. Creasy, “The Correlation Between Change Management and Project Success”, <https://www.prosci.com/blog/the-correlation-between-change-management-and-project-success> 15.01.2023

Ocm In Defense Sector

OCM is widely used within Western government agencies, including defense/military institutions in order to ensure the creation of a clear vision for the transformation, empower line personnel, and facilitate inclusiveness with the aim of achieving success within the established chain of command.²¹

Western defense organizations usually create guidelines for managers and offer a range of tools to support OCM efforts, including communication plan templates, training courses, trust building activities, questionnaires etc. Importantly, they base their ideas and efforts on concrete OCM models. Given the heterogeneity of cultures, as well as potential for changes, a combination of different OCM models and methodologies can be used depending on the situation. These models typically utilize various theories and perspectives, all of which focus on the psychology of resisting/accepting change.²²


For example, the U.S. Army War College elaborated a primer for senior leaders, which provides various methods to analyze and support changes within military organizations. It emphasizes the need to prepare personnel for change, as well as focuses on efficient methods and tools to actually implement these changes. This particular primer highlights few models, including Kurt Lewin's change management model, which underlines three main phases of change:



Graph N 2. Source: U.S. Army War College

1) present state; 2) transition state; 3) desired state. Lewin's model is considered to serve as a fundamental concept of OCM, providing the foundation under which numerous other models have been developed. Therefore, this is relatively simple model that can be modified to suit the culture and specific needs of a particular defense institution.²³

Ministry of Defense (MoD) of the UK successfully utilizes OCM within its organization. Specifically, the ministry provides methodology and toolkit for managers in defense. This approach outlines the aspects of Lewin's model, as it focuses on the general



Graph N 3. Source: Elisabeth Kubler-Ross Foundation

stages of change.²⁴ However, OCM efforts within the UK MoD are primarily constructed around

21 D. Chinn and J. Dowdy, "Five Principles to Manage Change in the Military", McKinsey & Company (2014), https://www.mckinsey.com/~media/McKinsey/Industries/Public%20and%20Social%20Sector/Our%20Insights/Five%20principles%20to%20manage%20change%20in%20the%20military/Five_principles_to_manage_change_in_the_military.pdf 15.01.2023

22 Brian Joseph Galli, "Change Management Models: A Comparative Analysis and Concerns", *IEEE Engineering Management Review* (2018), Vol 46, NO:3

23 T. Galvin, "Leading Change in Military Organizations – Primer for Senior Leaders". U.S. Army War College Press Publication (2018)

24 "Change Management in Defense: Methodology and Toolkit". Ministry of Defense of UK (2022)

the psychological path employees go through while facing change: shock, denial, anger, despair, exploration, acceptance, and commitment.²⁵ The model introduced by the UK MoD is similar to the approach suggested by Kübler-Ross Change Curve, which focuses on the following stages: shock, denial, frustration, depression, experiment, decision, integration.²⁶

These cases demonstrate that OCM is regarded by Western countries as a useful mechanism to prepare ground for change and to support its actual implementation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the failure to adopt major changes in the defense sector, including sharing of the best Western practices, can be triggered by various factors separately or in combination. The study has revealed that this failure is often influenced by ignorance of psycho-cultural factors leading to the resistance to change among personnel.

As an answer to the research question provided in this paper, the study has showed, that psycho-cultural aspects, in parallel with other contributing factors had significant negative effect on the implementation of major changes within defense institutions. These factors should not be analyzed separately, but understood as interconnected elements influencing the outcome of change initiatives.

In case of adopting PPBS in CEE countries, the failure is believed to be related to a few problems including prevalent centralized decision making, lack of awareness, reluctance of personnel etc. Meanwhile, these common problems are closely related to the psycho-cultural aspects of an organization or even a nation, such as the lack of creativity, collaboration, coordination, and consensus building. These factors have reinforced the problems, ultimately leading to the failure. Thus, the hypothesis proposed in this paper has been validated.

On the other hand, the study has presented that the failure within defense institutions of CEE countries could be avoided by institutionalizing Organizational Change Management (OCM), as it increases chances of successfully adopting changes and meeting desired objectives. Despite that this approach is mainly utilized by private sector, the examination of few OCM efforts of Western defense organizations, often regarded as role models for CEE countries, shows that OCM is a valuable mechanism for the defense sector as well.

OCM is operational in the process of implementing any type of reform. However, the analysis of introducing changes in post-Socialist states particularly emphasized the need to support adopting modern practices through OCM mechanisms.

Therefore, as a recommendation, this paper suggests that in order to effectively navigate the complexities of an introduced changes and mitigate resistance within defense organizations, it is essential to address their psycho-cultural factors prevailing at both the organizational and national levels through the application of OCM.

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²⁵ Supporting Change Toolkit. Ministry of Defense of UK.

²⁶ Elisabeth Kubler-Ross Foundation, "Kubler-Ross Change Curve", <https://www.ekrfoundation.org/5-stages-of-grief/change-curve/> 17.01.2023

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The New EU Energy Security Reality And Its Impact on The Wider Black Sea Region

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Abstract

This brief in-depth research “The new EU energy security reality and its impact on the wider Black Sea region” on a security Studies was organized by David Aghmashenebeli National Defence Academy of Georgia, Germany. Its goal is to support the security of the Wider Black Sea Region energy supply chains. The purpose of this project is to answer to the main question: Will EU energy security impact the south-eastern flank of the Euro-Atlantic space.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has created new problems that are not addressed by outdated security programs and old-fashioned traditional defence approaches. That the war in Ukraine is not the cause of a future conflict against the world order is not a new point of view, furthermore, the war in Ukraine is one of the results of the already existing conflict. It is a real possibility that the Kremlin will continue its aggressive foreign policy towards its neighbours and neighbours of neighbours in order to consolidate global power and “legitimacy”.

The eternal war in the region exposed the EU’s economic weaknesses in energy exports and supply chains. Military professionals believe that whoever controls the east of the Euro-Atlantic space and/or dominates the Black Sea, can easily project power on the European continent, Central Europe, the Mediterranean, the North/South Caucasus and the Middle East.

Russia eternal war has shown us more dependence, weaponization, interference and more vulnerability of the EU Countries; Security is no longer based on the previously established rules. In the near future It’s unlikely that relations between the EU and Russia will be based on beneficial energy relations. The European Union is moving beyond the binary dependency that binds international actors, creating a new reality in which the inclusiveness of energy security extends to several different areas, diversification will be critical for the EU. Supply chains are complicated and messy, it’s implausible to make positive changes overnight.

Taking into account Russia sharp growth in military spending, its ability to integrate state resources and masses and it’s “great propensity for risk” makes Russia both a “capable and unpredictable actor”. Russia’s blackmail to use nuclear weapons indicates that Kremlin is losing the war due to lack of ammunition and low technological capabilities and in the short term wants to take this war into a protracted or frozen conflict phase.

According to the analysis of the processes of the recent past, the stability of the region cannot be successful and effective only with the support of NATO member states on EU’s eastern flank. NATO, EU and their partners should have an emergency and long-term assistance strategy for the parties. From the lesson learnt in the last 30+ years on international cooperation issues it is vital that in the next 10-30 years the Euro-Atlantic and regional countries (except Russia) in the region, must counter challenges with collective deterrence of cooperation. Actively promoting stability is possible through the existence of the theory of Russian deterrence. Stability should be achieved by promoting collective deterrence and integration of Russia; a strategy of emergency and long-term assistance not only for alliance members, but also for partners, plus collective deterrence equals fixing and integration of Russia.

Speeches and workshops used in editing this paper, Organized by the Research and Policy Analysis Department (RPA) project of Strategic Competition Seminar Series-FY23 SCSS of George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) at Workshop I held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 20-24 February 2023 entitled “Alternative Ukrainian Future Trajectories: Implications for Russia and the West” and Workshop II held in Berlin, Germany on 16 May 2023“ (A summary of FY23 SCSS#8 hybrid seminar entitled “What if? Russian Variables, Inflection Points and Game Changers?” at SCSS Workshop II) have been very supportive in the preparation of the paper.

For the EU and its partners in the region to support the most desirable outcomes and mitigate the worst considering all scenarios discussed in the paper includes following key take-aways:

- 1.Relationships and cooperation matter
- 2.Security guarantees matter

Keywords:

Black Sea region, Economic, Energy, Russia, Ukraine, Military.

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Intradauction

On the one hand, energy plays an important role in the human development and economic growth of the country, on the other hand, it drives complex systems and encourages conflicts. According to the main international agencies Eurostat and EIA, the demand for energy is growing steadily. Scarcity of natural resources and geographical location increase the level of dependence of governments on energy politically, economically and geographically.

An unprovoked war in the wider Black Sea region has greatly complicated an already difficult strategic environment. Kiev took the confrontation with Moscow very seriously and made the wider Black Sea region the center of attention. This study presents the weaponization of the export of energy resources on the eastern flank of the Euro-Atlantic space. One of main question is indeed the sensitive dependence of the EU and its partners on Russian energy supplies; using various experiences in international relations, the question of the work will be: How relevant is it today to talk about weaponisation interdependence of energy relations between Russia and the EU?

Various open reports, books, academic journal articles, official (unsealed) documents, politicians' speeches, and parliamentary results were used in the editing of this paper, and publications of electronic news agencies, which are very supportive of obtaining a general idea about the energy sector both in the Russian Federation and in Western countries.

In the artical “The new EU Energy Security Reality and its Impact On The Wider Black Sea Region“ includes an introduction, tree chapters, three figures (graphs), key takeaways. The introduction conveys the relevance of the issue, goals and motives, which motivated me to choose this topic for the 2023 annual international scientific journal of the National Defense Academy of Georgia. The first chapter focuses on the fragile energy security environment created by the EU's lack of attention, and then next chapter delivered in the period of modern history, using the historical evolution of the Security Concept, we briefly evaluated the history of EU energy security and the current set-up of EU energy security.

Here we can draw a simple conclusion of the brief research work: energy security and dependence on it is a vital issue, closely related to national security and, therefore, a daily concern of national governments and alliances. There is no doubt that the Kremlin is bolstering its foreign policy and power on the European Union's eastern flank through energy export revenues and violating international rules. Research by reading, viewing, and observing is not intended to solve problems, but to help those who are interested in better understanding the problem.

Energy policy is one of the most important political security issues of our time. Russia and the EU are the main subjects of this research for two reasons: firstly, they represent two main different actors in the international field, and secondly, before the invasion of Ukraine, the EU was very dependent on imports of carbohydrates from Russia. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate how outdated the one-way energy dependence between consumer and supplier is in modern relationships. It should be noted that the Russian-Ukrainian war and the protracted conflicts on the southeastern flank of the European Union are seriously jamming the economic potential of the region and have turned the security system into a zone of growing tension. According to the definition of the European Environment Agency (EEA), security of gas supply is “the availability of energy at any time in various forms, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable and acceptable prices”².

Main Part

History Of Eu Energy Security

Just a few months after the invasion of Ukraine, we are witnessing a political and economic crisis at the regional and national level (empty gas storage facilities), which have significantly affected the global energy sector (a catastrophic increase in natural gas prices) and the security of supply channels (Nord Stream). The unjustified war in the region exposed the EU's economic weaknesses in energy exports and supply chains. Regional experts believe that whoever controls the east of the Euro-Atlantic space and/or dominates the Black Sea can easily project power on the European continent, Central Europe, the Mediterranean, the North/South Caucasus and the Middle East³.

According to the definition of the European Environment Agency (EEA), security of gas supply is “the availability of energy at any time in various forms, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable and affordable prices”. Taking into account several important circumstances: a. The Russian Federation was the largest supplier of gas to Europe before the war in Ukraine; b. The European Union has had a single

² Eurostat (nrg_ti_gasm) <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/SEPDF/cache/10590.pdf>;

³ 25 May 2018. What is happening in and around the Black Sea and how does it affect NATO? Published by Pavel Anastasov. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/05/25/the-black-sea-region-a-critical-intersection/index.html>;


gas market since the 90s; c. The provision of European economic and important social service activities is largely dependent on from natural gas, deliberately neglecting other energy sources, In this brief study, we will mainly talk about the security of European gas supply.

European demand for energy is growing steadily. The European consumer mainly relies on energy resources and their supply chains to meet social demands and to ensure economic activities (industry, cooking, transportation, and many others); The scarcity and geographical location of natural energy sources increases the degree of dependence of national governments on energy politically, economically and geographically. The EU has a high import dependency, more than half of energy needs to be imported, though the situation varies greatly in the different member states. Some countries have an energy dependence of ~80% and even 100%, whereas Denmark is a net exporter of energy⁴.

At the national, regional and international levels, energy security is vital and closely linked to national security; The rise in tensions between Ukraine and Russia in recent history and the war in Ukraine have clearly shown us its close relationship with the security of energy supply (gas pipelines and storage, energy markets, LNG terminals, transportation, normal functioning of transit facilities and supply chains).

Before the invasion of Ukraine, Russian gas exports to Europe amounted to 42%. According to Eurostat statistics (Eurostat, Statistic Explained, April 2023), before the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2021, the European Union imported 83% of natural gas from other countries, of which the highest percentage - 23% of natural gas came from Russia, after Russia Norway is the largest importer of natural gas (22.7%), gas was imported to Europe through Ukraine (10.2%) and Belarus (8.9%), the supplier of which is Russia (as ultimate origin). According to Eurostat, in 2021 dependence on natural gas was more than 90% in 15 EU member states. Until February 24, 2022, Brussels' dependence on gas imports from Russia was higher than from Norway. In recent years, the Russian Federation has been the largest supplier of gas to Europe, see image below⁵.

Extra-EU imports of natural gas, transit from neighbouring countries, 2020-2021



Note: This figure refers to the entries of natural gas from non-EU countries in the EU; Switzerland is nevertheless excluded from the list of origins as the gas transiting Switzerland (and entering to the EU from this country which is enclaved into the EU) has been by definition already reported as an entry by another EU Member State.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: nrg_ti_gasm)

eurostat

Figure 1: Percentage of extra-EU imports (entries) of natural gas by country of origin.

In terms of energy resources dependency, a brief overview of energy consumption levels usually shows that the EU's level of dependence on Russian gas until 24 February 2022 was one of the highest in the world. The outdated unilateral energy dependence of the parties is likely to have a significant impact on modern relations and national agendas between the Russian Federation and EU member states.

Taking into account that Russia often obstructed the supply of energy resources to the eastern flank of the European Union, established spheres of influence and created closed spaces (we will discuss this in the next chapter), the Wider Black Sea region was given great importance not only - regionally, but also on the energy security agenda in European continent. A number of key issues are becoming relevant, such as trade in natural resources in the region, their safe transportation and transit opportunities; However, the changing security environment raises a legitimate question about the future of the

4 December 2011. Susanne Langsdorf, EU Energy Policy: From the ECSC to the Energy Roadmap 2050. Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Green European Foundation – GEF;

5 Eurostat (nrg_ti_gasm) <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/SEPDF/cache/10590.pdf>;

region’s security: To what extent will EU energy security make the Wider Black Sea region secure?

In the recent past, natural gas supply interruptions were frequent due to geopolitical factors on the part of Russia; In relation to NATO and EU member states and partner countries Russia “successfully” used not only regular, irregular and hybrid challenges, but also blackmail through natural gas supply. Below, the table summarizes some of the main cases of challenges in the supply of natural gas from Russia.

Uncertain Event	Reasons/Caused	Impact on Countries	Consequences	Outcome
2008-09 The gas crisis, Gazprom threatened to reduce the supply of natural gas to Ukraine	failure to reach an agreement on gas prices and supplies	Hungary, Moldova Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Turkey, Slovakia, gas supply was dropped	On 31 December 2008 gas supplies interrupted. On 1 January 2009 were halted completely	EU member states to hold consultation on the gas crisis
2013-14 clamorous gas dispute, June 2014 gas supplies to Ukraine cut off	delayed debt payments; Annexation of Crimea	Ukraine, European countries. gas supply was dropped	30 October 2014 a deal was reached	Trilateral talks EU, Ukraine and Russia
2022 Russia-EU rattling gas dispute	Ukraine war related gas issues	Ukraine, European countries. gas supply was dropped	On 26 February 2022 Ukraine transit gas exports would be prohibited	EU sanctions on Russia, established shortly after the invasion
September 2022, the leaks Nordstream pipelines from Russia to Europe	Leaks in two gas pipelines were caused by sabotage	The West believed that sabotage would not have a significant impact on Europe’s energy stability	the leaks were lasted for at least a week, until the gas from pipes runs out	The EU’s security of gas supply is fragile

Table 1. Overview of some key cases related to the security of energy supply from Russia.

Although countries generally deal with energy issues at the national level in their own way and by choosing their internal energy balance, it often happens that the impact on one country or region is felt throughout the Union. This attitude, not only in the EU region, but also in hundreds of other organizations, creates the basis for the security of energy supply. Even though, Europe’s gas storage capacity is around 100 billion cubic meters (bcm), in case of necessity, it would cover only a quarter of European demand⁶.

The European Union’s (neighborhood policy) and Russia’s specific interests in the region have a great impact on European Union’s energy security; On the one hand, Russia is creating “spheres of influence” on the eastern and south-eastern flanks of the European Union and disruptions in energy supply chains, on the other hand, it has its own reintegration plan for the region, which at the first stage is aimed at the reintegration of the post-Soviet space. Russia perceives the growing potential of energy transit corridors in the region as a risk and adds an additional dimension to its conflicting interests. The fact that energy exports are a key element of Russia’s overall foreign policy strategy is well captured in a study by Daniel Hamilton, director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, entitled “The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives⁷.”

Russian commodity sales have been under a spotlight a months before the war amid heightened tensions between Moscow and the West over Ukraine. January 21, 2022 Reuters published an interesting study titled “Russia’s oil and gas revenue windfall”. To confirm my opinion here are some numbers from this study. It is a very large figure from the state budget. Russia’s sales of oil and natural gas far exceeded initial forecasts for 2021 as a result of skyrocketing prices, accounting for 36% of the country’s total budget⁸.

Given the very brief overview of energy consumption in the EU provided in the introduction, the context of wars, trends and intentions in the recent past, the next chapter of the paper examines Russian budget revenues and the current set-up of EU energy security.

A huge source of revenue for Russia’s budget

6 February 23, 2023. Analysis: Healthy gas storage warms Europe, but not enough. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/healthy-gas-storage-warms-europe-not-enough-2023-02-23/>;

7 June 30, 2008. Edited by Daniel S. Hamilton, is director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations - SAIS and Gerhard Mangott. pg. 113 Energy Politics, The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations - SAIS, Johns Hopkins University);

8 Factbox: Russia’s oil and gas revenue windfall Reuters January 21, 2022 <https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-oil-gas-revenue-windfall-2022-01-21/>

Monitoring Russian energy revenues make sense because it accounts for about 18 percent of Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) and more than a third of its state budget revenues. Despite the EU embargo on refined products of Russian origin, tax revenue cuts from Russian gas and oil sales, and a price cap that came into effect on February 5, 2023, the damage to the Russian economy remains surprisingly minor. At least according to the official figures, it raises some questions.

Before the war in Ukraine, tax revenue from the sale of Russian oil and gas in 2021 accounted for 45 percent of the Russian's federal budget. According to results for the first half of 2023, a combination of Russian oil price caps, import bans, economic sanctions and low market prices is working even as Russia's energy exports are flowing. The figure below presents the West's efforts to limit the Kremlin's ability to finance the war with Ukraine in 2022 and the first two months of 2023 from Russian oil and gas tax revenues⁹.

Figure 2: Tax revenue from Russia's oil and gas sales (\$1 ≈ 82 rubels in 2022)

Current set-up of EU energy security

Considerable attention should be paid to gas supply disruptions: both regional and global energy security processes require the stability and diversity of energy supply; However, prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, trade in energy resources between the EU and Russia, mutual benefit from Russian pipelines and storage facilities in the EU space did not cause any inconvenience to Brussels. Going back, in the short term, it appears that Russia's share of natural gas supplies to EU countries was potentially high; However, relations between Russia and the European Union have not been stable. Before the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU was still too dependent on Russian gas.

The increase or decrease in natural gas consumption, both nationally and regionally, has a profound effect on the international energy and security architecture. The extremely dependent position of the EU countries on natural gas imports is aggravated by the fact that gas supplies to the EU are provided by a narrow group¹⁰. February 14, 2023. Gas: a history of Energy Security in the EU. And what's next post-Russia? <https://energypost.eu/gas-a-history-of-energy-security-in-the-eu-and-whats-next-post-russia/>

After Russia sharply reduced natural gas supplies to the EU, namely from 42% to less than 10%, It appeared that Europe, due to a mild winter, a sharp reduction in industrial needs and diversification of suppliers in 2022-2023; he spent the winter more comfortably than Russia's possible calculations suggested. Moreover, the European Union now has more natural gas in its gas reserves than it did before the start of the unjustified war in Ukraine. The instant shock caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the 10-fold increase in natural gas prices forced EU countries to buy alternative fuels. If earlier Germany received half of its consumer gas from Russia, now it has refused to do so.

However, a good forecast does not mean that there will be no interruptions in natural gas supplies in individual EU countries. Eastern and southeastern EU countries are particularly vulnerable (Figure 3). The gas infrastructure is still arranged in such a way that the vast majority of gas comes through pipelines through Belarus and Ukraine. It is unlikely that the entire supply of gas to the East will be realized from Western Europe. Although the EU has averted an energy security crisis, serious challenges still remain: 1. replacement of Russian volumes in the short term, 2. still fear of rising and unpredictable prices, 3. security of gas infrastructure and supply chains of non-Russian suppliers, and 4. The untapped potential of the wider Black Sea region's pipelines.




Figure 3: Natural gas flows in the European market, the first half of 2022 vs the first half of 2021, (Bruegel, 2022)

9 APRIL 13, 2023 Increasing pressure on Russia's oil industry <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/russian-oil-industry/>

10 February 14, 2023. Gas: a history of Energy Security in the EU. And what's next post-Russia? <https://energypost.eu/gas-a-history-of-energy-security-in-the-eu-and-whats-next-post-russia/>;

As the historical experience of the recent past, Russia uses the export of energy resources as a geopolitical tool. Russian-Ukrainian energy and conventional conflicts have shown us that energy independence and stability and security of supply chains are vital to the EU. The diversification of energy supplies, aimed at reducing the dependence of the EU on Russia, has further increased the geo-economic importance of the Black Sea region, as Daniel Hamilton noted back in 2008¹¹.

The region is of growing and attractive importance both for Europe's energy security and stability, as well as in terms of transport infrastructure. The Region is also increasing geo-economic importance especially with regard to developing European energy security via the import of hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian Basin and Central Asia and its potential as a hub within a Pan-European Transport Area. The new 2022 Istanbul Grains Agreement and the 2022 Green Energy Transit Agreement raise the importance of the Black Sea.

The Region is a zone of common interest for the two principal institution of the EURO-Atlantic community. Both institutions have close relations with interested parties and aspirant members in the Region. Such relations are essential for the strategic interests of the countries and organizations concerned but not sufficient to ensuring the effective security of European energy security via the import of hydrocarbon resources from the Caspian Basin and Central Asia and its potential as a hub within an European Transport Area.

Five days before the invasion of Ukraine, the Atlantic Council's electronic agency published an extensive study by the Council's senior adviser under the title "NATO must seize the strategic opportunity in the Black Sea". The author of the article rightly points out in the research that unlike the steps taken by the alliance in the Baltic region to contain Russia, it did not consider similar actions in the Black Sea region before the Russian-Ukrainian war¹².

Military Experts believe that the European Union and NATO have almost nothing in the Black Sea, except for Turkey's limited capabilities and The Joint Task Force East of the US Army Europe. The Black Sea Region is at the forefront of a military realignment in Europe seeing a shift from central to south-eastern Europe. The US Army Europe (USAREUR) has created the Joint Task Force East of the US Army Europe and is developing an active military relationship and presence in Rumania and Bulgaria, including pre-positioning of equipment and the forward-deployment of forces when necessary.

To conclude this article we can say; By bypassing Russia, Europe can cooperate with other countries and regions in energy policy. Through energy diversification there is a good experience of relations, the cooperation between the South-East European countries and the South Caucasus countries, in Q2, 2023 Oil transport through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline increased 18 times from 19,200 tons in Q1 to 347,100 tons in Q2. This trend represents an effective export diversification strategy of Kazakhstan in transporting crude oil to European countries¹³.

Conclusion

At the end, it should be noted that International security structured is likely to changing, we have to be prepared for it. The Russia-Ukraine war has shown us more dependence, weaponization, interference and more vulnerability between Russia and the EU Countries; security are no longer based on the previously established rules. In the near future it is unlikely that relations between the EU and Russia will be based on beneficial energy relations. The European Union is moving beyond the binary dependency that binds international actors, creating a new reality in which the inclusiveness of energy security extends to several different areas, diversification will be critical for the EU. Supply chains are complicated and messy, It is implausible to make positive changes overnight.

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13 Jun 14, 2023. By Vusala Abbasova Kazakhstan is Increasing Oil Exports Through Alternative Routes. <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/kazakhstan-increases-oil-exports-via-azerbaijan-2023-7-13-16/>

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The Role of Leadership in Policy Towards Domestic Decisions And its Influencing the Formulation of Foreign Policy

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Abstract

In the process of governance, beliefs and values of civic and religious leaders are utterly significant. In the light of principles of political realism, the politics are commanded by objective laws, the roots of those can be traced to human nature, political behavior of human only depends on human nature. Behaviour of human, as a specific political individual, defines his political actions, being a political actor.

The mission of the following article is to determine the impact of role and decisions of the specific leader on internal politics, as well as international relations context. The subject of research is to explain leader's particular role in foreign affairs decision making and analysis of leaders' traits affecting the formation of foreign policy, by theoretical approach of Neoclassical Realism and practical aspects.

During Researching specific facts of international relations by Neoclassical Realism theory, three levels of analysis are used, first level examining role of leader or leaders, second level explaining internal factors of foreign policy, third level determining systemic factors.

The aim of this research is, both conceptually and practically, on individual analysis level, to determine the impact of ideological views, values and personal decisions of state or spiritual leader, when dealing with deterioration of relations with strategic partners or crisis.

Individual, first level of analysis emphasizes on individual, governmental or non-governmental statesman, country leader, whose political values, political weight, behavior, belief, woes, personal decisions affect internal political environment during decision making process, ultimately defining foreign policy and impacts regional and global security context. Theoretical and practical interaction let us explain the degree of impact of individual psychological, ideological, cultural factors, how political actors perceive their and others' capabilities and how those perceptions translate to foreign policy.

The research showed, that in today's volatile international system, personal decisions of regional and global leaders bear significant role and this topic generally, is a vital challenge of security and economy sphere.

Keywords:

International system, Neoclassical Realism, levels of analysis, systemic factors, analysis of leader's traits, Neoclassical Realism theory and political realism.

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Introduction

Realistic perceptions of international system and theoretical knowledge improve foreign policy analysis, create basis for rightful decisions and directing correct foreign policy.

The aim of the following research is, in its theoretical part, to present the importance of state and religious leaders conceptually, using leading international relations theory Realism, particularly by analysing Neoclassical theory; and to overview the decisions of leaders of different countries in different time period, that significantly affected international, global cooperation context, by qualitative content analysis method in practical aspect.

Research question has been formulated in this way: how do personal values, political views, and decisions of state or religious leader and internal context of the country affect shaping foreign policy.

Research question was answered in **hypothesis**: Personal values, views, belief, perceptions, political woes of state or religious leader, also internal political situation greatly define international cooperation context and affect shaping foreign policy.

In a specific geostrategic dimension, relevancy of a subject, theoretical and practical value are determined by the requirements of public opinion. The following article is interesting and relevant, because, unfortunately in Georgia and abroad, researching by Neoclassical Realism theory is often evaded, which creates vacuum of sources and becomes a sort of challenge for me. The problem of the research is that international relations are mostly affected by second and third levels, and outlining the roles of separate state or religious leaders becomes rather difficult.

This research will give a perception that on the first, individual level of analysis, what kind of impact can a role of state and religious leader, importance and decisions may have on global and regional security context.

Methodological Framework Of The Research

As a methodological framework, qualitative methods, content analysis and Case-Study were used. Research primarily relies on secondary sources, particularly respective materials, proceedings were explored, also statements of political, military, religious leaders; comprehensive interviews were conducted as well with international relations specialists.

Qualitative method allows to thoroughly examine values, views, official statements, interview, facts, style of thinking of decision makers, all of this representing a cognitive process, affecting perception, worldview, resulting in a behavior.

Theoretical Framework

Conceptually and explaining the following cases, Neoclassical Realism theory will be used. In international relations, realism and particularly neoclassical realism studies foreign policies of countries based on tight link and interaction between internal factors and international system.

Neoclassical Realism, in the process of shaping foreign policy, highlights the importance of variables, such as internal political system, interest of society, bureaucratic policy and public opinion.

Neoclassical Realism is based on views of Classical Realism, but unites internal factors to explain political behavior. It states, that when systemic factors, such as distribution of power and international constraints shape state strategic environment, perception of these systemic factors are affected by leader and internal political dynamics.

Main Part

Philosophical and psychological aspects of Neoclassical Realism-The Political Psychology Perspective

The political psychology plays a major role in understanding a political approaches and behaviors, decision making processes, interaction processes between the individuals and groups. Using political psychology is especially important during individual research of political phenomena. In international relations, during first individual level research, psychological factors of leaders bear a great significance in interstate decision making process, regarding public opinion that affects shaping foreign policy.

The most common approach has been to assume that foreign policy has its sources in domestic politics. These Innenpolitik theories argue that internal factors such as political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, or socioeconomic structure determine how countries behave to-

ward the world beyond their borders.²

Despite the differences in time period, Morgenthau, Thucydides, Hobbs and Machiavelli agree on primary views, when they observe an individual as a cornerstone of politics and major actor; according to their common view, leader, an individual must be a rational and make decisions solely based on national interests.

The paper of Hans Morgenthau “Politics of countries: Struggle for power and peace” represents a modern era thinking, continuation of ideas of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbs by the major thesis - Human nature is predatory, inherently vile and dark, which ultimately affects political relations, international relations as well. In the process of directing politics, it is wrong to mention ethics and politics in the same context, because political power is perceived the only guarantee of power. A human is a political animal, aspiring towards power, causing imminent political struggle.³

Thus the concern of political realism is with human nature as it actually is, and with the historic processes as they actually take place. It is opposed to ethical and legal reasoning which fails to take account of political realities. Here Morgenthau is repeating the view which he had set out earlier, that politics are governed by power against which the abstract principles of ‘scientific man’ are of no avail.⁴

The rich history of international relations shows us multiple examples of weak or extremely charismatic leaders actions or inactions leading to the beginning of important processes, such as first and second World Wars.

Classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau attributed egoism and power politics primarily to human nature, whereas structural realists or neorealists emphasize anarchy. Kenneth Waltz’s work is important for both. In *Man, the State, and War*, he defines anarchy as a condition of possibility for or permissive cause of war, arguing that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them. It is the human nature or domestic politics of predatory states.⁵

Leadership Trait Analysis - The role of leaders (Case Studies)

The phenomenon of a political and spiritual leader is a broad concept, its characteristics should be sought in the depth of public thinking, as they must be such actors who have such a necessary feature as the ability to influence the society based on cultural-ideological values. As a result, a shrewd leader will always affect the formation of public opinion and get people to do things they would never do on their own.

Leaders define the state’s international and domestic constraints. Based on their perceptions and interpretations, they build expectations, plan strategies, and urge actions on their governments that confirm with their judgments about what is possible and likely to maintain them in their positions. Such perceptions help frame governments’ orientations to international affairs. Leaders’ interpretations arise out of their experiences, goals, beliefs about the world, and sensitivity to the political context.⁶

The results of qualitative and comparative studies allow to find out the psychological features of the leader and inherent leadership qualities, charisma, whose action or inaction at the global level changed the vector of historical development, as well as determined the form of the state’s foreign policy. The qualities of a leader are influenced by the features of national-psychological and mental development, temperament, beliefs, political environment, strategic visions of predecessors and followers. The named factors and the psychological system allow the leader to make such decisions that determine the formation of foreign policy.

Tornike Turmanidze, associate professor of the Department of International Relations of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of Ivane Javakishvili Tbilisi State University, notes in his interview that “in general, when explaining foreign decisions, it is very difficult to determine which level of analysis is more important, therefore, when studying individual cases, its importance and severity are highlighted. The individual, first level of analysis is very important, because the one who runs the state is very important for the foreign policy of the country, it also matters what type of state we are talking about, therefore, in authoritarian countries, the leader is of greater importance, because no matter what decision he makes, no one can stop him. It is possible that the system has “some” type of restraining mechanism, but still the leader has some freedom of action. When you study the role of a specific leader, we take into account which state we are talking about and what is its internal political regime, how

2 G. Rose, *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, 1998, P.6.

3 ე. სკობის, *საერთაშორისო ურთიერთობების თეორია*. სალექციო კურსი. 2006, გვ.20.

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5 A. Wendt, *Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics*. Cambridge University Press, International Organization Foundation 1992, p. 395.

6 J. Kaarbo, *Personality and International Politics*. Published by: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2017, p 3.

international factors affect the ambitions and plans of this leader, his views and ideology“.⁷

In the neoclassical realist world leaders can be constrained by both international and domestic politics.

While the research programme on leaders' personalities (including Leadership Trait Analysis but also Operational Code Analysis, Motive Analysis, and leader biographies) offers significant insights, there are numerous important directions in which future work in this area should concentrate to further our understanding of how leaders influence world politics.⁸

To support the above arguments, I will give the examples of statesmen of the 19th and 20th centuries.

As a result of Napoleon Bonaparte's ill-advised policy, France found itself in an extremely difficult situation. For France, which is on the verge of maintaining its statehood, the genius of diplomacy **Charles Maurice de Talleyrand** appears as a savior, whose psycho-analytical picture looks like this: a synonym for mediocrity and unprincipledness, flighty, devilish, clever, dexterous, creator of current events in France, served and sold all The government, corrupt and submissive to all kinds of lowliness.

Talleyrand's dispositional signs and predictability of behavior indicate the fact that he possessed the highest level of personology, personality and other psychological theories, he looked at Napoleon not as God, but as a man, he realized quite early that the emperor would destroy the country, which determined his subsequent choices and decisions. It is also interesting his attitude to the victorious coalition leader Alexander I, who is the occupier and conqueror of his country. Talleyrand was well aware of the Russian emperor's personal structure, ambitions for progressive rule, conditioned emotional reactions in the dynamics that allowed him, the “synonym of mediocrity and unprincipledness” to save France doomed to collapse from occupation, contribution, humiliation, rule by foreign tribes. In addition, in a well-packaged, insidious plan, he proposed to the Congress of Vienna to remain within the legitimate boundaries of European countries, thereby maintaining Europe's geostrategic status quo.

Leaders can significantly affect foreign policy, in both democracies and authoritarian states. As Hermann and Hagan have argued: “state leaders play a pivotal role in balancing international imperatives with those arising from, or embedded in, domestic politics.” Leaders influence the motives, strategies, and policies of their own states and are therefore a critical component of their countries diplomatic capabilities.⁹

In the same context, another good example is the work of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

At the end of the First World War, the terms of the temporary truce of Mudros - the peace treaty practically represented the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire, which was signed on October 30, 1918 between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente countries.¹⁰

The national movement founded by Atatürk prevented the victorious allies from collapsing the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the heterogeneous, mental resistance of the population, it created a republic of politically, economically, and culturally western values.

The impact of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's devotedness to the reformation of the Turkish state remains a key element of modern Turkish identity. In 1923, Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey, and his presidency is marked as a period of major societal reform and modernization that launched Turkey into a new era of prosperity. During his time as the leader of the Turkish republic, Atatürk re-designed the political and legal system, revitalized the economy, secularized both government and education in abolishing the caliphate, granted equal rights to women, altered the alphabet as well as traditional attire requirements, and finally, advanced the cultivation of wisdom from the arts, sciences, industry, and agriculture. Atatürk had long believed himself to be the savior of the Turkish state and he was determined from an exceedingly young age to see this conviction come to fruition.¹¹

The philosophies of Plato and Machiavelli in describing the attributes of competent and effective leaders each call for differing qualities of personal character with the common goal of reaching an ideal state.¹²

Let us consider the case of a third, different leader, Adolf Hitler. When Hitler becomes chancellor, Germany is a diplomatically isolated state with no allies. All his first and subsequent decisions were precisely calculated in time and international environment. First, he demanded parity in armaments within the League of Nations, but when he was refused, he left the organization, held a plebiscite and showed Europe that this was the decision of the German people. Hitler played politically precisely with all ideologically opposed countries, he took advantage of the fact that Germany was seen as the only

7 Tornike Turmanidze, associate professor of the Department of International Relations. Tbilisi. 23.10.2023

8 J. Kaarbo, *Personality and International Politics*. Published by: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2017, p 14.

9 J. Kaarbo, *Personality and International Politics*. Published by: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2017, p 3.

10 N. Emir, *DEVLETLERARASI HUKUKU ve SİYASİ TARİH METİNLERİ*. ANKARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ HUKUK FAKÜLTESİ YAYINLARI. 1952. z 1-7.

11 R. Tolhurst, *Atatürk vs. Soleimani: Political Philosophy & Contemporary Archetypes*. 2021. P.44.

12 Ibid. P.21

country capable of restraining the Soviet threat, he consistently cut off the existing European alliances, and at the same time, in public speeches in the Reichstag, he always stated his unselfish support for European peace. It was the support of his own public that ensured the formation of his foreign policy and support in future wars. Politically, he opposed the French and the British, and subsequently he disrupted the peace processes by the hands of the Poles themselves, thereby destroying the French-Polish alias. The achievement of his foreign policy as a leader is the “non-aggression pact” and the deceived Stalin.

What were his strengths and weaknesses, his goals and methods? The answers to these questions reveal a man who was indeed responsible for Germany’s downfall. Answer to the question, do the beliefs of leaders matter in reinforcing or qualifying the democratic peace? Yes, the answer is simple, notion that democratic states are more peaceful than nondemocratic states-as strictly a state-level phenomenon.

Leaders who were high in nationalism and distrust were more likely to act negatively towards others. Building on Hermann’s earlier work, Keller’s study (of 39 leaders in 154 foreign policy crises), found leaders’ traits statistically significantly correlated with the centrality and severity of violence in states’ crises behaviors.¹³

From a democratic point of view, the comparative characteristics of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton will be interesting.

“Are these differences between the two leaders consistent with the pragmatic leadership styles of “muddling through” attributed to Britain and the dogmatic, “legalistic-moralism” attributed to the United States? It appears that the reverse is true-Blair’s leadership style appears to be relatively dogmatic while Clinton’s seems to be more pragmatic-even though the institutional constraints on a president’s exercise of power are less than those on a prime minister’s. Clinton’s operational code toward both types of states is a more pragmatic, flexible leadership style with a choice propensity for strategies of conciliation and appeasement to reach a political settlement. In contrast, Blair’s operational code toward nondemocracies is associated with a more dogmatic, dominant leadership style characterized by a propensity for choosing conflict behavior”.¹⁴

In order to find out what influences the change of beliefs of a particular leader, which subsequently completely or partially changes the nature of decisions, I introduce the issue of change of beliefs using the construction of an “operational code”.

“State leaders play a key role in shaping their country’s foreign policy. Neoclassical realism, which links power dynamics with internal factors, helps explain their moves. For example, President Nixon’s approach with the Soviet Union, the détente policy, wasn’t just about global power balance. He also had to address U.S. concerns post-Vietnam War. On the other hand, Turkey’s President Erdoğan chose to buy the S-400 missile system from Russia. This move was about regional strategy but also about local politics and Turkey’s changing global role. A leader’s personal beliefs can guide their decisions. Nixon, for instance, was strongly anti-communist, which influenced his actions during the Cold War. Then there are pure strategy decisions, like Erdoğan’s missile purchase, which aimed to strengthen Turkey’s defense and possibly change its global partnerships. Sometimes, decisions are made to boost popularity at home. Erdoğan’s strong actions abroad often helped him secure more support within Turkey. Economic growth is another driving force. The U.S. working closely with China, despite disagreements, shows how economic benefits can shape diplomacy. Finally, many leaders, when they’re about to leave office, look to leave a lasting positive impact, to be remembered well in history. In short, a leader’s personal views, strategic goals, domestic politics, economic aims, and legacy wishes all influence how they approach foreign policy”.¹⁵

Operational codes are a particular subset of an individual’s beliefs? those focused on the political universe. These beliefs structure and order reality for decision makers and help them to sort the signals in their environment from the noise. They exert a tremendous influence on how leaders interpret information, perceive the social environment, and make decisions. As such, they have a prima facie claim to relevance in political leadership and decision making. The foreign policy operational code of George W. Bush(GWB) over four distinct time periods: (1) prepresidential beliefs, (2) pre-September 11th beliefs, (3) post-September 11th beliefs, and (4) end-of-term presidency beliefs.¹⁶

GWB’s view of the political universe and other related philosophical beliefs all reversed direction, becoming more negative and conflictual after the terrorist attacks in 2001. The change in role also had an effect on GWB’s beliefs though it seemed to reinforce his prior beliefs, and strengthen them in cer-

13 J. Kaarbo, *Personality and International Politics*. Published by: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2017, p 9.

14 M. Shafer, S. Walker, *Democratic Leaders and the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton*. 2014. P. 19.

15 Interview with Sergi Kapanadze Think tank GRASS - founder and former director. Tbilisi. 19.10.2023.

16 j. Renshon, *Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush*. Sage Publications, Inc. 2008. p 3.

tain cases, rather than changing them.¹⁷

We will find out what was the political world-oriented “operational code” of George W. Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama, which really belongs to a specific subset of individual beliefs of the leaders, what was his personal profile, which had a significant impact on the decision-making process in determining domestic and foreign policies.

For analytical purposes we may distinguish separate components or variables of personality, but it is important to remember that in real life these components interact and modify each other. As an example, consider Obama’s striking quality of calmness, discussed above. Certainly his strong trait of emotional stability, which may have some genetic basis, is an important foundation of this calmness. However, media discussions of Obama’s calmness typically confine their explanations to temperament factors with a presumed genetic heri-tage.¹⁸

Barack Obama’s divergent approaches to the Libyan and Syrian crises are indeed an important case to describe his individual profile. Non-interference in the Syrian conflict was determined by his experience gained from the Libyan conflict, a value conflict occurred in his consciousness, Obama’s belief was that his intervention in the Libyan conflict accurately responded to the challenges of US national security, he perceived himself as a democratic leader, according to his political beliefs, the minimum US The intervention was to protect national interests and values. The conflict in Libya brought enormous economic costs to America, and failed to achieve the goal, which determined the future changes of Obama’s political “belief” towards the Syrian crisis.

It is interesting how Recep Tayyip Erdoğan looks Operational Code Therefore, a Personality Profile of Erdogan’s asks, “did Erdogan’s foreign policy beliefs change in his 20 years of incumbency?”

Turkey foreign policy change is not solely determined by international or domestic factors, but also by the prism of individual leaders’ personal beliefs, such as p resident Erdoğan, or minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.

Erdoğan’s life experience, due to his socio-economic background, is completely different from his predecessors.

Erdoğan’s profile and his political ambition has largely been deliberated to be a results of the institutional and the natural political world.

On Erdoğan’s profile, Yavuz argued that the Turkish populace perceives Erdoğan as a kabadayi and a mazlum. A kabadayi is a figure of reputation, authority, honor, and someone with a role of ‘neighborhood disciplinarian. A mazlum, on the other hand, refers to someone who was wronged. Erdoğan’s worldview is primarily shaped by his religion; Erdoğan does not place much emphasis on notions of a nation or nationalism.¹⁹

The domestic and foreign political vision of the 45th President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, his beliefs, starting from the election debates and the decisions made during his presidency, still cause surprise in scientific and political circles. A clear example is even moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, or even withdrawing military units from Syria. Trump’s foreign policy decisions were part of a long-term, institutionally changed foreign policy. In general, his foreign policy was unpredictable, as his speeches and decisions often did not coincide.

Overall, the results suggest that although the difference is not extreme, Trump differs from a typical US leader in certain important parameters. His main divergence from a liberal-interventionist US leader lies in his reluctance to involve in foreign policy decisions that cannot be narrated as a success story in short term. He has a high belief that he can control events, so he is likely to challenge constraints. This result is in line with Trump’s campaign record, challenging many material and ideational constraints from both within his party and outside it.²⁰

Operational code analysis and leadership traits analysis approaches are used to analyze candidate Trump’s foreign policy beliefs and strategies associated with them. Research results show that Trump’s profile indicates a foreign policy orientation that avoids involvement in affairs that are perceived as beyond immediate interests.²¹

His psychodiagnostic analysis, which is a synthesis of biographical data and media reports, is interesting for assessing Biden’s domestic and foreign activities.

Due to the fact that the president of the USA has a rather important role in the formation of

17 j. Renshon, *Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush*. Sage Publications, Inc. 2008. p 23-24.

18 ,D.J. Winter *Philosopher-King or Polarizing Politician? A Personality Profile of Barack Obama*. International Society of Political Psychology. 2011. p 18.

19 B. Kesgin *Turkey’s Erdoğan: leadership style and foreign policy audiences*. 2020. p 11.

20 Ö. ÖZDAMAR, Do Campaign Speeches Predict Foreign Policy? An Operational Code and Leadership Trait Analysis of Donald Trump’s MENA Policies. 2023. Pp 2-13.

21 Ö. ÖZDAMAR, Do Campaign Speeches Predict Foreign Policy? An Operational Code and Leadership Trait Analysis of Donald Trump’s MENA Policies. 2023. Pp 2-13.

foreign policy, the change of the first person of the White House, in the form of Joe Biden, also caused significant changes in the perceptions of foreign policy and aspects of the “operational code”. Joe Biden’s main ideas, perceptions, attitudes in terms of foreign policy were strategically formed by deepening cooperation with his allies, creating democratic alliances against America’s adversaries and competitors. Unlike the previous president of the White House, Biden’s foreign strategy aimed to restore the role of the US as a leading country through the “dictation” of national security.

In order to more clearly present the psycho-analytical portraits of the above-mentioned leaders, the opinion of Shadiman Bitsadze, academic doctor of history, associate professor of the Department of Security Studies of the National Defense Academy of Georgia named after SSP-Davit Agmashenebeli, is interesting. “Foreign policy is a constituent part of international relations, through which the national interests of the country should be effectively realized in the international arena. In the 20th century, the role of political and religious leaders in the process of foreign policy formation has increased dramatically. In the decision-making process, the individual factor characteristic of the leader as a person is of great importance. The US Central Intelligence Agency developed the so-called “Psychobiographical” methods, which represent a kind of analytical modeling based on the analysis of the leader’s biographical data and lifestyle in a four-module format - I. Emotional factor, II. Biographical data, III. Psychological portrait, IV. Motivation.”²²

Leaders with Biden’s personality profile are likely to exhibit an interpersonal leadership style, characterized by flexibility, compromise, and an emphasis on teamwork; they tend to be conflict-averse and risk-avoidant. In terms of Margaret Hermann’s leadership trait analysis framework, Biden is classified as a leader who respects constraints, is open to information, and is motivated primarily by a relationship focus — prompting a collegial, accommodative leadership style with a focus on reconciling differences and consensus building.²³

Ultimately, whatever one may think about America’s foreign policy as it relates to the Middle East and Israel, Biden’s leadership style and demeanor in this time of crisis are most certainly “presidential”.²⁴

The role of religious leaders

Religion has a special role in the political system and its functioning. The political system, legal-political regime determines what place religion should occupy in the life of the state. Religion plays a rather large role, and sometimes a decisive one, in the formation of public opinion. The authorities of the country often use the role of religion to achieve political goals, since its influence on people is very large. Often religion and politics are so intertwined that it is difficult to know where the line between them is. In some Islamic countries, the spiritual leader functions as a political leader.

The influence of religion on the development of the political system varies among the nations of the region, since the effect of religion finds its roots in the past of a particular nation and depends on the genetic code of that nation.

According to Giorgi Muchaidze, executive director of the Analytical Council of Georgia, “the visions and personal decisions of the state leader have a great influence on the formation of foreign policy in both democratic and autocratic states. In secular states, the influence of a specific religious leader is quite limited, especially when the society is multi-confessional and one religion is not dominant, and atheists represent a significant part of the population. In states with theocratic rule and one religion prevailing, the influence of the views and personal decisions of the religious leader on the formation of foreign policy is higher. Nevertheless, if we are not dealing with totalitarian rule, the domestic context and public visions form the boundaries within which both religious and state leaders have to operate in the formation of foreign policy.”²⁵

Conclusion

As the research showed, political and spiritual leaders are responsible for the formation of the country’s internal policy and are responsible for the formation of foreign policy and the resulting results, respectively. An important manifestation of leadership qualities is a deep analysis of domestic political and global events, an accurate perception of events and facts, consolidation of society and its correct direction based on national interests, the ability to demonstrate special skills in a crisis situation.

22 Interview with Shadiman Bitsadze, academic doctor of history. Tbilisi. 30.10.2023.

23 A.M. Griebie, A. Immelman, *THE PERSONALITY PROFILE AND LEADERSHIP STYLE OF U.S. PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN*. 2021. P 3.

24 Ch. A. Devega, *crisis of moral clarity: There's no contest between Trump and Biden — why are Americans confused?* . October 20, 2023.

25 Interview with Giorgi Muchaidze, executive director of the Analytical Council of Georgia. Tbilisi 26.10.2023.

Leaders in democracies are very important, but not so much as in authoritarian countries, since there are more factors that affect leaders, they have to consider more things, and in this case they have less freedom to act.

The leader's beliefs and role are crucial in foreign policy decisions and foreign policy formation. The more diverse the personal values and values, the greater the chances of peace and stability. But, unfortunately, in the real international situation, leaders are characterized by unreasonable and selfish morality, which is constantly changing and uncertain.

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Turkey's Role in South Caucasus

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Abstract

This paper will study Turkey's influence in South Caucasus. The study applies Barry Buzan and Ole Waever's Regional Security Complex Theorem (RSCT) to understand Turkey's politics in the region since the end of the Cold War. The author of this paper shares the belief with the coiners of the RSCT that it is necessary to combine systemic, regional, national, and domestic factors to provide the most accurate description and prediction of potential developments in international politics. Importantly, it is crucial to wisely combine the age-old tenets of Realist theory with important constructivist concepts to better explain security. In this regard RSCT, in the humble opinion of the author, is the most complete theorem in the field of international relations to analyze the behavior of any particular state and/or dynamics of global and regional interaction among states.

For the purposes of the research it is important to place Turkey correctly in the framework of Buzan and Waever's theory and concepts - that is, classify Turkey correctly according to their taxonomy and fortunately, they help me with this. They have devoted important part of their work to insulator states such as Turkey. Turkey's role as an insulator state is particularly interesting to me. To paint a comprehensive picture of the geopolitics in Caucasus the roles of the US, Russia and EU will be investigated from the perspective of RSCT. Again, the investigation will be detailed and hopefully, productive.

Theoretical Framework:

Following theories will be presented before the author suggests the goggles that should be fashioned for the purpose of this research:

- “Political realism theory”, whose main subject is the state;
- The theory of “cooperative security” - Cohen's concept, which includes recognition of common threats by states and joint efforts on it;
- Complex theory of regional security - RSCT, which is also related to the Copenhagen school.

Keywords:

Political realism theory, South Caucasus, Turkey.

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Introduction

1.1. Neorealism

Different versions of realism in the field of international relations - from classical to neoclassical - distinguish military power as the most important factor determining political relations between great powers, and states in general. Neorealist scholars have proposed three theories to explain states' motivations to engage in multilateral balancing: the balance of power, balance of threats, and balance of interests theories.

According to realist scholars, states care about their military power. The increase in power by some adversely affects the interests of others. To protect their national interests, states engage in unilateral or multilateral balancing. One-way balancing implies economic growth and/or increased military spending. Multilateral balancing occurs when states enter military alliances.

Waltz suggests that balance-of-power politics is found where two and only two requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units willing to survive.² As Waltz and other realists suggest, states' uncertainty about each other's intentions in a decentralized and anarchic system leads to their constant fear and mistrust that states might use force against them at some point. This is a world where there are no permanent friends or allies, but, on the contrary, only permanent interests. For Waltz and others, power is a means of survival. The main concern of states is to maintain their power vis-à-vis other states.³

On the other hand, offensive realist John Mearsheimer starts with the same assumptions as Waltz. That is, the international system is anarchic, the states do not trust each other and take care of their power resources, which is crucial for their survival. But unlike Waltz, Mearsheimer does not think that states are status quo entities trying to maintain the existing balance of power. Offensive realism views states as power-maximizing units. For offensive realists, an anarchic international system encourages states to become more aggressive by expanding and protecting their reach and power.⁴

In his book *The Origins of Alliances*, Walt proposes a theory of balance of threats. Unlike defensive and offensive realists, Walt argues that states become allies against threats, not just against power.⁵ In their quest for survival, states carefully consider the following risk factors:

aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intent.⁶

Schweller proposes the theory of the balance of interests to explain the motivation of states in the international system. According to his theory, countries that can make significant gains from change are more likely to take action to achieve it. In contrast, status quo states are content with their share of the international system and seek to maintain their power. By the same token, revisionist states may prefer to increase their absolute power rather than maintain their own security.⁷

Thus, states, according to neorealist scholars, have different motivations regarding the use of military force. Above I presented three theories from the realist school: the balance of power, balance of threats, and balance of interests theories. According to Waltz, who shared the logic of the balance of power, states are concerned about their security and use force mainly for defensive purposes. In contrast, Mearsheimer believes that increasing security often requires the use of offensive force. Walt suggests that states align against threats. Finally, Schweller, a supporter of the theory of balance of interests, focuses on situations in which states are primarily motivated by territorial expansion and therefore willingly endanger themselves in order to increase their power in the system.

1.2. "Cooperative security" theory - Cohen's concept

After the Cold War, security in the post-bipolar global world has become diverse, multidimensional. A term like "collaborative security" entered the political vocabulary. It represents peaceful international security conditions after the Cold War, growing cooperation and harmony. The post-bipolar order trend was highlighted in the "win-win" game format.

The author of this theory, Richard Cohen, proposes two new concepts of international security - to the classic components of collective security and collective defense, two more important components are added: individual security and stability maintenance. The mentioned components were added to the traditional components because new threats such as cyber-terrorism, natural disasters, etc. appeared in the international arena.

Cohen's concept of "cooperative security" includes the following tools:

2 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010), 76

3 Ibid., 82.

4 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014), 36.

5 Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 66.

6 Ibid., 68.

7 Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (1994): p. 76, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539149>.

1) Recognition of common threats: Countries must recognize common challenges. They are unable to face challenges alone. The growing process of globalization created the need for a unified security system.⁸

2) Increasing mutual understanding of values: There should be ideological congruence among team members. Human rights are best protected by a liberal-democratic state.

3) Institutional format: the creation of common institutions creates a solid platform around common problems and provides for further development and refinement of cooperation.⁹

Collaborative security depends on the four rings of security. Ring 1: Protection of human rights at home and abroad (individual security). Link 2: Support for peace and stability in the common space (collective security). Ring 3: common defense against the enemy (collective defense). Link 4: Providing active stability in other regions; Mutual assistance between allies - political, informational, economic and military (maintaining stability). In order to achieve a strong connection and security, it is necessary to include all four links in the system. Skipping any link will have no satisfactory results.

Michael Mihalka expands the analysis of cooperative security and deepens its theoretical foundations. He traces the history of cooperative security organizations, arguing that they date back to the early 19th century, and extends the concept beyond the Northern Hemisphere to include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹⁰ Mihalka notes that many members of the OSCE and ASEAN are quasi-authoritarian or transitional democracies rather than consolidated liberal democracies. Even states that do not share common values can still cooperate, but only if their ruling elites have confidence in their common future and believe that working together is better than working alone.

However, Mihalka warns the reader that non-democratic countries have limited ability to continue cooperation. They may manage to avoid war with each other - as in the case of ASEAN - but are unlikely to develop a common position on regional threats to stability. Mihalka thus argues that the future success of cooperative security depends not only on the spread of liberal democracy, but also on strengthening economic ties with non-democracies and their sense of a “security community” that serves the interests of all its members. Mihalka, unlike Cohen, concludes that “cooperative security is possible even among states that do not share common values.”¹¹ Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka have done a great job of presenting their views on this topic. Their disagreement on the topic testifies to the complexity and importance of the issues they raise.

1.3 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

Having reviewed neorealism and cooperative security theories in the previous two sections I cannot help but feel that they are too abstract, too theoretical. They need more grounding, more geography, more gravitation and laws of physics. After reviewing RSCT my reader will know better what my rambling is all about.

From the perspective of RSCT, a key weakness of both the neorealist and cooperative security approaches to security is that they either overplay the role of the global level and/or underestimate the role of the regional one. Neorealism is a systemic theory and chooses not to lose itself in so-called levels below systemic. But as Buzan and Waever and many others have showed and what I will try to demonstrate with the case of Turkey in this study, one cannot simply explain the behavior of states through systemic factors. Regional variables might be at least as important as systemic variables in understanding state security policy. And also, in many ways regional variables shape the way systemic variables affect states.

According to the central idea of RSCT, since most threats are geographically close to each other, security interdependence is usually organized into regional clusters, which are called security complexes. It is important to note that the securitization process is inherently open and influenced by a number of factors. Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is an international relations theory developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wever in 2003 in *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Buzan and Waever are perhaps best known as key figures in the influential Copenhagen School of Security Studies, where security as a social construct is a central tenet. RSCT uses a mixture of materialist and constructivist approaches. From the side of materialists - the idea of limited territoriality and redistribution of forces, which is close to neorealism. And, from the constructivists - the theory of securitization, which focuses on the political process through which the issue of security is determined, where hostility and friendship are independent variables. RSCT argues that international security must be viewed from a regional

8 Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka, *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order* (George C. Marshall European Center for Security studies, 2001), 43.

9 Ibid., 45.

10 Richard Cohen, “Cooperative Security: From Individual Security to International Stability,” *Cooperative Security: From Individual Security to International Stability* | George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies, accessed February 10, 2023, <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-papers/cooperative-security-new-horizons-international-order/cooperative-security-individual-security-international>.

11 Ibid.

perspective and that relations between states (and other actors) exhibit regular, geographically clustered characteristics.¹²

Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) are defined as clear and stable patterns of security interactions between actors. They differ from each other in the degree of interaction. The level of interaction between members of the same RSC is high, and between members of different RSCs is relatively low. As the name implies, regional security complexes are geographical in nature, composed of neighboring actors and isolated from each other by natural barriers such as oceans, deserts, and mountain ranges. Individual states can also act as such “insulators” between RSCs.¹³

RSCT argues that the actions and motivations of actors in the field of international security are strongly regional in nature. The theory is complicated by the presence of actors with global security interests and power projection capabilities. However, Buzan and Weaver argue that even the security interests of global powers are fundamentally regional. Their involvement in regional security issues should most often be seen as a challenge to emerging issues in the region.¹⁴

RSCs can be interpreted as autonomous systems, as “micro” systems embedded in a larger, global political system. The RSC contains its own security dynamics, which under normal circumstances are largely independent of global security dynamics. This allows us to apply various IR concepts – such as balance of power, polarity and interdependence – on a regional scale.

The theory also includes the concepts of regional subcomplexes (essentially RSCs within RSCs) and supercomplexes (essentially surrounding neighboring RSCs). Buzan and Waever think that security interests are primarily regional. This contrasts with the prevailing view during the Cold War, which saw regional security policy as a reflection of the interests of the global great powers. Buzan and Weaver point to the Middle East, where the security landscape has not changed despite the end of the Cold War.¹⁵

Buzan and Waever call for a kind of expansion of the monolithic neorealist school of international relations. They emphasize the importance of adopting a regional perspective (as opposed to a dominant global system perspective) and call for greater attention to security actors other than states. The concept of security not as an objective fact, but as an intersubjectively constructed social phenomenon is a pillar of the Copenhagen school of IR. According to RSCT, regional security complexes cannot be identified or understood only by examining material differences between actors, attention must also be paid to how actors interpret such material facts.

Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT): main variables

In an anarchic world RSCs are a common fact. They act as a transmission belt between global forces and their regional manifestation. As such RSCT has an important theoretical characteristic, it is agreeable with most realist, liberal or other theories that operate at system level. At the same time, like constructivism the theory recognizes that deep down their actions and interpretations are not just a reflection of the distribution of power – security is also determined by patterns of amity/enmity among states.

RSCT emphasizes the importance of a distinct middle level between state and system, which the theory like realism does not bother to explore. The theory stresses that most of the security issues arise at the regional level; states are afraid of their neighbour and they ally with other actors from the same region, and commonly regions are geographically (mountains, lakes, seas, etc.) separated from each other, or they might be separated by insulator states. The concept of an insulator state is unique to RSCT and signifies a location occupied by one or more unit where larger regional security dynamics take place.

In their 1998 book Buzan and Waever provide the following definition of RSC: “a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.”¹⁶ The main idea here is that the most important process of securitisation will necessarily take place in regions. Again, these processes of securitisation will be different from global processes. And, global and regional levels need to be understood separately.

In RSCs the realist logic of anarchy and geographic proximity affect neighbour states. The mechanism of penetration allows global powers to align with regional powers.¹⁷ It is important to note that RSCs are structures in the international system in which units are relatively interdependent, and their relations are much more intense than that of other units. But because vulnerability is often related with distance, the relationship is far from uniform. So anarchy and distance effect the relationship between states and produce regionally based patterns of relations, so called security interdependence, which are more intense

¹² Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 10.

¹³ Ibid., 12.

¹⁴ Ibid., 20.

¹⁵ Ibid., 21.

¹⁶ Ibid., 44.

¹⁷ Ibid.

among the states in the region/complex than between those in the states and outside of it.¹⁸

The more power a state has the further it can extend its influence beyond its immediate region. Superpowers abide less by the logic of geography and distance – they are omnipresent. Then there are great powers that penetrate at least one more region beyond their immediate. And then there are small states that are locked in their regions with their neighbours. Outside powers to a region when they make security alignments with states inside a region are called to penetrate it.

As mentioned before, RSCs are characterized by patterns of amity/enmity taking place in a geographically specific area. Amity-enmity variable in RSCT is based on Wendtian constructivist social theory. Wendt offers three social structures of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian.¹⁹ The idea is based on what kind of roles states play in the system, whether they are enemies, rivals or friends. What is important to consider here is that RSCT is a healthy mix of constructivist and realist theory, meaning that only realist take on distribution of power is not enough to predict the security dynamics in regions. Amity/enmity is very important to understand relationships among states. And learning history can contribute decisively in the process as well as factors like culture, religion and geography.²⁰

RSCT consists of four levels: 1) domestic 2) state-to-state relations/regional 3) interregional 4) the effect of global powers in the region.²¹ There are also subcomplexes, which if complexes are very big can exist as relatively autonomous parts of a larger complex. It is very important to keep in mind that all levels of analysis are very important and in different scenarios different levels of analysis can be more important than others. But what is important to mind is that the regional level will always be very important and should be part of analysis.

According to RSCT every RSC has an essential structure which consists of following variables: 1) boundary 2) anarchic structure 3) polarity with attendant distribution of power 4) social construction/amity/enmity among states. Given the developments there are three possible outcomes: 1) maintenance of status quo 2) internal transformation, for ex. regional integration 3) external transformation, when for ex. the boundaries of RSCs merge.²²

It is also important to categorize security complexes according to their polarity and types, in terms of amity/enmity ranging from conflict formation to security regime to security community. These are similar to Wendt's Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian worlds. But there are also standard and centered RSCs. In a standard RSC there are at least two powers whose security agenda is military-political. Such complexes are anarchic. Polarity is defined here by regional actors.²³ Centered RSCs come in a few forms. In two forms they are unipolar with a power being a superpower or a great power. The third variant can be a region, like for example the EU, integrated by laws, rules, norms, institutions and etc. The EU is a sort of security community with certain actor qualities. Legitimacy is an important variable designating the degree of acceptance.²⁴ Having too many powers scattered around the world makes it possible for the world populated with great power regional security complexes or supercomplexes. Great power regional security complex implies that there is more than one great power inside it and naturally, the security dynamic within it is virile. Also, intense spillover might bind discrete complexes into supercomplexes with one or more great powers at their core.²⁵

Shortly, it needs to be mentioned why sometimes RSCs fail to form. Such conditions are overlay and unstructured complexes. Overlay implies that an outside power comes to dominate the region so that local security patterns do not develop sufficiently. For example during the Cold War, Europe was overlaid by the US-USSR rivalry. Unstructured regions occur for two reasons, either when states are so weak that they cannot exert power beyond their borders or where their geographical borders isolate them from other states.²⁶

As mentioned before, a region can undergo internal or external transformation or get overlaid; rarely does it unravel back to an unstructured region. To understand internal transformation it might be handy to check material conditions for changes of polarity conditions contributing to changes of amity/enmity. The potential for external transformation can be observed by observing interregional security. Where such dynamics are intense change is more likely. Using variables such as interaction capacity, power differentials and system polarity will refine the research.²⁷ Interaction capacity, which stands for

18 Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, "The Future of the South Asian Security Complex," *South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers*, 1986, pp. 246, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-07939-1_9.

19 Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 50.

20 Ibid.

21 Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, "The Arms Dynamic in World Politics," January 1998, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685854003>, 201.

22 Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 62.

23 Ibid., 62.

24 Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2010), 145.

25 Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 62.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 67.

technological and social infrastructure for transportation and communication influences regional security.²⁸ With low interaction capacity regions will probably be unstructured. Standard RSCs would require high interaction capacity.

Again, Buzan admonishes us that it is important to avoid the fallacy that orthodox Waltzians fall for. That is not to make the error of explaining what happens in any given region directly from the perspective of the global distribution of power. Because the relevant power distribution for local actors in the region is of course local.²⁹ But Waltzians are used to thinking globally not regionally and thus, they are prone to such omissions. Realist theory forgets historical and geopolitical in its abstract systemic theorization and it ignores that states are non-mobile.

In the footsteps of Buzan and Waever this study looks at security through concrete political geographic dimension, without unjustified abstraction of Realism. In RSCT security is viewed through the prism of geography. However, just like in Realism, power politics will be an important component that RSCT will be built on. But along with power it is important to add constructivist method and the concept of securitisation to RSCT. Buzan and Waever have included more than military-political security in security studies. For them security is not only state-centric but also societal, that is the referent object is any collectivity whose identity is threatened.³⁰ The authors eloquently distinguish the whole system of referent objects and securitising actors, that is those who securitise. What is significant in this vision of security is that a securitising actor assumes a role of breaking regular rules for the sake of security. What is crucial here is that the matter has turned constructivist and the questions are when and under what conditions who securitises what. It is important to realise that this whole reality is a process. Again there are conditions that help but the theory is not causal but rather a performative act, it produces genuine novelty.³¹

To understand security in constructivist RSC framework it is important to look at the following points: is the issue securitised successfully? If yes, then how does this security action effect the other and where? If there are many chains clusters can form. As such, it is decisive to remember that security in RSCT is a discursive phenomenon and cannot be explained solely by objective geographic and/or power considerations.

To sum up, the strenght of the RSCT is in its bottom-up approach, which captures the specifics of regions and how they determine regional and regional effect of global politics. Buzan and Waever provide excellent taxonomy which allow just that also the theory might lack Waltzian parsimony and elegance it certainly compensates the lack of which in relevance. The theory, what is important, allows to compare regions because it provides thoretical concepts; it also describes connections and mechanisms in its theoretical frame. The theory distinguishes global from regional as two separate levels and allows researchers to study their interaction. Regions are seperated into different regional security complexes (RSCs). And RSCs can have different nature: some unipolar, bipolar and etc. Complexes can have insulators between them, or they can be divided into sub- and supercomplexes. Moreover, intense dynamics could lead to the transformation of regions.

Unlike Waltzian theory which is largely static and permits only structural change via power, RSCT allows for the study of change in much richer and more realistic typologies. Except for power and geography- those material factors, RSCT employs securitization, a constructivist concept, which allows to distinguish regions from each other. It is important to remember that one cannot infer from objective factors to following developments. The security actors fight out among themselves is the security they make out.

Having explained in details the theoretical framework used in the research it is due time to proceed to applying its empirical counterpart and namely to understanding Turkey's role in Caucasus.

Turkey and South Caucasus

During the Cold War Turkey wanted to be European, modern, Western. It was a member of NATO, OECD and the Council of Europe. It had aspirations to join European Union. The relationship towards Russia was that of a NATO country. It also did not engage much in the Middle East and Central Asia. As an insulator state Turkey avoided to be drawn into wars around it. After the Cold War Turkey lost its importance for a while. It was not needed anymore, Eastern and Central Europeans rose in rank and Turks started to have an identity crisis. Soon Turkey started to project its influence towards Central Asia and Caucasus. Especially, Caucasus was elevated in the international project over pipelines.³²

By the end of 1990s Turkey seemed to realize its role towards different regions. It did not want to accept its role as an insulator state and defined itself as the center of European and Asian continents but it is only a proclamatory statement for Turkey does not possess neither power nor legitimacy to play such

28 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Beyond Westphalia?: Capitalism after the 'Fall,'" *The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989–1999*, 2000, pp. 89–104, <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511599767.007>.

29 Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 69.

30 Ole Waever, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 27.

31 Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 69.

32 *Ibid.*, 393.

a role. But de facto Turkey understands its regional role, its insulator position and has increased interest in regions and regionalism.³³ Turkey has started to label itself a ‘Bermuda triangle’ between the conflict regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East.³⁴

Normally, insulator states are not active policy-makers. But after the Cold War Turkey has acted contrary to this notion. And, it is actually possible for states like Turkey to be active insulators. At the same time it remains an insulator between different regions because it is not powerful enough to bring different regions into one. So other powers, like for example Greece, Russia, Syria and others do not see so much threat coming from Turkey that would make them get together. If they did then regional politics and its geography would change and Turkey could cease to be an insulator. And there is one more but, if Turkey becomes powerful enough, that is if it becomes the regional great power it claims it is, it might trigger its neighbours to coalesce against it. But for the foreseeable future it seems Turkey will remain an insulator state, because although it is very active in its foreign policy, it has neither actual power nor potential resources to change the status quo, and it will stick to many of the policies traditionally adopted by insulators.

But it is important to understand with regard to whom Turkey will not be able to change the status quo. And here when we concentrate on Caucasus it is crucial to mention another power, namely Russia who has a claim to the region. And again this region should be understood from the perspective of EU-Europe and US, because the first is an expanding RSC bordering with Caucasus and the second is the only superpower with global interests, and specific interests in Caucasus. So, in our classification system, Turkey is an insulator Russia is a regional great power, EU-Europe is a RSC which is expanding into Caucasus and the US is the only Superpower. Now that we have a more or less full roster of actors (again, this theory is state-centric) it is easier to understand the following.

The RSC in which Caucasus is located is centred on a great power – Russia. It was a superpower as a Soviet Union. Now, a few words about discursive element of Russian policy: Duma, Russian parliament securitises the issue of ethnic Russians in the neighbouring states. There are over 25 million Russians living in neighboring states and according to the Russian government threat to their lives is threat against the Russian state. Putin’s policy has been to consolidate the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a means to gaining control of the RSC.³⁵ But it is evident that the CIS has failed to develop which speaks poorly to Russia’s image of the RSC’s leader.

The second important organization in Russia’s RSC is GUAM. As an organization it faces even more problems than CIS. But it is important to take it into the picture for our purposes to have a full understanding of Russia’s and Turkey’s role in Caucasus. Existence of GUAM is an indicator of the participants’ dissatisfaction with Russian influence.³⁶ If the members manage to cooperate among themselves and the US and EU they will be able to escape Russian dominance, just like Eastern Europeans did. And the same logic applies with regards to Turkey, just in case it decides to bully around. GUAM’s importance is making Black Sea Region and namely, Caucasus open to NATO and EU membership, at least open to some of the GUAM members. And, if GUAM countries follow through on their commitment, that is if their domestic governments remain pro-Western, Russia a weakened great regional power can do little to obstruct it.

Caucasus is a subcomplex in the RSC of Russia, and it has two parts North Caucasus, which is part of Russian Federation and South Caucasus consisting of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. For the sake of this research South Caucasus is the region of primary concern. The region is of external interest for Turkey, Iran, the USA and EU.³⁷ South Caucasus (Trans-Caucasus) is battered by secessionist conflicts and issue of alignments out of the region. Georgia is plagued by the secession of three regions: Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adzharia. Russia uses these conflicts to seal its influence on the region.

Nagorno-Karabakh is a region in Azerbaijan mainly settled by Armenians which Stalin made an autonomous region within Azerbaijan.³⁸ Conflicts in the region have been on and off since 1987, latest being 2022. Russia and Turkey have, of course, played the central roles in brokering the peace. But the settlement of the conflict is not close in sight. What has been stable is the relationship between Turks and Azerbaijanians, who continue to be allies, and the same is true about Russians and Armenians. Surrounded by Muslim states Armenians do not have much choice. What is important is that Russia and Turkey have come to see that their powers are limited in South Caucasus, but even so they have not given up their position in the region. What is surprising is that they have means to control the region, not unilaterally, and in coordination with each other, but still, they have.

33 Ibid., 394.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., 411.

36 Ibid., 412.

37 Ibid., 419.

38 Paige Sullivan and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: Documents, Data and Analysis* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 598.

As EU enlargement has been rolling east after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it has come to play one of the major roles in the region. Just like the United States it has interest in pipelines. Especially so, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when EU's dependence on Azerbaijani resources has increased. Caucasus is important for its oil and gas and Turkey, EU and US recognize it. For countries like China it is because of energy, for Turkey and EU it is because of economic importance, for others like Russia and the US it is mainly because of influence. For Russia oil and gas resources are a matter of national security.

Caucasus is a mini-complex and an insulator, but still where Russian influence is strong and it remains a sub-complex within Russian RSC. At the moment the complex has more or less Russian component: 1) Russia actively helping secessionist governments 2) Russia encouraging spillover between North and South Caucasus among ethnic groups 3) Russian policy regarding Energy and Pipeline.³⁹ But what is worrisome for Russia are possible developments which can make South Caucasus a more insulated mini-complex with a bipolarised structure on one side Turkey and the USA supporting Azerbaijan and Georgia and on the other, Russia and Iran supporting Armenia.

As mentioned before Russia is a great power in a centered region. And it is also part of a weak supercomplex with EU-Europe.⁴⁰ Three transformations are possible regarding Russia's role. 1) Russia's global position can change 2) Its RSC can transform from centred to balanced 3) External transformation is possible regarding the border to Europe.⁴¹ Regarding its role as a global power Russia as we see is doing utmost to keep itself among great powers. Regarding the second point if GUAM evolves it can transform the complex into a more balanced one. And this is quite possible. Turkey could help here too. Regarding the third point, as mentioned before the ever expanding European Union will reach Caucasus and it will no longer be only Russia's RSC.

As the picture shows Caucasus is a part of Russia's RSC and EU RSC is slowly but surely has been growing in its influence since the end of the Cold War. One RSC is centered on EU, another one is centered on Russia. Turkey is an insulator state between the two RSCs. The EU RSC is a security community and it is highly legitimate among its members. On the other hand, the Russia's RSC is dominated by Russia's power and Russia's legitimacy is constantly challenged. It is likely that if EU's RSC continues to grow externally and cohere internally, Russia will be challenged in its RSC more and more, to the point that two RSCs will merge into one supercomplex.

It is unlikely that Russia will be able to reestablish an imperial/Soviet control over Caucasus. As mentioned before it is possible that groups like GUAM form a counterweight to it. And, what is more likely is that with the involvement of external powers like the US and Iran a minicomplex will form as part of a EU-Russian supercomplex with countries siding either with Russia or the US/EU.

But how about the insulator role of Turkey or such mini-complex as Caucasus? Insulator separates from each other two or more distinct regional security dynamics. In case of Turkey it is two: EU-Europe and Russia RSCs. It is important to remember that in its most basic exposition RSCT consists from RSCs, insulator states, and global level powers. That is all states are part of RSCs excluding global level powers and insulator states. The latter belongs either to no region or to several.⁴² As mentioned there are special cases of insulators called mini-complexes. Now, typical insulators differ from mini-complexes in that they face complexes around them but do not link them, while mini-complexes do. For example, Turkey in this regard is a typical insulator, whereas Caucasus is, of course, a mini-complex. Mini-complexes are normally small and weak. But if the Russian power continues to diminish Caucasus will probably grow to be an insulator.⁴³ However, at the moment the Caucasus is very weak, and despite its weakness Russia is still strong enough to make sure that Caucasus is a subcomplex which functions as an insulating mini-complex inside Russia's RSC. But with the passage of time, there are all signs that Caucasus will gain its insulator status.

Conclusion

As this study tried to demonstrate RSCT is an excellent tool to study regional security. RSCT suggests that the regional level is the most important or at least as important as the global or domestic levels. But it does not require it to be the only level, or the only important level to study international security. RSCT differentiates global and regional levels and dynamics and allows for a more nuanced explanation of security developments, better explanation of how global and local dynamics interplay to produce the endproduct.

For the given study RSCT has been used to investigate the role of Turkey, Russia, EU and the US in the security of South Caucasus. While the emphasis in this research is on Turkey, the reader, the one who has read so far, would have realized that the RSCT is interactive and as such requires drawing a world

39 Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 423.

40 Ibid., 435.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., 484.

43 Ibid.

apart of an individual world of each actor, if you allow me the frivolity of expression. Anyhow, the final work described the European Union, the US, Russia, along with Turkey in creating the reality in South Caucasus.

Important observation is that South Caucasus is a centered RSC, with Russia as its center. And, according to RSCT in centered RSCs classical balance of power dynamic is suppressed. But an important development here is that with the passage of time Russia will be more and more challenged in its RSC, by growing EU-Europe complex bumping into it and producing one supercomplex, or GUAM countries uniting and producing a counterweight. As a reminder the first scenario will lead to the following development: with the involvement of external powers like the US and Iran a minicomplex will form as part of a EU-Russian supercomplex with countries siding either with Russia or the US/EU. Here, Turkey will be just an insulator state among two complexes which will lose its insulator function and will side with either one of the parties.

As mentioned beforehand, Turkey has been an unconventional insulator by being quite an active one. But being weak it has been unable to bring the different RSCs together into one arena. If regional powers qua potential enemies like Russia, Greece, Syria and etc., start taking Turkey seriously then transformation of RSC could be expected. Insulator states are good candidates for transformation theoretically. However, historically and empirically such cases are quite rare.⁴⁴ As such in the near future Turkey will not be able to command enough power to disturb the status quo of the Russian RSC and have to wait for developments in the EU-Europe and Russian supercomplex and the US foreign policy towards Caucasus.

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⁴⁴ Buzan and Waever, *Regions and Powers*, 487.

Using Linear Regression in the Context of Military Power Enhancement

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Abstract

The article explores the application of linear regression in the context of military power enhancement. Linear regression analysis is employed to identify the key factors that contribute to military strength, such as defense expenditure and military personnel levels. The study utilizes data from 31 NATO member and partner countries and employs open-source data for analysis. The research aims to determine the impact of various independent variables on the dependent variable, the Military Strength Ranking for 2022, and identify which variables can be adjusted to achieve greater military power. The study's hypotheses are tested to establish the significance of each variable. The results indicate that defense expenditure and military personnel are statistically significant factors influencing military power. A higher defense budget and greater military personnel correlate positively with a higher Military Strength Ranking. However, the study acknowledges the challenge of balancing defense spending with civilian priorities, known as the “guns versus butter” dilemma. The importance of efficiently allocating defense funds to maximize military capability is emphasized, as history has shown that mere financial resources do not guarantee security. The study recommends increasing the share of military personnel, reducing administrative costs and optimizing structural units, particularly in supply and administration areas and the civil office's structural units, to enhance military capability within existing defense budgets. Additionally, the role of reserve forces is highlighted as a valuable resource for augmenting combat capabilities. The article underscores the need to strike a proper balance between active and reserve components of military capability.

Keywords:

Linear regression, military power, defense expenditure, military personnel.

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Introduction

Originally proposed by Sir Francis Galton in 1885, linear regression is a statistical method employed to establish and quantify the relationship between the variables under consideration.²

Linear regression analysis elucidates the connection between a set of independent variables and a dependent variable by formulating an equation in which the coefficients delineate the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable. This equation can also be employed for making predictions.

Mathematically, the simplest form of linear regression can be expressed as follows: $Y = a + b \times X + e$. In this equation:

- Y signifies the value of the dependent variable, which is the variable being predicted or explained.
- “a” or Alpha represents a constant that corresponds to the value of Y when X equals zero.
- “b” or Beta denotes the coefficient of X, which signifies the slope of the regression line, illustrating how much Y changes for each unit change in X.
- X represents the value of the independent variable, which is what predicts or explains the value of Y.
- “e” represents the error term, signifying the discrepancy in predicting the value of Y given the value of X (although it is typically not explicitly shown in most regression equations).³

The multivariable regression model can be expressed in the following manner: $Y = a + b_1 \times X_1 + b_2 \times X_2 + \dots + b_n \times X_n + e$.

Increasing military power is essential for national security, defense against potential threats, and maintaining geopolitical stability. A strong military act as a deterrent to aggression, provides the capability to respond to crises, and enhances a country’s influence in international affairs. Linear regression can aid in achieving this goal by analyzing historical data to identify key factors that contribute to military power, such as defense expenditure, personnel levels, etc. By understanding the relationships between these variables and military strength, decision-makers can allocate resources more effectively, develop evidence-based defense policies, and prioritize areas for improvement.

In this study, a linear regression analysis model was utilized to establish the correlation between a set of independent variables (x) - including Defense expenditure in US dollars at current prices and exchange rates for 2020, Defense expenditure as a percentage of real GDP for 2020, and Military personnel for 2020 - and the dependent variable (y) - Military Strength Ranking for 2022, as indicated in Table 1.

This model was instrumental in quantifying the influence of each of the mentioned input variables (x) on the military power index (y), thereby facilitating an analysis of which inputs could be adjusted to enhance military power. Based on the study’s outcomes, recommendations were formulated to improve a nation’s military capability.

Main Part

1. Literature Overview

According to Bluman, regression is a statistical approach widely employed by researchers in various fields to elucidate the relationship between variables.⁴ There are two types of relationships recognized: the first is simple regression, involving two variables – an independent (explanatory) variable and a dependent (response) variable. The second type is multiple regression, which entails two or more independent variables used to predict a single dependent variable. The nature of this relationship between variables can be linear or nonlinear, as well as positive or negative.⁵

In their article, Kumari & Yadav explained the fundamental concepts and provided guidance on performing linear regression calculations in SPSS and Excel.⁶

Foong et al. introduced a novel technique that incorporates the use of test statistics, p-values, and the coefficient of determination in hypothesis testing.⁷

Schober & Vetter pointed out that linear regression is an exceptionally versatile method with broad applicability in medical research, capable of addressing various research questions and study objectives.⁸

2 Kh. Kumari, & S. Yadav, Linear regression analysis study. Journal of the Practice of Cardiovascular Sciences, 4(1), 2018. 33-66, p.1 <https://tinyurl.com/dae3zv8f>

3 California State University. (No date). PPA 696 RESEARCH METHODS SIMPLE REGRESSION. <https://tinyurl.com/7cv86s77>

4 A. G. Bluman, *Elementary statistics: a step-by-step approach 8th Ed.*, p. 534. McGraw-Hill, 2012. <https://tinyurl.com/2b4453e7>

5 Ibid.

6Kh. Kumari, & S. Yadav, Linear regression analysis study. Journal of the Practice of Cardiovascular Sciences, 4(1), 2018, 33-66 <https://tinyurl.com/dae3zv8f>

7N.G. Foong, , Ch. Y., Ming, Ch. P. Eng, & N. K. Shien, An Insight of Linear Regression Analysis. Scientific Research Journal, 15(2), 2018, 1-16, p. 4 <https://tinyurl.com/3eu9kejj>

8 P. Schober, , & Thomas R. Vetter, Linear Regression in Medical Research. Anesthesia & Analgesia, 132(1), 2021, 108-109, p. 108

Edelman et al. attempted to enhance the accuracy of predicting total procedure time (TPT) by employing linear regression models based on estimated surgeon-controlled time (eSCT) and other pertinent variables.⁹

Schneider et al. regarded linear regression analysis as a crucial statistical tool for analyzing medical data. They briefly expounded on the theory behind linear regression analysis and provided illustrations for interpreting statistical parameters.¹⁰

Uyanik & Güler aimed to illustrate the process of multiple linear regression analysis by investigating whether the five independent variables in the standard model (specifically, end-of-the-term scores obtained from courses in measurement and evaluation, educational psychology, curriculum development, guidance, and teaching methods) could significantly predict the KPSS score, which served as the dependent variable. This analysis was based on ANOVA statistics.¹¹

Li et al. examined the factors influencing wartime equipment waste and introduced a predictive model for wartime equipment waste using multiple regression analysis. They employed the ordinary least-squares approach, complex correlation coefficient, and t-test in their analysis.¹²

Choi & Suh proposed a research framework to systematically forecast spare parts demand for military aircraft. They evaluated the predictive performance of various data mining techniques and identified which managerial feature set was most effective for accurately forecasting military aircraft spare parts demand.¹³

Khan & Al Zubaidy, in a study involving students from different programs at a Military College, explored the connection between students' performance and factors such as military or physical training, academic aptitude, and the time spent on training needs analysis modules.¹⁴

Boekestein utilized logistic regression analysis to predict future violent conflicts globally and identify variables that significantly contributed to violent conflict.¹⁵

Kalin applied linear regression to a range of countries under the United States European Command (EUCOM) and the United States to assess the efficiency of each country in achieving military power. The study also investigated the overall relationship between military power and the selected variables.¹⁶

The summarize, linear regression analysis is a versatile method that finds utility in a wide array of domains, including the defense sector. Researchers in different domains use linear regression to understand relationships between variables, whether simple or multiple, and predict outcomes. The mentioned studies demonstrate the use of linear regression in medical research, education, wartime equipment waste prediction, spare parts demand forecasting for military aircraft, performance analysis of military college students, and predicting future violent conflicts. It shows how linear regression remains a versatile and valuable statistical method in addressing diverse research questions and aims.

2. Research Methodology

All variables for this study were pulled from open sources.

A total of 31 NATO member countries, as well as aspirant and partner nations like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, were chosen for the Excel-based regression analysis. The data was organized such that each variable occupied a separate column, as illustrated in Table 1.

Defense expenditure encompasses all expenditures, both current and capital, related to a state's armed forces. In theory, a higher level of defense expenditure suggests better military capability and, consequently, a higher position in the Military Strength Ranking. However, as Harrison pointed out, how money is allocated in defense matters just as much as the total amount available. History is replete with

<https://tinyurl.com/4rbjhcxu>

9 E. R. Edelman, S. M. J. van Kuijk, A. E. W. Hamaekers, M. J. M. de Korte, G. G. van Merode, & W. F. F. A. Buhre, Improving the Prediction of Total Surgical Procedure Time Using Linear Regression Modeling. *Front. Med.*, 4, Article 2017,85, p. 1 <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmed.2017.00085/full>

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15 B. C. Boekestein, A Predictive Logistic Regression Model of World Conflict Using Open-Source Data. *Theses and Dissertations*. 2015. <https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/101>

European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest

instances of wealthier nations being defeated by more modestly resourced adversaries.¹⁷

The commitment made by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members in 2014 to increase their defense expenditure as a percentage of real GDP to 2% by 2024 continues to be a topic of discussion in NATO regarding military spending.¹⁸ The United States notably outperforms other countries in this regard (3.72% in 2020). When evaluating appropriate levels of such spending, it is crucial to assess its effectiveness and alignment with other national priorities.

Military personnel are a crucial component of readiness, alongside equipment, supplies, training, and maintenance. A mission-ready force relies on having an adequate number of qualified military personnel, who play a pivotal role in military capability, especially combat-ready forces. It's essential to note that increasing military personnel must be accompanied by the development of other components across the entire DOTMLPF¹⁹ spectrum to achieve comprehensive military readiness.

Regarding the dependent variable, Global Firepower (GFP) has been providing a unique analytical assessment of data related to 140 modern military powers since 2006.²⁰ GFP ratings are based on a country's potential war-making capability on land, sea, and air using conventional means. These ratings incorporate factors such as manpower, equipment, natural resources, finance, and geography, with more than 50 individual factors contributing to the final GFP rankings. These rankings offer valuable insights into a volatile global landscape where the potential for conflict looms. Essentially, the GFP rating serves as an indicator of a state's defense organization performance, with an improved ranking signifying enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of defense programs. For this study, a reverse military power index was used, implying that a higher military power index represents a stronger country, while a lower initial military index suggests a stronger position.

Table 1
Variables for the Regression Analysis

№	Variables	Dependent		Independent		
	Country	Military Strength Ranking for 2022	Military Strength Ranking for 2022 (reversed)	Defense expenditure in US dollars at current prices and exchange rates for 2020	Defense expenditure as a percentage of real GDP, for 2020	Military Personnel, for 2020
	United States	0.0453	35.8958	784952000000	3.72	1346000
	France	0.1283	5.7275	52727000000	2.03	208000
	United Kingdom	0.1382	5.2184	61925000000	2.29	156200
	Italy	0.1801	4.7871	26071000000	1.38	175500
	Turkey	0.1961	4.4351	13396000000	1.86	437200
	Germany	0.2322	4.3067	58902000000	1.55	186900
	Spain	0.2901	3.7337	12828000000	1.00	122500

17 T.Harrison, Rethinking Readiness. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 8(3), 2014, 38–68, p. 41 <https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Rethinking-Readiness.pdf>

18 J.Techau, The politics of 2 percent, NATO and the security vacuum in Europe. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015. <https://tinyurl.com/5c5z6w8h>

19 DOTMLPF-P is a tool that allows senior leaders to analyze their organizational capabilities from the perspective of “Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy” when making future strategic decisions. <https://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/dotmlpf-analysis>

20 Global Firepower, 2022, March 1 Military Strength Ranking. <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php>

	Ukraine	0.3266	3.4016	5924000000	4.10	209000
	Canada	0.3601	3.3736	23595000000	1.44	71000
	Poland	0.4179	3.1759	13590000000	2.28	120000
	Greece	0.4506	2.8681	5019000000	2.65	107600
	Norway	0.5455	2.6527	7272000000	2.01	20800
	Netherlands	0.5937	2.5771	13125000000	1.47	40000
	Romania	0.5938	2.5072	5051000000	2.03	66400
	Czech Re- public	0.6161	2.3944	3201000000	1.31	26800
	Portugal	0.7282	2.2436	3306000000	1.43	28700
	Hungary	0.8633	1.7083	2770000000	1.79	22700
	Denmark	0.8677	1.6836	4979000000	1.40	18100
	Slovak Re- public	0.9617	1.5252	2050000000	1.96	12900
	Croatia	0.9962	1.4729	1031000000	1.80	15200
	Bulgaria	1.1071	1.3664	1075000000	1.55	25600
	Belgium	1.1451	1.3265	5427000000	1.05	25200
	Lithuania	1.7083	0.8633	1176000000	2.11	16300
	Slovenia	1.9486	0.8573	568000000	1.08	7000
	Georgia	2.0014	0.8169	292000000	1.80	20650
	Latvia	2.2758	0.6953	743000000	2.22	7000
	Moldova	2.5799	0.5859	44500000	0.40	5150
	Estonia	2.6527	0.5455	719000000	2.32	6600
	Albania	3.0023	0.4276	188000000	1.27	6700
	Montenegro	4.8015	0.1695	83000000	1.73	1900
	North Macedonia	5.7275	0.1283	154000000	1.25	6100

Developed by the author, based on²¹

The central research question of this study can be framed as follows: What influence did the independent variables (x) - Defense expenditure in US dollars at current prices and exchange rates for 2020; Defense expenditure as a percentage of real GDP for 2020; and Military personnel for 2020 have on the dependent variable (y) - the Military Strength Ranking for 2022? Additionally, which of the independent variables could be adjusted to enhance military power?

This research question leads to the following hypotheses:

H0: The independent variables - Defense expenditure, Defense expenditure as a percentage of real GDP, and Military personnel - do not exert an impact on the dependent variable - the Military Power Index.

H1: The independent variables - Defense expenditure, Defense expenditure as a percentage of real

²¹ <https://www.nato.int>, <https://sipri.org>, <https://data.worldbank.org>, <https://www.iiss.org>, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/>

GDP, and Military personnel - do indeed have an impact on the dependent variable - the Military Power Index.

3. Results and Analysis

The R-squared value of approximately 0.99 (rounded to two decimal places) signifies that our model explains roughly 99% of the variability in the dependent variable. In general, a higher R-squared value indicates a stronger model fit.

The standard error of the regression reveals the typical level of error in the regression model's predictions. Based on the output, we can infer that, on average, the predicted values deviate from the observed values by approximately 0.75 units (as presented in Table 2).

Table 2
Summary Output

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.993386034
R Square	0.986815813
Adjusted R Square	0.985350903
Standard Error	0.755086722
Observations	31

Within Excel's ANOVA table, the most crucial statistic is the Significance F, which corresponds to the p-value for the F-test assessing the overall significance of the model. This test evaluates whether the model, with all of its independent variables, offers a better explanation for the variability in the dependent variable compared to a model with no independent variables. If the test result is statistically significant, it indicates that the model is effective.

Our p-value for the overall F-test is 1.76781E-25 (as displayed in Table 3). This notation uses scientific notation, where the "E-25" implies shifting the decimal point 25 positions to the left. This value is smaller than any reasonable significance level. Consequently, we can deduce that our regression model, taken as a whole, is statistically significant.

Table 3
ANOVA Table

	<i>df</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Significance F</i>
Regression	3	1152.232609	384.0775364	673.6359255	1.76781E-25
Residual	27	15.39421086	0.570155958		
Total	30	1167.62682			

The table below (refer to Table 4) displays the parameter estimates for the independent variables in our model, including the intercept value (constant).

Our model comprises three independent variables: Defense expenditure measured in Current prices and exchange rates US dollars for 2020, Defense expenditure as a percentage of real GDP for 2020, and the Military personnel in 2020.

For the Defense expenditure variable, the coefficient is approximately 2.86656E-11. The positive sign indicates that as Defense expenditure increases, there is a tendency for the Military Strength Ranking to increase as well. This suggests a positive association between these two variables, meaning that for every one-unit increase in Defense expenditure, the Military Strength Ranking increases by an average of approximately 2.86656E-11.

Regarding Defense expenditure as a share of real GDP (%), the coefficient is 0.078969912. This signifies that for each one-unit increase in Defense expenditure as a share of real GDP (%), the Military Strength Ranking increases by an average of 0.078969912.

Lastly, the coefficient for Military personnel is 9.02932E-06. This implies that with every one-unit increase in the count of Military personnel, the Military Strength Ranking increases by an average of approximately 9.02932E-06.

Table 4
Coefficients Table

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>Standard Error</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>P-value</i>	<i>Lower 95%</i>	<i>Upper 95%</i>	<i>Lower 95.0%</i>	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	1.140795626	0.396525398	2.876979962	0.007750685	0.327192713	1.954399	0.327193	1.954399
Defense Expenditure, Current prices and exchange rates US dollars, for 2020	2.86656E-11	2.9769E-12	9.629350406	3.17259E-10	2.25575E-11	3.48E-11	2.26E-11	3.48E-11
Defense Expenditure as a share of real GDP (%), for 2020	0.078969912	0.226270214	0.349007104	0.729791137	-0.385298217	0.543238	-0.3853	0.543238
Military Personnel, for 2020	9.02932E-06	1.76409E-06	5.118391948	2.21592E-05	5.4097E-06	1.26E-05	5.41E-06	1.26E-05

The p-values associated with the coefficients serve as indicators of the statistical significance of the dependent variable. When the p-value falls below the specified significance level, it allows us to reject the null hypothesis, which asserts that the coefficient is equal to zero, implying no relationship.

In the case of Defense Expenditure, the p-value is 3.17259E-10, which is less than 0.05. Consequently, this variable is deemed statistically significant.

Similarly, for Military Personnel in 2020, the p-value is 2.21592E-05, also less than 0.05, indicating its statistical significance.

Excel presents the p-values for both of these independent variables in exponential notation due to their exceptionally small values. This suggests that the coefficients are statistically significant at a very high level of confidence and implies a linear relationship.

Conversely, the Defense Expenditure as a percentage of real GDP (%) variable lacks statistical significance, as its p-value surpasses the typical significance threshold of 0.05. This implies that this particular variable might not have a meaningful impact on the dependent variable in this analysis. Following standard practice, it can be considered to exclude Defense Expenditure as a percentage of real GDP (%) from the final model, as retaining statistically insignificant variables may compromise the accuracy of the model.

4. Discussion and Conclusions

The aim of the Linear Regression Analysis was to investigate the association between three independent variables for the year 2020: Defense Expenditure measured in Current prices and exchange rates US dollars, Defense Expenditure as a percentage of real GDP, and Military Personnel, and the dependent vari-

able, Military Strength Ranking for the year 2022. The goal was to determine which of the independent variables exerted the most substantial influence on the military power index and whether this influence was positive or negative.

The analysis unveiled that the variables of Defense Expenditure and Military Personnel exhibited statistically significant p-values (less than 0.05), signifying their importance in the model. Conversely, the Defense Expenditure as a percentage of real GDP variable did not meet this level of significance and can therefore be omitted from the final model.

The study demonstrated that a higher Defense expenditure and greater number of Military personnel were positively associated with a higher military power index, which in principle aligns with expectations. Consequently, countries focusing on these factors would likely improve their position in the ranking of military power. However, since the coefficients are very small, this means that with each increase in defense expenditure or the number military personnel per unit, there is a very tiny change in the military strength ranking. For example, in the case of Georgia, doubling defense spending increases its position in Global Firepower by only 0.01 points. It is noteworthy that the same result can be achieved by creating one infantry battalion, which consists of four to six companies and can include about 1,000 soldiers.²²

A crucial concern arises regarding the feasibility of most countries, including Georgia, being able to increase their military budgets and personnel to a degree that significantly impacts their positive ranking. Such a substantial increase might be achievable only for a garrison state, which prioritizes military strength above civilian living standards and is immune to public resentment. Nonetheless, such a strategy would lead to a gradual reduction in military capability due to the neglect of civilian investment, eroding the economic base from which military power is drawn.

Given limited resources, nations face the challenge of striking a balance between defense investment and civilian goods, commonly known as the “guns versus butter”²³ dilemma. This choice is influenced, in part, by considering the military expenditures and positions of potential opponents. During wartime, defense usually takes precedence over social programs, but in peacetime, decisions to increase defense spending are often complex. It is also essential to recognize that a substantial defense budget does not guarantee security; the key lies in the efficient and effective allocation of defense funds. In defense, the manner in which money is spent is as critical as the total amount available, and history has numerous examples of countries with fewer resources overcoming wealthier opponents.

Based on the above findings, the recommended approach is to consider increasing the share of military personnel and the combat component of the Ministry of Defense within the existing defense budget. This can be achieved by reducing administrative costs and optimizing structural units, particularly in supply and administration areas, as well as the civil office of the Ministry and its subordinate civil organizations (e.g., legal entities of public law). In this scenario, it is crucial to regard military personnel as a fundamental component of military capability, encompassing combat-ready forces. An increase in the count of military personnel implies the concurrent enhancement of other essential capability elements (spanning the entire DOTMLPF spectrum) that are indispensable for establishing a comprehensive military capability.

It is also highly advisable to give due consideration to increasing the share of the reserve component of the military capability of the defense forces, as it could significantly augment the overall number of combat forces within the allocated defense budgets. It should be kept in mind that maintaining the military capability of a state fully available at all times is impractical. Striking a proper balance between the active and reserve components of military capability is the most desirable yet challenging path. This necessitates a careful analysis to answer important questions, such as whether the focus should be on active units or reserves during peacetime. Given the existing limitations in resources, it might be more appropriate to substitute active forces with reserve forces as a potential solution. However, this matter requires thorough study and analysis.

Conclusion

the study analyzed defense expenditure and military personnel as important factors influencing military power, while other variables may also contribute to a nation’s military strength. Factors such as technological advancements, geopolitical alliances, and strategic military doctrines were not considered in this study, but may be further explored in future research.

22 <https://www.defense.gov/Multimedia/Experience/Military-Units/army/#army>

23 In the field of macroeconomics, the “guns versus butter” model serves as an illustration of a basic production possibility frontier. It illustrates how a country allocates its limited resources between investing in defense-related items and civilian goods. In this scenario, a nation faces a decision when it comes to utilizing its finite resources. It can opt to allocate resources to either “guns” (investing in defense or military) or “butter” (investing in the production of civilian goods), or find a balance between the two. This model can be viewed as a representation of the choices countries make between military and civilian expenditures, even in more intricate economic systems.

Disclaimer

The views represented in this paper are those of the author and don't reflect the official policy or position of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia.

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The Challenging Path of Georgia towards NATO Membership

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Abstract

Georgia is a small nation situated in a region characterised by instability, where the occurrence of conflict escalation has become a frequent occurrence within the realm of regional politics. Ensuring stability in the South Caucasus region is a paramount concern for Georgia in terms of its security agenda. This commitment is clearly articulated in Georgia's National Security Concept (NSC), which was officially approved in 2011. Additionally, Georgia's Foreign Policy Strategy for the period 2019-2022 also underscores the importance of maintaining peace in the South Caucasus region. The level of public support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) affiliation in Georgia has been considerable, mirroring the widespread agreement among major political parties over the objective of attaining NATO membership. In 2018, a revision was made to the Georgian Constitution, including a paragraph that specifies the need for all governmental institutions to actively strive towards the objective of Georgia's prospective participation in NATO. The admission to NATO has been widely regarded as the most reliable means to achieve a state of stability and prosperity, enabling the nation to fully capitalise on its capabilities and opportunities. This article is characterised by its descriptive approach and aims to examine the dynamics of the evolution of NATO-Georgia ties throughout the history.

Keywords:

NATO, NATO Strategic Concept, Georgia, war, enlargement.

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Introduction

The integration of Georgia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is among the foremost objectives in Georgia's foreign and security policy agenda.² Georgia places significant emphasis on the role of NATO in enhancing the stability and security of the nation. Georgia has made concerted efforts to eliminate corruption within its political institutions, adopting new legal framework and pursue modernization initiatives in its armed forces. Simultaneously, the governmental changes implemented in Georgia adhere entirely to the proposals put forward by the Alliance, so making a substantial contribution to the advancement of democratic processes inside the nation. Furthermore, Georgia aspires to not just assume the position of a security consumer, but rather to actively contribute to the enhancement of shared Euro-Atlantic security.³

As stated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, in the event that a NATO Ally experiences an armed assault, the other member states of the Alliance shall interpret this act of aggression as an armed attack on the collective and shall undertake the measures they feel appropriate to provide assistance to the Ally that has been targeted.⁴ Georgia views NATO as the only collective defence organisation with the necessary political, military, and other resources to protect the security of its members and uphold peace within the Euro-Atlantic region.⁵

In the year 1991, after the attainment of independence, Georgia made a significant decision by opting for a pro-Western trajectory, marking a pivotal moment in its history. Georgia has faced persistent challenges to its sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and democratic progress as a result of its geopolitical position. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia embarked on a quest to secure assurances for its national security within the Euro-Atlantic region.

The historical trajectory of developing NATO-Georgia relations

The progression of NATO-Georgian relations can be categorised into five distinct phases: (1) the initial establishment of relations following Georgia's independence up until the Rose Revolution; (2) the period spanning from the Rose Revolution to the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia; (3) the timeframe encompassing the Russian-Georgian war and the subsequent annexation of Crimea; (4) the period following the annexation of Crimea up until the Russo-Ukrainian War; and (5) Georgia and its priorities under the new NATO Strategic Concept.

Given the significance and fleeting nature of time, it is crucial to discuss the aforementioned five phases. This relationship is separated into five phases based on its significance and the causes that cause it to change. The categorization of NATO-Georgia relations into these five phases is associated with the transitional phases of NATO-Georgia relations, when one phase concludes and the subsequent, fresh phase begins. Eduard Shevardnadze's first public declaration expressing Georgia's desire to join NATO is widely seen as a pivotal moment in the first phase. The Russia-Georgia conflict marked a significant milestone in NATO-Georgia ties and second phase. The third phase culminates with Russia's annexation of Crimea, accompanied by heightened NATO support and collaboration with PFP nations, such as Ukraine and Georgia. The fourth phase concludes with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, while the fifth phase begins with the introduction of NATO's new Strategic Concept.

The initial establishment of relations following Georgia's independence up until the Rose Revolution

In 1991, with the attainment of independence, Georgia made a significant decision that marked a crucial moment in its history, opting to pursue a trajectory aligned with Western values and interests. The geographical location of Georgia in close proximity to expansionist Russia has always posed challenges to its sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and democratic progress. Consequently, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia began a search for assurances on the security of the nation inside the Euro-Atlantic organisation.

NATO-Georgia relations officially began in 1992, when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997.

2 სსიპ „საქართველოს საკანონმდებლო მაცნე“. „CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA - Article 78“ <https://matsne.gov.ge/ka/document/view/30346?publication=36>. The information was accessed on Nov 27, 2023.

3 Ministry of Defence of Georgia. „თანამშრომლობა ნატოსთან - MOD.GOV.GE,“ <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/page/38/tanamshromloba-natostan>. The information was accessed on November 18, 2023.

4 NATO. „The North Atlantic Treaty.“ NATO, 1949. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 18, 2023.

5 Ministry of Defence of Georgia. „თანამშრომლობა ნატოსთან - MOD.GOV.GE,“ <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/page/38/tanamshromloba-natostan>. The information was accessed on November 18, 2023.

The primary motivation for the shift was to establish a security forum that would be more suitable for fostering an improved and more effective relationship. In the present day, Georgia actively engages in this framework, offering partners and member states a platform to deliberate upon significant matters across many domains.⁶

Georgia has been actively involved in the Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) since 1994. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) serves as the primary framework for engaging in political conversation and facilitating the development of various programmes and initiatives. The first NATO-Georgia Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) was developed in 1995, including a range of collaborative initiatives across many domains. Georgia regularly engages in regular joint military exercises and command staff trainings, in addition to participating in international seminars and conferences on contemporary security problems organised by the Alliance and partner nations under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.⁷

In 1996, the first Georgian Unit took part in the PfP Field Training. Since then, Georgia has actively engaged in several military trainings and exercises. Both military and civilian personnel from various branches of the security sector have been receiving education at various Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training centres. Last decades Georgia served as the host country for many NATO/PfP exercises.

In the context of the historical trajectory of NATO-Georgia relations, a significant event to highlight is the NATO summit that took place in Prague in 2002. During this summit, Eduard Shevardnadze, the second president of Georgia, expressed Georgia's aspiration to become a member of NATO for the first time.⁸ This declaration clearly indicated the country's desire to identify itself with Western nations. This period has been seen as the start of security cooperation between Georgia and the United States via the Georgia Train and Equip Programme. The Georgia Train and Equip Programme began in 2002 and included the collaboration between the United States and Georgian Armed Forces.⁹ The program's objective was to provide Georgian battalions with specialised training and resources in small unit tactics, specifically to combat terrorism.

Eduard Shevardnadze's official declaration expressing Georgia's desire to join NATO aimed to bolster the country's ability capacity to address domestic security issues and effectively manage the challenging Pankisi Gorge region, which had proven difficult to control and had become a haven for terrorists and criminal organisations. Georgia got assistance from the United States as a component of its global counter-terrorism strategies, specifically to combat the menace of domestic terrorism in Pankisi Gorge.

The period spanning from the Rose Revolution to the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia

After the Rose Revolution, the newly established Georgian government significantly enhanced its diplomatic ties with NATO and actively pursued membership in the Alliance as a prominent objective of its foreign policy agenda. In 2004, Georgia became the first country to establish an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO and to participate in the aforementioned programme. This programme outlines the necessary steps for implementing reforms across various domains, emphasizing the need for Georgia's government to work together in a coordinated manner.¹⁰ The NATO International Service is responsible for the yearly evaluation of IPAP performance, highlighting the importance of collaboration with the alliance for the efficacy of ongoing reforms within Georgia.

Between the years 2004 and 2008, a cumulative sum of five assessments was obtained, consisting of four official evaluations and one unofficial evaluation. All of the observed outcomes had a favourable nature.¹¹ On September 21, 2006, the Alliance initiated collaboration with Georgia under the auspices of the Intensified Dialogue on Membership Issues (ID - Intensified Dialogue on Membership Issues) with the aim of aligning Georgia with NATO's standards.¹²

6 Ministry of Defence of Georgia. “თანამშრომლობა ნატოსთან - MOD.GOV.GE,” <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/page/38/tanamshromloba-natostan>. The information was accessed on November 18, 2023.

7 Ministry of Defence of Georgia. “თანამშრომლობა ნატოსთან - MOD.GOV.GE,” <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/page/38/tanamshromloba-natostan>. The information was accessed on November 18, 2023.

8 “NATO Speech by President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze at the EAPC Summit -Atlantic Partnership Council - Prague Summit - 22 November 2002,” <https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021122h.htm>. The information was accessed on November 19, 2023.

9 Ministry of Defence of Georgia. “თანამშრომლობა ნატოსთან.” MOD.GOV.GE. <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/page/38/tanamshromloba-natostan>. The information was accessed on Nov 18, 2023.

10 NATO. “Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs).” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49290.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 19, 2023.

11 Ministry of Defence of Georgia. “თანამშრომლობა ნატოსთან.” MOD.GOV.GE. <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/page/38/tanamshromloba-natostan>. The information was accessed on Nov 18, 2023.

12 NATO. “NATO Update: NATO Offers Intensified Dialogue to Georgia.” <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0921c.htm>. The information was accessed on Nov 19, 2023.

In 2006, Georgia initiated a dialogue with NATO¹³, aligning with Western involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Georgia has made significant contributions to NATO's international security operations, receiving practical assistance in training and equipping its forces. Georgia played a significant role in NATO's efforts in Afghanistan, contributing significantly to the operations.

Between 2004 until the conclusion of the mission, a total of over 30,000 Georgian military soldiers actively engaged in international operations in Afghanistan.¹⁴ These deployments were organised into more than 100 rotations, each operating at various levels such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

Based on a comprehensive analysis of many NATO reports and assessments, it can be deduced that the Georgian military soldiers shown a commendable level of competence, professionalism, and seamless execution in carrying out their designated missions across various hierarchical levels throughout the rotations.

The Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008 was a pivotal occasion in the advancement of this cooperation. Subsequently, at the Bucharest summit held from April 2nd to 4th, 2008, Germany, France, and Italy made the collective decision to withhold NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine, but they promised an eventual membership to the Alliance.¹⁵ The political decision made at the Bucharest Summit regarding Georgia may be seen as a pivotal intersection.

The decisions taken in Bucharest were complex and need examination from several viewpoints. The United States government actively advocated for a Membership Action Plan for both, Georgia and Ukraine in a comprehensive manner. Nevertheless, this assertion did not hold true for everyone, especially those who were preoccupied with the worsening of diplomatic ties with Russia. The decision had adverse consequences, shown in the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict. According to several scholars and experts,¹⁶ this served as the foundation and motivation for Russia to annex additional Georgian lands.

The timeframe encompassing the Russian-Georgian war and the subsequent annexation of Crimea

The aforementioned decision at the Bucharest summit, served as a catalyst for Russia's initiation of armed assault against Georgia in 2008. During that period, Russia engaged in hybrid operations, including acts of sabotage, explosives, and the targeted killing of Georgian officers. On August 7, 2008, the regular Russian military forces breached the internationally acknowledged border between Russia and Georgia. The military operation transgressed the basic tenets of international law and signified a new phase in the realm of international politics and armed conflict.

The Russian-Georgian War, was a significant turning point in the relationship between the United States and Russia, as well as in modern European security reality. Despite being little comprehended at the time, this conflict marked a significant shift in global politics too. This war foreshadowed the resurgence of major power politics and marked the conclusion of the post-Cold War era. In 2008, Russia exhibited a strong determination and capability to actively oppose the U.S. perspective on European security, reject NATO enlargement in its neighbourhood, and confront a standard international system where smaller nations can independently determine their own affairs without interference from major powers.¹⁷ Russia had no intention of allowing Georgia to regain control of the areas. However, after NATO's announcement at the Bucharest Summit, Russia decided to demonstrate its might to prevent any further expansion of NATO in his neighbourhood and teach the Western countries a lesson.

In September 2008, following Russia's aggression against Georgia, the Allies established the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) to assist in recovery and reconstruction. The NGC implements resolutions adopted at the Bucharest Summit and oversees the aid process.¹⁸ The North Atlantic Council visited Georgia in September 2008, signing a framework document for the NGC. In December, NATO foreign ministers endorsed the advancement of the Annual National Programme (ANP) for Georgia, specifically

13 NATO. "NATO Update - 2006: Georgia Begins Intensified Dialogue with NATO," <https://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/12-december/e1214b.htm>. The information was accessed on November 19, 2023.

14 NATO Infocenter. "მობილ ავღანეთში". [Infocenter.gov.ge, https://infocenter.gov.ge/nato/international-missions/misia-avghanethshi/](https://infocenter.gov.ge/nato/international-missions/misia-avghanethshi/). The information was accessed on November 19, 2023.

15 NATO. "Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2008)." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm. The information was accessed on November 19, 2023.

16 Evans, Ryan. "The August War, Ten Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War - War on the Rocks." War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/>. The information was accessed on November 20, 2023.

17 Evans, Ryan. "The August War, Ten Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War - War on the Rocks." War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/>. The information was accessed on November 20, 2023.

18 NATO. "NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC)." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52131.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 20, 2023.

within the NATO Georgian Commission.¹⁹ The yearly national programme is limited to nations participating in the Membership Action Plan, making Georgia an exceptional example. The program aligns the country with NATO criteria and the content of ANP is classified as confidential. NATO's annual reviews of every ANP have shown positive results, demonstrating the importance of the NGC in promoting cooperation and aid.

It is worth mentioning that subsequent to the first visit in September 2008, the North Atlantic Council conducted four further trips to Georgia, occurring in the years 2011, 2013, 2016, and 2019.²⁰ These visits serve as a significant affirmation of the unshakable political support provided by the Alliance to Georgia.

Subsequently, on December 7, 2011, a ministerial meeting of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) took place at the organization's headquarters. During this meeting, Georgia was designated as an aspiring country, alongside Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and North Macedonia.²¹ An important advancement in the context of Georgia's integration into NATO was the active involvement of the Georgian delegation in all sessions held at the Chicago Summit in 2012, with the exception of the meeting exclusive to NATO member states.²² Following the conclusion of the Chicago summit, a notable development occurred in the NATO-Georgia relationship, wherein Georgia was categorised among the aspirant nations. Specifically, this grouping pertains to the Balkan countries that possess discernible possibilities for attaining membership inside NATO.

The period following the annexation of Crimea up until the Russo-Ukrainian War

During the Wales summit in 2014, the participating Allies made the decision to establish an important framework in collaboration with Georgia.²³ The primary objective of this framework is to enhance alignment with NATO, bolster defence capabilities, and facilitate Georgia's preparedness for potential membership. The execution of the fundamental package included the participation of all NATO members, as well as two partner nations, namely Sweden and Finland. The Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) serves as the primary mechanism for operational collaboration between the nation of Georgia and the NATO. The package is designed to enhance Georgia's defence capabilities in accordance with NATO standards and facilitate Georgia's progress in its preparations for prospective NATO membership. It is noteworthy that in December 2020, a comprehensive assessment was undertaken by NATO and the reviewed SNGP program was adopted by NATO Foreign Ministers.²⁴ This package has significant components aimed at enhancing Georgia's defence capabilities. SNGP encompasses comprehensive assistance provided at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels across 16 key domains, fostering collaboration between Georgia and NATO.

The 2018 Brussels Summit of NATO marked a significant milestone as it convened the heads of state from member nations at the highest echelon to engage in focused deliberations pertaining to matters concerning Georgia. The significant contribution of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP) in fostering political discussion and collaboration between NATO and Georgia has been widely acknowledged throughout the course of the last ten years. NATO has provided a good evaluation of the continuing security reforms and legislative improvements in Georgia. It is noteworthy to emphasise that, as per official declarations, the notable advancements in reforms undertaken by Georgia are duly acknowledged and must be sustained.²⁵ These reforms have been crucial in propelling Georgia, an aspiring nation, towards its membership preparations and enhancing its defence and interoperability capabilities with the Alliance. The adoption of the NATO-Georgia commission declaration is a notable occurrence, as it marks the first instance in the history of NATO-Georgia relations when a declaration has been issued at the level of heads of state. Previously, joint declarations had been made only at the level of foreign ministers.

During the Fifth NAC International Conference in Tbilisi in 2019, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the for-

19 NATO. "NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC)." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52131.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 20, 2023.

20 NATO. "Visit to Georgia by the North Atlantic Council." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169016.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 20, 2023.

21 NATO. "Relations with Georgia." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 20, 2023.

22 NATO. "Chicago Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2012)." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 21, 2023.

23 NATO. "Wales Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2014)." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 23, 2023.

24 NATO. "Relations with Georgia." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 24, 2023.

25 NATO. "Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2018)." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 24, 2023.

mer Secretary General of NATO, expressed the view that it is necessary for Georgia and NATO to engage in discussions regarding the development of mechanisms that would specifically safeguard the territories of Georgia under the control of its government. The objective of such mechanisms would be to ensure that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which pertains to collective defence, exclusively applies to these territories in the event of Georgia's membership in NATO.²⁶

Georgian priorities under the new NATO Strategic Concept

In light of the existing strategic circumstances, NATO is compelled to establish its priorities and undertake the process of renewing its Strategic Concept. Based on the NATO 2030 plan and previous summits, NATO's objectives may be categorised as follows: Enhancing the security and unity of the Allied nations, addressing the challenges posed by Russia and China, managing emerging dangers, and promoting the Open Door Policy and collaboration with partner countries.²⁷

The 2022 Strategic Concept of NATO reasserted its commitment to further enhance its collaboration with Georgia and reiterated the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, affirming the future membership of Georgia in the Alliance. The concept underscored the interconnection between the security of nations seeking membership in the Alliance and NATO. Georgia exhibits a firm endorsement of their independence, sovereignty, and preservation of geographical boundaries.²⁸

According to the Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia for the period 2019-2022, Georgia's primary strategic objective is to enhance the nation's sovereignty and peacefully reclaim its territorial integrity within the internationally recognised boundaries. The primary objective of Georgia's foreign policy is to achieve national unity via the peaceful resolution of the Russia-Georgia conflict, specifically addressing the areas of Georgia that are currently under occupation.

The Foreign Policy Strategy of Georgia places significant emphasis on the goal of integrating into NATO. This objective is identified as one of the foremost objectives within the realm of foreign policy. To effectively pursue this integration, the strategy outlines a series of sub-priorities that are seen crucial for advancing Georgia's alignment with NATO:

- The promotion and intensification of political discourse within the framework of the NATO-Georgia Commission;
- The use of Georgia's Annual National Programme (ANP) as a significant mechanism for integration serves to facilitate the progression of Georgia's accession to NATO;
- The use of Substantial NATO-Georgia Package as a means to enhance self-defence capabilities and accomplish interoperability with NATO;
- Enhance diplomatic ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in order to make a meaningful contribution to the maintenance of security in the Black Sea region;
- The involvement of Georgia in the promotion and maintenance of international security and stability;
- Georgia's actively engagement in NATO exercises and training, which include the staging of joint NATO-Georgia exercises inside Georgia's borders. These activities aim to enhance defence capabilities and foster compatibility with the alliance;
- Strengthen defence capabilities of Georgia, enhance interoperability with NATO member nations, and foster consensus on admission via the augmentation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with NATO member and partner states.²⁹

The document of measures "tailored support to Georgia" was agreed at the summit of NATO member states held in Madrid on June 28-30, 2022. This document outlines specific strategies aimed at enhancing Georgia's defence capabilities and facilitating NATO's increased engagement in this endeavour. These steps serve to enhance both the political and practical support for Georgia. The political steps seek to facilitate the initiation of a discussion between Georgia and NATO. The practical actions used are designed to expedite the process of transitioning Georgia's equipment from Soviet-era to NATO-compliant standards, as well as enhance Georgia's situational awareness.³⁰

26 GHN - ახალი ამბების სააგენტო. "საქართველო და უკრაინა ნატოში უნდა მოვიწვიოთ რუსეთის მიერ ოკუპირებული და ანექსირებული ნაწილების გარეშე - რასმუსენი," <https://ghn.ge/news/277623-sakartvelo-da-ukraina-natoshi-undamovitsvot-rusetis-mier-okupirebuli-da-aneksirebuli-natsilebis-gareshe-rasmuseni>. The information was accessed on Nov 24, 2023.

27 NATO. "NATO 2022 - Strategic Concept," <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>. The information was accessed on November 25, 2023.

28 NATO. "NATO 2022 - Strategic Concept," <https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/>. The information was accessed on November 25, 2023.

29 MFA - Ministry of International Affairs. "საგარეო პოლიტიკის სტრატეგია," <https://mfa.gov.ge/Foreign-Policy-Strategy>. The information was accessed on Nov 25, 2023.

30 NATO. "Relations with Georgia," https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm. The information was accessed on Nov 24, 2023.

Considering the existing diplomatic ties between the Georgia and NATO, Georgia has not been officially issued a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, Javier Colomina, contend that the issue of corruption in Georgia and Ukraine remains unresolved, hence necessitating its resolution prior to the Alliance considering their prospective participation.³¹ As per the statement made by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, it is imperative for Georgia to re-establish its trajectory of changes in order to reclaim its previous status as a leading proponent of reform, a distinction it had until around three years ago.³²

However, with regards to the aforementioned matter, it is important to acknowledge that at the official level, based on the comments issued by NATO, it is evident that Georgia is actively pursuing reforms and striving to enhance its alignment and compatibility with the NATO alliance. An illustrative instance of this phenomenon is the NATO Military Committee, which convened in Tbilisi in November 2023. NATO Military Committee conducted a series of high-level engagements visit in Georgia. The NATO Military Representatives convened a specialised meeting of the Military Committee with their Georgian military counterparts. The primary agenda of the conference included deliberations on the prevailing security conditions internal and across Georgia, the progress made in implementing Georgia's defence reforms, and the status of military cooperation between NATO and Georgia.³³ NATO has provided a good evaluation of the continuing security reforms and legislative improvements in Georgia. It is noteworthy to emphasise that, as per official declarations, the recent visit of NATO's foremost military entity serves as a reiteration of the Alliance's unwavering dedication to Georgia's independence, sovereignty, territorial unity, and its desire to become part of the Euro-Atlantic community.

The government of Georgia has been adopting significant anticorruption measures in order to enhance its governance. In its endeavour to secure NATO membership, Georgia is parallel pursuing accession to the European Union. Georgia has started the implementation of a framework given by the European Union (EU). After Georgia submitted its application for membership in the European Union in March 2022, the European Commission released an opinion that delineated 12 key areas for the nation to focus on throughout its journey towards admission.³⁴ The aforementioned recommendations include several domains, such limited to democracy, the rule of law, judicial reform, and basic rights.

In November 2023, European Commission presented a proposal to the European Council, advising them to confer upon Georgia the status of a candidate for membership in the European Union. According to the Commission's remarks, Georgia has undertaken measures to enhance its interaction with the European Union and has expedited the implementation of reforms in order to achieve the twelve objectives outlined in its application for membership.³⁵ The aforementioned accomplishment and the affirmation by the European Commission validate the Georgian government's inclination towards the West, its aim for European integration, and its unwavering dedication to democratic principles and process in Georgia.³⁶ However, the implementation of these changes will serve as a catalyst in steering Georgia towards genuine independence and democracy.

Georgia in NATO-led Peacekeeping International Missions

Georgia plays a prominent role in bolstering Euro-Atlantic security via its active participation in missions led by NATO. From 1999 until 2008, the armed troops of Georgia were stationed in the region of Kosovo.³⁷ The participation of Georgia to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan has considerable significance. Among the non-NATO nations, Georgia had the distinction of being the second greatest provider of troops to Afghanistan.

From 2003 until 2008, the Defence Forces of Georgia participated in the "Multi-National Force - Iraq" with other international military forces deployed in Iraq. The coalition, under the leadership of the United States, was assigned the responsibility of providing assistance and assuring the establishment of a

31 Zaza Suladze, "ხავეერ კოლომინა: „ბოლო ერთ წელში, საქართველოში რეფორმების პროცესები გაჩერდა.“ Voice of America, May 26, 2023. <https://www.amerikiskhma.com/a/7109510.html>. The information was accessed on Nov 24, 2023.

32 Ge.Civil, "NATO Concerned Over Georgia; Reforms." Civil Georgia, May 8, 2022. <https://civil.ge/archives/489415>. The information was accessed on Nov 24, 2023.

33 NATO "NATO Military Committee Visits Georgia." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_219979.htm?selectedLocale=en. The information was accessed on Nov 27, 2023.

34 EEAS. "The Twelve Priorities | EEAS". https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/twelve-priorities_en?s=221. The information was accessed on Nov 28, 2023.

35 DG NEAR. "Georgia," https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/georgia_en. The information was accessed on Nov 28, 2023.

36 DG NEAR. "Opinion on Georgia's Application for Membership of the European Union," https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/opinion-georgias-application-membership-european-union_en. The information was accessed on Nov 28, 2023.

37 Infocenter. "მისია კოსოვოში". Infocenter.gov.ge. <https://infocenter.gov.ge/nato/international-missions/misia-kosovoshi/>. The information was accessed on Nov 27, 2023.

proficient defence force, as well as facilitating the enhancement of defence capabilities for the Iraqi government.³⁸

A total of 8,495 military soldiers from Georgia actively engaged in an international operation in Iraq, spanning over 19 rotations conducted at various hierarchical levels, resulting in Georgia attaining the position of the third highest contributor in terms of the quantity of military soldiers involved in the operation.³⁹ In the context of the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, it is noteworthy that Georgian military forces were redeployed to their home country, thereby terminating the engagement of the Georgian Defence Forces in Iraq.

Between 2004 until the conclusion of the mission, a total of over 30,000 Georgian military soldiers actively engaged in international operations in Afghanistan. These deployments were organised into more than 100 rotations, each operating at various levels such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).⁴⁰ The primary responsibilities undertaken by the Georgian forces included a wide range of operational activities, including comprehensive operations, safeguarding critical infrastructure, conducting patrols and searches, managing checkpoints, executing engineering security operations, providing assistance to military hospitals, and facilitating escort missions.⁴¹

The ongoing relevance of Georgia as a dependable partner is a consistent international concern, fostering sustained support from NATO. Georgia's engagement in peacekeeping operations is a significant determinant for its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Based on a comprehensive analysis of many NATO reports and assessments, it can be deduced that the Georgian military soldiers shown a commendable level of competence, professionalism, and seamless execution in carrying out their designated missions across various hierarchical levels throughout the rotations.

Conclusion

Georgia has endeavoured to eradicate corruption within its governmental structures and implement modernization measures in its forces. Georgian armed forces have actively engaged in a diverse range of NATO exercises, and a contingent of their military personnel was sent to Afghanistan in support of NATO's mission. Georgia is actively involved in ongoing international peacekeeping operations and trainings, contributing to Euro-Atlantic security and countering international terrorism. This collaboration is crucial as the threat of terrorism transcends national boundaries, necessitating global efforts. Georgia's military personnel receive unique military experience, enhancing its capabilities. Past 15-20 years, over 18,000 troops have received comprehensive training, resulting in a highly skilled force that adheres to NATO criteria.⁴² This resource is crucial for Georgia's development trajectory. Georgia's troops demonstrate commendable performance, upholding its reputation as a reliable partner to NATO member countries and partner nations.

Generally, it is evident that Georgia has not yet met the requisite criteria set by NATO to receive a formal invitation for NATO membership or MAP. To adhere to NATO standards, it is crucial for Georgia to continue his efforts in democratisation and concurrently undertake further defence reforms. However, when examining the depth of the relationship between Georgia and NATO, it becomes evident that Georgia has not shown any inclination to make concessions or withdraw from their respective stances. The notion of "NATO fatigue," sometimes referred to as a shared weariness towards NATO, is a tactic used by certain individuals to manipulate public opinion. In contrast, the citizens of Georgia and Government demonstrate a notable commitment to their pursuits. The effective resolution of these problems will serve as evidence of Georgia's shared commitment to actively engage in the goals of NATO, therefore promoting a safer and more democratic global environment.

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39 Infocenter. "მისია ერავში". Infocenter.Gov.Ge. <https://infocenter.gov.ge/nato/international-missions/misia-erayshi/>. The information was accessed on Nov 27, 2023.

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41 Ministry of Defence of Georgia. "საერთაშორისო მისიები". Mod.gov.ge. <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/mission>. The information was accessed on November 27, 2023.

42 Ministry of Defence of Georgia. "საერთაშორისო მისიები". Mod.gov.ge. <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/mission>. The information was accessed on November 27, 2023.

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Communications in the Nuclear Age

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Abstract

The Nuclear Age, sometimes called the Atomic Age or the Atomic Era, refers to the period of time following the first atomic bomb during the Second World War. This is a time period with major implications in the history of science as well as ethics, the military, and international relations. Communication is the vital link between nuclear facilities and the public. If people do not know and understand the facts on which optimal energy choice decisions should be based, they cannot make informed decisions on how their own objectives can be met. Therefore, it is crucial to know how to communicate efficiently and strategically.

Keywords:

nuclear; communication; audience; impact; warning;

Introduction

The Nuclear Age, sometimes called the Atomic Age or the Atomic Era, refers to the period of time following the first atomic bomb during the Second World War. This is a time period with major implications in the history of science as well as ethics, the military, and international relations.

In this period communication is significantly important since we should be extremely careful. In other words, there are some cases of communication attacks and damage. Therefore, effective communication ensures that your core message is clearly sent and ensured.

Main Part

During an incident, communication with the community becomes especially critical. Emergency communications may include alerts and warnings; directives about evacuation, curfews, and other self-protective actions; and information about response status, family members, available assistance, and other matters that impact response and recovery. Well-conceived and effectively delivered emergency messages can help ensure public safety, protect property, facilitate response efforts, elicit cooperation, instill public confidence, and help families reunite. The extent to which people respond to a warning message is influenced by many factors, including individual characteristics and perceptions, whether the message comes from a credible source, how the message is delivered, and the message itself. You have many communication tools to choose from, including in-person events, print and broadcast media, and Internet and social media. Each has advantages and limitations depending on your communication objective and the intended audience. Whatever communication tools you use, be sure your emergency communications are clear, contain specific and adequate information, are in sync with other information being disseminated, and are accessible to the whole community¹.

If you want to effectively communicate with someone across obstacles and boundaries, a core message is essential. You need a simplified idea that is relatable regardless of if the understanding and meaning behind the rest of your content shifts over time.

Effective communication can help keep your message regularly updated and adapted to the times. Besides, messages have to be simple. If the core message remains clear, it remains effective communication.

During emergency situations methods of communication should be using the cell phone, land line, mobile applications, radio or the satellite phone.

Communications is important for emergency management fully prepare, and respond in a timely manner. Communications is the key to effective mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. It has to be two-way and engage the public.

Concise, quick and clear messages are the key to effectively communicating in an emergency.

Research was conducted among the members of state and international organizations. The method of oral face-to-face interview was used. The age of respondents varied from 20 to 70. Their job profiles included high ranking managerial as well as low level ones. Interviews revealed that different factors affected communication².

First of all, sending the message clearly and ensure it reaches the intended audience. Then comes urgency. In other words, speech and frequency of the media should be matched. Another factor is to identify whether this information is related to safety. What also requires attention is how long this information will be useful for the audience.

One more factor is appropriateness. In other words, in order to enhance comprehension appropriate media should be chosen and the following elements should be ensured. One should think about whether the message is sensitive, which staff is needed to carry out this media approach and whether an effective public speech can be delivered.

Obviously, with the view to pass information to the public and the media, media briefings should be used. In fact, such meetings and events may serve as the powerful tool to provide help in terms of communicating the messages. Advantages of media briefings are as follows. They give a chance to the members of the public to speak about challenges and issues.

It must be stated that general principles of effective communication should be applied in all emergency communications. Here what matters is specificity, clarity and consistency. The information should be provided in sequence, the message should have a reason, supporting information and the conclusion. The message should be worded exactly and every used word should have a value. Unnecessary detail should be avoided and the message should be kept consistent.

If warnings or alerts are written in a poor manner, credibility and understanding will suffer. Therefore, the following guidelines should be used. First of all, the message should be specific enough

1 James A. Anderson, „Communication Theory: Epistemological Foundations“, New York: Guildford Press, 1996.

2 Bryan C. Taylor, “Nuclear Waste and Communication Studies.” Review of Communication 3, no. 3: 286–92. Published online: 05 Nov 2010.

and respond to “Who? What? When? Where? Why? and How?”. If not, the public will be confused and unclear thus leading to certain dissatisfaction.

There is another element in this respect – being specific about the message and provide consistent information. What this means is that parts of the message should be well-versed with one another. This will avoid uncertainty. If messages are put together so that they provide clarity, the receiver will be clear about them and guessing or speculation will be avoided.

Clarity is making the message easily understandable. Therefore, one should avoid technical jargon or terminology and the information should be conveyed in simple terms so that to avoid overload or lack of clarity.

A very significant piece of advice is not to overstate the facts. In other words, facts should be provided as they are and there should not be omission of important information. Above everything, respect for the judgement of your public should be conveyed.

The final piece of advice is to ensure that the needs of the recipients of the message should be met. We, as originators of the message, should formulate it so that to make it clear and simple to understand, abbreviations should be used to a minimal level, the most important information should be initially presented so that the receiver gets a proper understanding of what is required and then any other details should follow. Messages should be developed so that non-standard terminology or format is avoided³.

Conclusion

All-in-all, communication in a nuclear age requires careful consideration, planning and management in order to achieve the intended goal. Messages should be clear, not overloaded, to the point and meaningful so that all parties involved have one and the same understanding of the issue. Expressing personal meanings serves the beneficial goals. Provided that the audience is affected by the delivery and messages of the sender of information, the communication process should be of high quality and integrity and clarity should be maintained. This is extremely significant since according to the new projections and assuming electricity generation will increase by 85% over the next three decades, nuclear energy could contribute about 14% of global electricity by 2050, up from its 10% share today.

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Unveiling Quishing: The Dark Side Of Qr Codes In Cyber Attacks

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Abstract

In the ever-expanding realm of technological integration, the emergence of QR phishing, aptly termed “quishing,” has become a potent threat to digital security. This article navigates the complexities of quishing, unveiling the clandestine techniques wielded by cyber perpetrators through QR codes. It scrutinizes the evolution of these deceptive maneuvers, explores the nuanced strategies employed, and advocates essential proactive measures crucial for fortifying defenses against this insidious facet of cyber assaults.

Drawing upon the ubiquitous presence of QR codes in our daily interactions, this article illuminates the shadowy underbelly of quishing, revealing the potential risks lurking behind these innocuous-looking symbols. By delving into the core mechanisms of quishing, this exploration aims to equip individuals and organizations with insights necessary to navigate the perilous terrain of cyber threats engendered by QR codes.

Continuously evolving cyber tactics demand a proactive stance. Hence, this exposition seeks to empower readers with an in-depth understanding of quishing, emphasizing the critical need for heightened vigilance, robust security measures, and comprehensive awareness to thwart the ever-looming specter of QR-based phishing exploits.

Keywords:

QR phishing, Quishing, cyber threats, digital security, deceptive maneuvers, proactive measures, cyber assaults, QR codes, cyber tactics, heightened vigilance, robust security.

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Introduction

Within the fabric of modern technological interactions, the unassuming presence of QR codes has woven a tapestry of convenience and vulnerability. Amid this intricate web, a looming threat surfaces - **QR phishing** or **“Quishing”** - an insidious tactic leveraging these ubiquitous codes as a conduit for cyber attacks.

The prevalence of QR codes in daily life has entrenched a sense of trust and reliance, yet this very trust becomes a chink in the digital armor, exploited by cybercriminals to perpetrate phishing attacks. This article endeavors to navigate the multifaceted landscape of quishing, shedding light on the deceptive maneuvers that render QR codes both a tool of convenience and a gateway for exploitation.

In this exploration, we peel back the layers of this emerging threat, exposing the shadowy underpinnings concealed beneath the surface of innocuous squares. By unraveling the complexities of quishing, we aim to arm individuals and organizations with a comprehensive understanding, equipping them to discern the potential risks inherent in these seemingly innocuous symbols. As we delve deeper into the mechanisms driving quishing, it becomes evident that our reliance on QR codes warrants a nuanced comprehension of the risks they harbor. This understanding is foundational to fortifying our defenses against the malicious intent lurking behind these deceptively simple visual codes.

Through this investigation, we seek to empower readers with insights essential for navigating the labyrinthine pathways of cyber threats ingrained within QR codes. This knowledge serves as a beacon guiding us toward a proactive stance against the looming specter of QR-based phishing exploits, emphasizing the cruciality of vigilance, education, and fortified security measures.

Main Part

Deciphering Quishing and understanding the depths: At the heart of quishing lies the manipulation of QR codes, transforming these innocuous-looking squares into gateways for cyber exploitation. Cybercriminals adeptly embed malicious URLs within these codes, camouflaging them amidst the sea of legitimate links. When unsuspecting individuals scan these QR codes, they unwittingly open the door to a world of fraudulent websites or malware infiltration. The inherent trust and convenience associated with QR codes become the very tools exploited by attackers to orchestrate their deceit.

The Evolution of Tactics by adapting to Cyber Resilience: Quishing, like any other cyber threat, is not stagnant. It evolves. From the static codes of yesteryears to the dynamic QR codes of today, cybercriminals continuously refine their strategies. Dynamic QR codes offer a tactical advantage, enabling attackers to alter destinations post-distribution, eluding traditional security measures. Moreover, social engineering plays a pivotal role, embedding these deceptive codes within alluring promotions or contests, preying on human curiosity and trust.

Essential Preventive Measures: Mitigating the risks posed by quishing necessitates a multifaceted approach. Education emerges as a potent tool, arming individuals with awareness about the potential dangers lurking within QR codes. Implementing QR code scanners equipped with URL preview capabilities empowers users to scrutinize destinations before engagement, adding a layer of defense against fraudulent links. Rigorous security audits and robust encryption protocols fortify organizational defenses, creating formidable barriers against potential breaches.

By embracing a proactive stance and comprehending the intricacies of quishing, individuals and organizations can navigate the treacherous waters of QR-based phishing exploits. This heightened awareness, coupled with stringent security protocols, serves as a formidable shield, safeguarding against the deceptive allure of QR codes wielded for malicious intent.




Fig. 1. Quishing attack performance diagram

Conclusion

Quishing poses a substantial threat in the landscape of cyber vulnerabilities, exploiting the very convenience that QR codes offer. As technology propels us forward, it is imperative to remain vigilant, educating ourselves and fortifying our defenses against evolving cyber threats. Through knowledge dissemination, robust security measures, and an unwavering commitment to vigilance, we fortify our digital resilience, ensuring that the dark side of QR codes remains a conquered territory in the realm of cyber security.

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