
Europe's Grand Strategy (The Common Security and Defence Policy)

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Abstract

The paper explores the security challenges, national interests, and defense policy development of modern European countries, namely Great Britain, France, and Germany. Great Britain recently exited the European Union on February 1, 2020. Over the years, Britain has played an active role in the EU's security and defense policy. Therefore, we cannot overlook the significance of Great Britain, and while discussing it, we will first focus on the period before Brexit (until 2020) and then review the period after Brexit.

The aforementioned states are major players in shaping Europe's security architecture today. Working together and developing a common strategy is crucial for the security of the continent. The European security policy that was established after World War II is based on the theory of interdependence. I conducted the research using discourse analysis to examine the internal national security strategies of these states, as well as their relationships with one another and with international organizations such as NATO and the European Union.

Keywords:

security, Europe's grand strategy, NATO, European Union, and politics.

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Introduction

Germany, France, and Great Britain are the main and most influential states in the European Union's security and defense policy. They are the leaders of the European security system. While Britain and France played important roles in shaping security policies, Germany was able to cooperate and partner with both of them and showed a willingness to lead, both politically and economically, which became a turning point in the formation of the security policies. These three countries jointly launched several security and defense initiatives, which were crucial in forming the European Union's Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

In the current global scenario, European countries avoid conducting military interventions independently. Instead, their military operations and missions are closely tied to the collective defense and security policies of NATO and the European Union, and they operate in a multinational environment. It appears that the era of unilateral (individual) military interventions and operations in contemporary international politics is a thing of the past for European nations.

It should be noted that the Russian Federation is an exception, although it is not included in our discussion this time, since Russia applies an expansive policy in the neighboring region while we focus on the EU member states and Great Britain and directly on the European security architecture. The aggressive and expansive policy of Russia is a subject of separate discussion. Russia's foreign policy goals, tasks, and ways to achieve them do not align with the political and security issues that modern European states face.²

The second argument for why the EU member states and Great Britain no longer refer to independent military missions and operations is that today, war is now considered an existential issue for states. Europe has experienced several wars in the past, which resulted in significant losses. And waging wars is an expensive and risky affair that involves high economic costs. In the aftermath of the Cold War, European countries have been working together to strengthen their security and defense policies in collaboration with their allies. This is because if a national government makes a mistake that affects the security of Europe, the Allies step in to identify the risks and economic costs involved.³

It can be said that Germany, France, and Italy are also betting on the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and NATO. Their military missions and operations are aimed at resolving crises and strengthening the EU's position. The situation is similar to NATO. States aim to bolster their position in the organization while also supporting it. Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain are all working towards safeguarding their own national interests and security policies while at the same time being mindful of the interests of the other member states and the European Union as a whole. In the event of any issues, a series of negotiations and discussions on security matters are initiated.⁴

Germany, France, and Italy are key actors in the development of policies and the management of missions related to the EU's common security and defense policy. They hold significant influence in civil-military operations, including the distribution of resources. The UK played a vital role in the development and execution of the CSDP until 2020. Even after 2020, the UK remains the primary security partner of the EU and works closely with NATO. It's unlikely that any military or civilian operation of the European Union would take place without the participation of the UK, Germany, Italy, and France. Therefore, these countries work together to align their national interests and identify common goals and objectives. The agreement reached on this issue is crucial for the success of any EU military or civilian mission. In addition, Germany plays an important role in political affairs, both in its relations with third countries and within the European Union. Since the time of Chancellor Merkel, Germany has actively sought to take a leading role in the EU and NATO by finding political solutions to military and civilian crises.

Main Part

The EU-NATO relationship is viewed by researchers and political scientists as a partnership and competition. This dynamic is driven by both formal and structural reasons. The formal reason for this is due to the political deadlock between the Turks and the Cypriots, which is a classic diplomatic impasse.

Another important issue is that the presence of two rapid reaction forces raises concerns about resource duplication, and this prompts the question of where the military forces of NATO and the European Union should be located. Moreover, institutional rivalry is a constant feature of international diplomacy. As Simon Lunn, Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, points out, "Whenever a new crisis emerges, there is always a sense of rivalry and competition."⁵

2 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics in the New National Interest* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 97-134.

3 *Ib.* 105.

4 *Ib.* 106.

5 Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State* (Oxford University Press, 2008), 27-44.

However, it is important to recognize that in the current political situation, the development of the security and defense policy of the European Union without NATO is unimaginable. NATO has played a crucial role in maintaining Europe's security since World War II. In this competition, the primary European military actors, France and Great Britain are attempting to advance their strategic interests and opinions on how to establish the relationship between the state, the European Union, and NATO.⁶

France is advocating for the EU to be an autonomous military actor internationally. On the other hand, French leaders are proposing that Europe should have a consistent and permanent military force (armed forces/defense forces). Great Britain, however, believes that the EU should be involved in military missions and operations only in areas where NATO's capabilities are limited. According to the UK's strategic reasoning, NATO should remain the predominant security and defense organization in Europe, and it should be NATO that decides when EU military forces should participate in a particular crisis.⁷

The Kosovo crisis had a significant impact on the development of European security. Throughout the crisis, the US military power and political influence were dominant in resolving the issue. After the experience of the crisis in Bosnia and Kosovo, Germany, France, and Great Britain recognized the need for a quicker modernization of the security and defense policy of the European Union and the European forces, both from political and military perspectives. As an initiative,⁸ Germany proposed the development of military power across Europe, not just in leading states, therefore, both Britain and France were involved in the general modernization process throughout the continent.⁹

The European Union is currently facing a significant historical situation due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and Russia's aggressive and expansive policies in Eastern Europe and Georgia. This has led to a change in the existing European security architecture, causing serious concerns for France, Germany, Italy, and Poland. These countries are now focused on improving EU military capabilities and security policies. In this article, we will discuss the security dilemmas, national interests, and defense policy development of France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy in relation to the European Union.

France (French Republic)

In security policy, France is guided by the specific model of the European Union, which implies the creation of a militarily autonomous and powerful Europe. During an interview with Europe 1 radio, French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the need for a sovereign army of the European Union to counter the "Russian threat" and ensure European safety. Macron stated that Europe cannot fully protect itself until it has a self-sufficient army, independent of the United States. He also expressed concern about the growing populism and extremist nationalism in Europe that is dividing the continent. Therefore, a stronger and more united Europe is needed to counter these challenges.¹⁰

French Defense Minister Hervé Morin addressed the Security Policy Conference in Munich, calling for "L'Europe de la Défense" and highlighting the necessity of shifting towards European Realpolitik. He emphasized that the European Union cannot remain entirely reliant on NATO and urged Europe to mature beyond its military 'infancy' and take on the responsibilities of a global actor.

Without proper military support, Europe cannot play any role globally. However, Europe needs to prioritize the development of its military capabilities to modernize the army and reflect strategic ambition. In this regard, France's strategic security view is more aligned with the British view than with that of other European countries.¹¹

France is working actively to leverage all the opportunities provided by the terms of the Lisbon Treaty to bolster the common security and defense policy of the European Union through concrete actions. It is also collaborating with member states to develop crisis management capabilities. Given the impact of the flow of migrants from North Africa on the security of France and Europe, France is playing an active role in resolving crises in Africa. The French defense minister has emphasized that protecting common interests requires a collective effort from states and populations.¹²

The same message was in an article by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in March 2008, where he stated: "Les Européens devaient avoir les moyens militaires pour leurs ambitions poli-

6 Bart M. J. Szewczyk, *Europe's Grand Strategy Navigating a New World Order* (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2021), 16-20.

7 *ib.*,

8 Laura Chappell, *Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy Converging Security and Defence Perspectives in an Enlarged EU* (University of Surrey, UK, 2012), 1-35.

9 *ib.*,

10 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest* (palgrave macmillan, 2009), 97-134.

11 The French White Paper on defence and national security - <https://media.nti.org/pdfs/15-Fr.pdf> (10.30.2022)

12 Security, Disarmament and Non-proliferation - <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/> (10.30.2022)

tiques” (Europeans need to have military means for their political ambitions). His article also emphasized the idea that Europe lacked adequate military capabilities to defend itself and that France wanted to be a full member of all NATO structures. The main concept of French strategic thinking is that the European Union must have autonomous military capabilities.

Enhancing Europe’s military capabilities is a common transatlantic interest. Given that the EU already has a foreign policy, it is important to acknowledge the need for a more active security policy that includes the establishment of a unified military force. The current situation presents France with a political platform to promote their vision of L’Europe de defense, which aims to bolster the EU’s military capabilities and increase its role in foreign policy.

In France, General de Gaulle formulated a French security strategy aimed at France’s position as a European and global player. After World War II, the fear of German domination shaped French political views regarding the construction of the European Union.

In the aftermath of World War II, France aimed to establish a united European army and a supranational defense community. This was intended to balance Germany, as they would no longer be able to form a military as powerful as the Wehrmacht. However, given the pressing need to contain the Soviet Union led by Stalin, NATO became the primary security organization in post-war Europe, and the idea of a French-European army was temporarily delayed.¹³

The post-Cold War international order made it impossible for France to maintain great power status in a completely new security environment. NATO’s increased involvement made it clear that the French forces in international operations were not only commanded by the Americans but they were subject to the political decisions of the European states. In the 1990s, France returned to NATO’s military structure as it felt that its influence in Europe was gradually weakening. Additionally, the unification of Germany led to the emergence of a stronger German economy in Europe.¹⁴

French strategic thinking tried to adapt to the existing international order in such a way as to shift its own security priorities and goals. The strategy consisted of three specific issues: a) France should use its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council more actively for UN peacekeeping operations, b) it should integrate and be involved in NATO missions as much as possible; c) An Atlantic security structure should be established through the European Union. French strategic thinking still follows de Gaulle’s vision, “France must become a global security player. But the way to achieve it must be adapted to the circumstances.”

France aims to expand its political influence through military missions. Its participation in multilateral missions is driven by a desire for influence in NATO and the EU. It can be assumed that France will continue to play an active role in these organizations using military instruments.¹⁵

Since the end of the Cold War, the approach to military operations and peacekeeping missions has changed significantly. In the past, it was possible for nations to carry out military missions independently, but this approach has become less common. Nowadays, great powers tend to seek specific partners for peacekeeping missions and military operations. This strategy adds more legitimacy to the mission and helps to reduce risks. France is a good example of this change. Before 1990, France conducted its military missions in Africa individually, often in a semi-covert fashion. However, after the end of the Cold War, France had to look for a partner state to join them in their interventions.¹⁶

In 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy was elected as the President of France. During his presidency, he renegotiated military cooperation with NATO and the European Union. The focus was mainly on the former French colonies in Africa, where Sarkozy acknowledged that the presence of the French military was still based on agreements made after the end of colonialism. He also recognized that the French political, military, and economic involvement in Africa was perceived by many as a neo-colonial intervention.

French strategic thinking is heavily focused on the African continent. For many years, France pursued a highly secretive policy in Africa, but today this has changed, and their actions are more transparent. France is trying to legitimize its military missions in Africa by involving the European Union. Former French President Chirac had a clear strategy in mind - he believed that France needed to make some sacrifices in terms of national sovereignty in order to gain permanent influence on the African continent.¹⁷

13 Defence and National Security Strategic Review - <https://cd-geneve.delegfrance.org/Defence-and-National-Security-Strategic-Review-1890> (10.30.2022)

14 Post-cold War Security in and for Europe - <https://www.sipri.org/publications/1984/sipri-fact-sheets/post-cold-war-security-and-europe> (10.30.2022)

15 France’s National Security Strategy - <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/work-document/frances-national-security-strategy-wp/> (10.1.2022)

16 A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade - <https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/press-release-a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/> (10.1.2022)

17 The French Strategy In Africa:France’s Role On The Continent - <https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/75199> (10.11.2022)

After the end of the Cold War, European states have reduced their national defense budgets by about 30%. This reduction has led to a greater degree of interdependence among these states, as the Great powers can no longer implement their security policies alone. To address this, there is a need for military cooperation organized and united by the European Union. In the past, French strategic thinking was focused on achieving greatness and maintaining sovereignty. However, presently, the emphasis is on multilateral cooperation within organizations like the European Union and NATO to ensure Europe's security. Furthermore, the belief that the French should avoid all international initiatives that they cannot control is now outdated. Instead, the French are striving to take on leadership roles in these organizations.¹⁸

Since 2008, France has become significantly more active in NATO. In his first foreign policy speech, Sarkozy pointed out that NATO was not a competitor for the common security and defense policy of the European Union.

During the Cold War, France's security interests and strategic plan were focused on giving more autonomy to the military capabilities of the European Union. However, in the modern period, the concept of de Gaulle's sovereignty has disappeared, and France is now establishing pragmatic and close military cooperation with the US and NATO in terms of international peacekeeping missions and military operations with the European Union. It is noticeable that whenever an international crisis arises, French officials still emphasize the idea that Europe needs an autonomous military force. France supports a multipolar environment in the international system and opposes unilateral systems.

France's shift in security strategy can be traced back to the 1980s when it decided to fully integrate into the defense structures of the European Union. Since then, France has actively participated in multinational operations under NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. Of all the international organizations, the European Union holds the highest priority for France as it is committed to creating an integrated European defense structure and maintaining a common foreign and security policy.

France is aligned with both the EU and NATO in their security policy development but is primarily focused on the EU. Some researchers have questioned whether France is one of the strongest states in terms of security and defense. The answer is quite simple: Yes. France is gradually increasing its defense budget and working to develop its own armed forces, both technically and intellectually. What's more, it enjoys a high level of legitimacy from its population, with 80% of French citizens in favor of an increase in military capabilities.¹⁹

The Defense White Book, *Le loi de programmation militaire*²⁰, which was published in 1994, emphasized the importance of multilateralism, as European countries moved towards greater cooperation on security issues over the long term. It is worth remembering that France has a nuclear arsenal, which makes it an important player in ensuring the security and defense of the European Union.

France's strategic vision emphasizes that French and European security goals are identical. France also wants to be more involved in EU crisis management. "This allows France to increase its political and military weight in Europe."

France places great importance on the comprehensive approach of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in its strategic security tactics. This approach involves the integration of military and civilian instruments. However, unlike the Nordic countries and Great Britain, France has not yet adopted a similar approach towards NATO.²¹

In the past few years, France has shifted its focus in terms of security policy. For almost half a century, the backbone of the EU and European security relied on French-German relations. However, in 2007, Sarkozy initiated a unilateral approach to the "EU-Mediterranean union", which caused Merkel to be irritated.

There were disagreements over security policy as Germany refused to join EU forces in Darfur. The views of sovereignty and integration differ more between France and Germany than between France and Britain. The latter two states aim to establish robust intergovernmental European military alliances. On the other hand, Germany wants an integrated European Union without special emphasis on military capabilities.²² Despite the withdrawal of Great Britain from the European Union, it remains France's main partner in strategic thinking, as their strategic visions coincide.

18 Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the U.S., and the Atlantic Alliance - <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2001-05-01/two-strategies-europe-de-gaulle-us-and-atlantic-alliance> (10.11.2022)

19 A Strategic Compass to strengthen the security and defence of the European Union by 2030 - <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/european-defence-63008/article/a-strategic-compass-to-strengthen-the-security-and-defence-of-the-european> (10.25.2022)

20 Politique de défense française - <https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/defense/lpm1995.htm> (10.25.2022)

21 Common Security and Defence Policy as France's Winning Strategy - <https://journals.lka.lt/journal/lasr/article/599/info> (10.20.2022)

22 France and Germany Towards Security and Defence Integration: Same Goal, Different Approaches - <https://finabel.org/france-and-germany-towards-security-and-defence-integration-same-goal-different-approaches/> (10.30.2022)

Great Britain (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Britain has never aimed to develop the EU's security policy or strategy to fit its interests. However, 1998 was a turning point when France and Britain presented a bilateral declaration. The declaration emphasized the need to develop autonomous military capabilities within the EU, leading to some tactical changes in British policy. In the first part of this discussion, I will focus on the situation before Brexit (until 2020), and in the second part, I will review the post-Brexit period.

In 2002, Britain conducted a review of its security and defense policy, prompted by the inadequacy of European military capabilities during the Kosovo operation. However, unlike France, Great Britain has a closer political and military partnership with the USA, which made it impossible for Britain to ignore the USA's strategic plans for Europe. Therefore, Britain's approach to the EU is intriguing.

According to the researchers, the British government used the political and security structures of the EU to lead its policies in different ways. "The British government utilized EU structures for political and security leadership, and to obtain financial benefits for national policies." Although this statement may seem exaggerated, it has logical arguments to support it. The British government utilized EU structures for political and security leadership, and to obtain financial benefits for national policies.²³

Britain adopts a pragmatic approach towards its security policy with the EU. If the EU aims to enhance military cooperation, then it can work in collaboration with France, and if the goal is to strengthen security policy, then Britain can cooperate with Germany. Britain analyzes the specific objectives of continental European countries and the EU, and based on that, it formulates action plans.²⁴

From a strategic perspective, Britain has a special relationship with the US and it remains a key security partner. In addition, Britain is striving to prevent the EU from confronting NATO and to maintain balance in Europe. During the negotiations, Britain constantly tries to balance the interests of the member states while also maintaining a "special relationship" with the USA. This balancing act serves as a "connecting bridge" in Europe-US relations. The reason behind this balanced behavior is quite clear: the stronger Britain is in terms of security in Europe, the more attractive it is to the United States, and therefore, the more leverage it can gain from its relationship with the United States.²⁵

Tony Blair (Anthony Charles Lynton Blair - Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007) proposed a new world order for British security, which he called "The Doctrine of the International Community". According to Blair, this doctrine was focused on human rights and democracy, which he believed to be the primary pillars of sovereignty.

The concept laid the groundwork for a Western values agenda that aligned with the EU's human rights and security principles. However, Britain's new pro-European stance, in response to globalization, caused domestic unrest. Blair's confidence in British political life dropped significantly due to the Iraq war, leading to his resignation. It is worth noting Blair's stance on the Kosovo conflict. He believed that member states should intervene with military capabilities instead of relying solely on Washington. On the other hand, the Bosnian war was not seen as a threat to national interests, and the only significant decision was the implementation of humanitarian missions.²⁶

Great Britain officially left the European Union on February 1, 2020. Subsequently, negotiations have been launched between the UK and the EU member states in the areas of foreign, security, and defense policy. Both parties are working towards understanding the framework for future cooperation and taking into account the unique characteristics of their partnership.

It's important for the United Kingdom to decide on its level of involvement in the foreign and security policies developed by the European Union and how much it can pursue national policies that differ from the existing EU policy portfolio. There are three possible scenarios for future foreign, security, and defense relations between the UK and the EU: integrated player, associated partner, and observer.²⁷

Integrated player (actor) - After leaving the EU, the United Kingdom is no longer a member of the Foreign Relations Council, the Council of Europe, the Political and Security Committee, and the working groups. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom can still participate, with a special status, in the process of developing the EU's foreign and security policy, for example, in the form of the EU+1 agreement. Great Britain has the opportunity to participate in the Council on Foreign Relations on the

23 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest* (palgrave macmillan, 2009), 97-134.

24 Never-ending divorce: The role of UK-EU security cooperation after Brexit - <https://ecfr.eu/article/never-ending-divorce-the-role-of-uk-eu-security-cooperation-after-brexit/> (10.23.2022)

25 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom Security in an interdependent world - https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228539/7291.pdf (10.30.2022)

26 The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009 Security for the Next Generation - https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229001/7590.pdf (10.30.2022)

27 A Secure Brexit? UK Security and Defense and the Decision to Leave the European Union - <https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/secure-brexit-uk-security-and-defense-and-decision-leave-european-union-0> (10.30.2022)

relevant issues of the agenda (with the precedent of the participation of the US Secretary of State and the UN Secretary General), in the work of the PSC and its working groups.²⁸

The United Kingdom will continue to meet its existing commitments to ongoing CSDP military and civilian operations and will participate in future missions. It will also maintain its existing obligation to provide a battle group to the EU. The United Kingdom may also have associate membership status of the European Defense Agency; participate in projects in a specific case; be granted observer status in the agency’s governing board. Under this agreement, the UK’s diplomatic and military capabilities will be integrated with the EU’s foreign and security policy and common security and defense policy for mutual benefit.²⁹

Associated partner - The concept of an associated partner relationship with the EU’s foreign and security policy can be exemplified by Norway’s case. In this type of agreement, the UK would be invited by the EU to participate in developing policy declarations and join in various areas of action, such as sanctions. Cooperation in security policy will be carried out through “dialogues” that will take place between ministers, directors, and working groups. Additionally, the UK has the option to participate in CSDP operations and sign an Administrative Agreement with the European Defense Agency (EDA) to enable its participation in EDA initiatives. Furthermore, like Norway, the United Kingdom may also participate in the EU battlegroup.

Observer – According to this model, the UK would be separate from the EU’s foreign and security policy both politically and organizationally. If Great Britain chooses to continue relations with the status of an “observer,” it will be formally disconnected from the foreign and security policy of the European Union. However, the UK may still benefit from bilateral cooperation with EU member states. In the area of Common Security and Defense (CSDP), the UK may adopt the practices of the US. While the US has not taken part in EU military missions, it has been collaborating on crisis management with the EU since 2011 through its signature.

	<i>Battlegroups</i>	<i>European Defense Agency</i>	<i>Working groups</i>	<i>Policy and Security Committee</i>	<i>Military and Civil Operations</i>	<i>Membership of the Foreign Affairs Council</i>
Integrated	Yes	Association Member	No	Special Status	Yes	Special Status
Associate Partner	Invited Participant	According to the agreement	No	No	According to the agreement	No
Observer	No	No	No	No	Civil only	No

Table N 1.

After leaving the European Union, Great Britain actively started negotiations with the European Union on defense and security policy issues. The European Union and Great Britain signed the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) to establish a new relationship between them. The agreement covers various policy areas such as energy, transport, and fishing, but foreign policy and security were excluded from the negotiations at the request of the UK government. As a result, the existing legal framework considers any UK involvement or participation in the EU’s defense and security structures as that of a “third party”. The negotiations in February 2020 did not include any cooperation or discussion on foreign security and defense policy. The negotiating directives clearly stated that such areas “do not require an institutionalized relationship”.³⁰

The UK is planning to shift its approach, moving away from its previous focus on maintaining the post-Cold War rules-based international order. The country has bigger plans and goals in mind. According to British strategic thinking, the European Union institutions have bound Britain and prevent-

28 Brexit: defence, security and immigration - <https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/eu-referendum/defence-security-and-immigration/> (10.30.2022)

29 ib.,

30 Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+ - <https://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/Dahrendorf/Dahrendorf-Martill-Sus-BJPIR.pdf> (10.22.2022)

ed it from playing an important role in the world, as it has in the past centuries. Therefore, Britain's 2030 strategic goals emphasize the protection of democracy, human rights, and global security, both in Europe and worldwide.³¹

This new strategy suggests that Britain will likely rebalance its security efforts towards national security and international obligations. However, the country remains committed to safeguarding European security and strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is the basis of UK defense policy.

The United Kingdom is actively involved in frequent military exercises with its European allies and key NATO partners in Eastern Europe such as Ukraine and Georgia. It also has significant bilateral defense treaties with specific European countries, with its most significant treaty being the one with France. The Franco-British Joint Expeditionary Force is a result of this bilateral agreement and it allows for a wide range of joint Franco-British intervention scenarios.

During the UK's membership in the EU, it agreed to certain commitments regarding the EU's common foreign and security policy. The October 2019 Political Declaration, which accompanied the Withdrawal Agreement, outlined the UK and the EU's views on supporting ambitious, close, and long-term security cooperation while acknowledging that any future cooperation must respect the "strategic and security interests" of both parties. It remains unclear how the UK plans to develop cooperation in the field of security and defense.

Great Britain has expressed its willingness to participate in security programs and instruments developed by the European Union which are directly related to British security interests. One example of such cooperation is Britain's active collaboration with the European Union in enhancing the military and economic capabilities of Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that Britain calls on the European Union and its member states to increase their support and take more action towards strengthening Ukraine's military and economic resources.

Having a set of formal agreements enabling relevant coordination is a necessity for British defense and security cooperation. Such a relationship would be underpinned by regular consultation and coordination between the UK and the EU on all aspects of foreign policy and security.

In the field of defense and security cooperation, the EU has established robust legal frameworks, programs, and assets such as economic sanctions, legal cooperation, and law enforcement. However, the UK has declined to accept this legally and instead prefers formal agreements. Despite no longer being a member of the European Council, the UK and the EU are expected to have shared interests in various aspects of their foreign and security policies.³²

The United Kingdom is highly interested in maintaining close cooperation with other European countries, especially France and Germany, regarding foreign and security issues. One of Britain's primary objectives is to establish strong collaboration in security and defense matters with EU member states and European allies. For Britain, it is crucial to ensure security on the European continent and assert its leadership role in this process, which is also significant on the global stage.

NATO remains a central pillar of UK defense policy but Britain is also eager to see the EU's common security and defense policy focused on strengthening the European pillar within NATO and building a European defense identity around that pillar.

The United Kingdom is committed to collaborating with European countries on security and defense matters in special coalitions that operate outside Europe. Although the UK is willing to participate in meaningful foreign policy cooperation, its leaders are likely to be hesitant about proposals for a new comprehensive institutional framework, and they will resist any initiatives that threaten existing cooperation, especially with NATO. In general, the UK will work together with the EU on security and defense issues, but only if it is in its national interest.

Germany (Federal Republic of Germany)

"Germany's foreign and security policy over the last few decades has been characterized by stability, continuity, and pragmatism, it is a reliable and predictable process involving high-ranking politicians, and most importantly, foreign and security policy is related to the values and interests of the German population, however it is not static. Germany's foreign and security policy always reacts to important issues in the international environment" - Guido Westerwelle

For almost five decades, Guido Westerwelle's explanation of German Foreign and Security Policy has been a reflection of its nature and ambitions. Since the time of Bismarck, tactical combinations and stability have been the hallmarks of German foreign and security policy. This policy greatly influences the EU's foreign and security policy standards. Germany is responsible not only for the transformation

31 National Security Strategy - <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-security-strategy> (10.22.2022)

32 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy - https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-security-strategy.pdf (10.22.2022)

of member states' foreign and security policies but also for how they represent and identify their preferences and interests. Germany has integrated its international security policy identity into the European security framework, establishing shared values and norms of behavior. Notably, Germany seeks to connect its national security interests with the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations. In recent years, Germany has taken a prominent role in shaping security in Europe. The EU's CSDP serves as the primary security platform for Germany to implement specific preferences.³³

Germany's emergence as a significant player in foreign and security policies is of great interest due to its historical behavior in this context. After World War II and the Cold War, Germany's commitment to European integration was based on reconciliation with former enemies and the consolidation of a strong European Union (EU) for political and economic integration on the continent. Since then, German leaders have used the EU as the primary political and economic platform through which Germany plays a significant role in international relations.

During the early and mid-1990s, German foreign policy was aimed at promoting the integration of Eastern Europe into the European Union. According to analysts, Germany's foreign and security policy was an attempt to suppress its reputation and fears resulting from the aftermath of World War II. Germany took on great responsibility for the integration and development of the EU and made efforts to resolve various political and economic crises.

Germany wanted to convince its neighbors and partners that unification would not threaten the peace and stability of Europe, and the trajectory of change in Germany in the post-unification period was dramatic. Germany also tried together with the EU member states to solve the main security challenges on the European continent, which arose as a result of the breakup of Yugoslavia and then Russia's aggressive and expansionist policy in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, 2022). In the past, Russia has initiated large-scale hostilities with both Georgia and Ukraine, resulting in the loss of many innocent lives and the occupation of additional territories. In response to the unstable security environment created in Eastern Europe, Germany has taken on a mediating role in negotiations with Russia. Germany's involvement and activism in the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) have been crucial in institutional development and effectiveness.³⁴

Germany has also created a space for security maneuvers in Europe for member states that can reconcile national interests and EU views and develop a common security strategic plan. Germany has also called on member states to support the EU's deployment of military forces abroad, a decision that highlights the most interesting aspect of the evolution of German foreign policy over the past two decades. Germany's default position remains a multilateralist and partnership-based approach to foreign policy aimed at developing a security and defense policy.

According to some analysts, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (German Chancellor from October 27, 1998 to November 22, 2005) was eager to align the security and defense interests of the EU and Germany and develop a unified strategic plan. Merkel (Germany's first female chancellor from November 22, 2005, to December 8, 2021) has continued this trend, and she has also shown a willingness for Germany to play a more active security role in Europe.³⁵

German and EU security policy under Merkel reflects a strong enthusiasm for EU enlargement and a fair amount of skepticism about several aspects of European market integration. Germany, however, supports deeper European integration in security fields and was a strong proponent of the proposed EU constitutional treaty. German leaders have been actively promoting the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Germany has played an important role in Middle East politics, working closely with the USA, and has served as a mediator in various crises. Germany has also been instrumental in developing relations with Russia while providing financial and political assistance to Eastern European states. Additionally, Germany has cooperated in security issues, making significant contributions to the overall stability of the region.³⁶

The Russian Federation plays an important role in the European Union's security strategy. However, the Ukraine-Russia war of 2022 demonstrated that Russia remains a threat to the Eastern European states. Therefore, the European Union needs to take more effective steps to address this issue. Germany has already increased its defense budget by 100 billion euros, and it is crucial for the EU to have a state that can play a significant role in negotiating with Russia. Germany is an ideal candidate for this role as it constantly strives to ensure that the European Union does not feel threatened by Russia

33 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest* (palgrave macmillan, 2009), 138-165

34 Laura Chappell, *Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy Converging Security and Defence Perspectives in an Enlarged EU* (University of Surrey, UK, 2012), 35-40.

35 National Security Strategy - <https://www.bmvg.de/en/national-security-policy> (10.30.2022)

36 Towards the National Security Strategy - the process - <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/nationale-sicherheitsstrategie> (10.22.2022)

during negotiations. However, negotiations have stopped recently, and Russia is issuing ultimatums and calling on the West to make certain concessions, which greatly undermines the EU's security strategy.³⁷

Angela Merkel's security strategy was centered around fostering close bilateral relationships with Eastern European countries in the military, economic, and political spheres. She also sought to assure Eastern European states that Germany's cordial relationship with Russia did not pose a threat to European unity and security. In addition to its ties with Russia, Germany also provided critical financial assistance to Eastern European countries, enabling them to become competitive powers in the region and avoid falling under Russia's sphere of influence. (For instance, Germany aided Georgia and Ukraine in their efforts to join NATO and the European Union by creating specific formats and programs that provided these countries with valuable assistance both economically and politically.)

Negotiating a new EU-Russia partnership and cooperation agreement was one of Germany's main goals during its EU presidency in early 2007. However, Merkel interrupted the negotiations in a certain process, because Russia's demands and views gradually contradicted the EU's security policy. Some observers and Eastern European leaders saw it as an important confirmation of Merkel's commitment to European unity in foreign policy.

Olaf Scholz assumed the position of Chancellor of Germany on December 8, 2021, succeeding Angela Merkel. However, just two months after taking office, on February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" to "demilitarize and denazify" Ukraine. Within minutes, air and missile strikes began across Ukraine, including in the capital city of Kyiv. This was followed by a ground invasion from multiple directions, marking another aggressive and expansionist policy by Russia towards Ukraine. Despite this, Russian propaganda media continues to refer to it as a "special military operation". Given the difficult situation that Scholz inherited³⁸, it's challenging to assess his policy and approach towards Russia. Nonetheless, it's worth noting some of Scholz's comments and evaluations regarding the Russia-Ukraine war.³⁹

During a pre-election meeting of the Social Democratic Party in Essen, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Russia has damaged the entire world by attacking Ukraine. He further added that the ongoing war worsens the global economic and social problems that have arisen due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Scholz emphasized that the destruction caused by this conflict transcends beyond the borders of Russia and Ukraine, potentially impacting the future of the entire world.⁴⁰

As the chancellor pointed out, Putin is following the imperialist vision of previous centuries, but he has miscalculated. Scholz, in a recent statement, mentioned that Ukraine will receive aid now as well as in the future. He also highlighted that the democratic countries swiftly reacted by imposing strict sanctions on Russia. Scholz pointed out that the actions of the Russian President not only bring chaos to Ukraine but also threaten the future of Russia. According to him, President Putin is making a grave mistake. Additionally, Scholz promised that every possible measure would be taken to end the war and restore peace in Europe, where borders will be respected and never violated again.⁴¹

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz accused Russia of waging an "imperialist" war against Ukraine and pledged "strong" support for Kiev to defend its sovereignty. Olaf Scholz, who addressed the Crimean Platform summit via video conference, said that the Ukrainian people had shown extraordinary courage to defend their country.⁴²

"Ukrainians are appreciated all over the world for their tenacity and courage. They reject a world where the word of the strong goes, not of law, where big powers can swallow up small states if they want." German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said, emphasizing that Moscow's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and recent attempts to occupy more Ukrainian territory are a clear violation of international law, adding: "We want to reiterate that the international community will never accept Russia's illegal, imperialist annexation of Ukrainian territory."

During the meeting, Scholz expressed Germany's condemnation of Russia's attempt to integrate parts of Ukraine's territory forcefully. He emphasized that "any fake referendum or other attempt to change the status of parts of Ukraine's territory will never be recognized." Scholz also assured the authorities in Kyiv that "the German government will continue to provide financial and military assis-

37 National Security Strategy The National Security Strategy: providing guidance in the face of current and foreseeable security challenges - <https://www.bmvg.de/en/national-security-policy> (10.22.2022)

38 EUROPE POLITICS Putin must recognize he cannot win Ukraine war, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz says at UN - <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/09/21/putin-must-recognize-he-cannot-win-ukraine-war-olaf-scholz-says-at-un.html> (10.22.2022)

39 German foreign and security policy after Merkel - <https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2019/german-foreign-and-security-policy-after-merkel> (10.22.2022)

40 Germany's Chancellor Olaf Scholz faces growing criticism over handling of Ukraine war - <https://www.euronews.com/2022/04/22/germany-s-chancellor-olaf-scholz-faces-growing-criticism-over-handling-of-ukraine-war> (10.22.2022)

41 Scholz: Putin started war for 'completely absurd' reasons - <https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-scholz-says-putin-started-war-for-completely-absurd-reasons/a-62880926> (10.22.2022)

42 Ukraine war: Olaf Scholz says Vladimir Putin does not see war as mistake - <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62907923> (10.22.2022)

tance to Ukraine”. He stated that Germany would continue to supply weapons, including modern air defense systems, missile launchers, new anti-drone weapons, and tons of ammunition.⁴³

The new Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, holds a more rigid and direct policy towards Russia compared to his predecessors. He has highlighted important issues and is expected to pursue a more pragmatic and firm policy towards Russia. However, it is too early to make assumptions, and only time will tell. The Russia-Ukraine war has also affected Germany’s internal politics, as Scholz has approved a new budget for the Bundeswehr, which has significantly increased compared to previous years. He has also initiated the modernization and improvement of the defense forces. Previously, pro-Russian politicians had dominated the German political elite, but the results and course of the war have brought changes. After the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, Germany will most likely increase its efforts to strengthen the security and defense policy of the European Union, both economically and politically as well as militarily.⁴⁴

Since the unification, Germany has emerged as the main supporter of the common security and defense policy of the European Union. This has been possible due to international events and the political situation within Europe. Germany aimed to develop a security policy that would allow member states to work together on security issues and pool their defense resources. To achieve this, the EU needed a strong state partner that could play the role of a mediator in member states. Germany has been able to represent this kind of state. The country holds significant political power within the European Union, which is essential for the development of security and defense policy. Ultimately, it can be said that the European Union has placed its hopes on Germany for the development of a common security and defense policy.⁴⁵

The turning point for Germany was the Balkan military conflicts in Europe, where the ineffectiveness of the security of the European Union and European states was highlighted. Germany’s involvement in security and defense policy has intensified since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, due to the development of civilian and military crisis management capabilities and the refinement of police training. Germany actively participates in EU military and civilian missions: in Bosnia, Kosovo, the coast of Somalia, and Afghanistan. It has also carried out four police operations, which are currently supervised by the European Union. Germany is particularly cautious about military operations between the EU and NATO. Germany’s goal is for the common security and defense policy of the European Union to be a “complement” to NATO, not a “substitute.” To this end, Germany supports formal agreements between NATO and the EU aimed at avoiding duplication of NATO structures, such as the so-called “Berlin Plus” agreement, which allows the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities for operations conducted by the EU.⁴⁶

Germany is a well-organized democratic state where decision-making and developing security policies is a challenging process. German democracy is characterized by strong democratic control and legitimacy of security and defense policies. It is crucial to obtain this legitimacy from Germany’s domestic political institutions during all phases of military and civilian operations. Democratic control of the military apparatus is strongly emphasized in Germany, as the country has a historical heritage based on the experience of the period from 1933-1941.⁴⁷

The German Parliament has a unique system in Europe, where it has the right to approve the sending of military personnel to a mission. The Parliament not only issues a mandate for the start of military operations but also checks the legitimacy of a particular military operation. The Parliament has the authority to approve the mandate and mission procedures beforehand, as well as implement control mechanisms during the operation’s implementation. The German Constitution prohibits the sending of German military personnel abroad and engaging in any military operation, which requires the German government to take authority from the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court. The court decides whether the government’s request to send German troops abroad is legitimate or not.⁴⁸

To summarize, German foreign and security policy can be divided into two main directions: pre- and post-Russo-Ukraine war. It is difficult to analyze the ongoing war, but it is clear that Ukraine will become a strong actor in the creation of Eastern European security architecture once the war ends.

43 Macron, Scholz and Draghi meet Zelenskyy in Kyiv during historic visit - <https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-scholz-draghi-kyiv-visit-zelenskyy-ukraine/> (10.22.2022)

44 Germany’s new national security strategy - <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/germanys-new-national-security-strategy/> (10.22.2022)

45 A Security Strategy for Germany - https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/90089/Security_Strategy_Germany.pdf (10.25.2022)

46 Arm for the storm: Germany’s new security strategy - <https://ecfr.eu/article/arm-for-the-storm-germanys-new-security-strategy/> (10.25.2022)

47 German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications - <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL34199.pdf> (10.25.2022)

48 Germany’s security strategy in the making - <https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/germanys-security-strategy-making> (10.25.2022)

According to the current situation, it is best to consider the ongoing process and official comments and decisions of the German Chancellor to conclude what role Germany will play in the future security of Europe. On August 10, 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Berlin had provided Kiev with highly effective weapons that have changed the fighting situation in Eastern Ukraine. He made this announcement at a joint conference with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid in Berlin.

In the ongoing battle in the east, Ukraine is relying on weapons such as howitzers and others to make advancements, as per Scholz. Additionally, Germany has agreed to provide Ukraine with more Iris-T air defence systems. While Kiev has been requesting modern battle tanks from its Western allies, German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht has declined to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Lambrecht stated during the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) National Security Strategy Panel that no Western country has provided infantry fighting vehicles or tanks to Ukraine.⁴⁹

According to Scholz, Germany will continue to support Ukraine in collaboration with its partners. Initially, Germany was very cautious and restrained during the first weeks of the war. However, its position toward security changed dramatically as the war progressed. Along with the USA, Germany became the main supporter of Ukraine. Therefore, it can be said that Germany will play a significant role in Europe's security post-war, including creating and protecting its architecture. Germany has taken responsibility for the direction of security in Europe and is one of the main leaders, alongside Britain, in Europe.⁵⁰

Olaf Scholz delivered a highly interesting speech at the German Bundestag in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. He referred to the situation as a "Zeitenwende", or historical turning point, and announced that his government would significantly increase military spending, a departure from Germany's prior cautious defense policy. Scholz's speech was met with positive reactions from both German and international politicians and was also supported by opposition leader Friedrich Merz. As per Patrick Wintour, Scholz declared a "180-degree turn of course" in defense and security policy.⁵¹

Germany is poised to become a significant player in the process of creating and implementing the European Union and European security due to the Zeitenwende. According to Germany's strategic security thinking, the conflict with Russia is already occurring in the geopolitical environment of Europe. This environment is characterized by great power competition and systemic rivalry between the USA and Russia-China. The emergence of rival blocs poses an existential challenge for Germany, as its export-oriented economy is highly dependent on ongoing globalization. In the first stage, Germany will have to abandon certain cautious policies and principles that it has long defended. This includes, first of all, the idea of the so-called European peace dividend. Another principle is based on the belief in the beneficial and democratizing effects of economic interdependence with autocracies such as Russia and China. The massive energy crisis is showing Germans how dangerous it is to rely on just one actor in a strategically important area. Russia has turned this dependence into a means of hybrid warfare.

The purchase of American F-35 fighter jets and the establishment of a powerful air base signify a significant shift in Germany's defense policy. Until recently, many researchers and politicians thought this was impossible. However, these measures should only serve as the beginning of a comprehensive process to define Germany's security role in Europe and the world. Germany should determine what it can do and how it can contribute to the development of European and international security in this new reality. Germany recognizes that it is the strongest country in Europe in terms of security. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock argues that the national security strategy should be based on a comprehensive understanding of security. Previous strategic documents, such as the 2016 White Paper and the 2017 Guidelines titled "Crisis Prevention, Conflict Management, Peace Promotion," rely on a broad concept of security that encompasses not only politics and the military but also human, economic, and environmental factors.⁵²

At the national security strategy development launch event at the Federal Foreign Office on March 18, 2022, Baerbock emphasized the need for a concrete, clear, and comprehensive security strategy. Defining the priorities of the strategy is the main challenge. Without a strong Bundeswehr, Germany cannot be trusted to provide security. Therefore, one of the top priorities should be the modern-

49 Scholz joins Ukrainian soldiers training in Germany German chancellor pledges continued military support for Ukraine in war against Russia - <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/scholz-joins-ukrainian-soldiers-training-in-germany/2669352> (10.25.2022)

50 The service members are in Germany for training on Gepard tanks. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has vowed to send even more heavy weapons to Ukraine in the coming months. - <https://www.dw.com/en/scholz-meets-ukrainian-soldiers-training-in-germany/a-62927402> (10.25.2022)

51 Turn of phrase: Germany's Zeitenwende Scholz's Zeitenwende speech was widely viewed as a major adjustment to Germany's foreign and security policy. But, six months on, it is unclear whether the country is up to the task. - <https://ecfr.eu/article/turn-of-phrase-germanys-zeitenwende/> (10.25.2022)

52 Germany to buy 35 Lockheed F-35 fighter jets from U.S. amid Ukraine crisis - <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-decides-principle-buy-f-35-fighter-jet-government-source-2022-03-14/> (10.25.2022)

ization and increase of the Bundeswehr budget to enable it to play a leading role in the security and defense policy of both NATO and the European Union. A strong Bundeswehr is crucial for defense in the EU.⁵³

The idea of European and EU sovereignty must guide the strategy process. Germany's ruling parties have made this principle a part of their coalition agreement. According to their interpretation, European sovereignty involves creating and maintaining the military capabilities of Europe and the EU, as well as acting independently to protect their interests and values. Germany also wants to enable the EU to make its own decisions within an interdependent international system and implement them in a more competitive geopolitical environment, even when faced with opposition.⁵⁴

It is becoming increasingly clear that the European Union and its member states are not equipped to deal with crises and conflicts using only conventional military force, especially when faced with a formidable adversary like Russia. However, there is an understanding that interdependent relationships between European states can be leveraged to create a strong security and defense policy in coordination with the EU.

It is finally time for Germany to take the lead in securing Europe. As the country with the largest population and the strongest economy at the heart of the continent, Germany's armed forces must play a central role in Europe's conventional defense. They should be equipped with the best technology and resources available, making them the most capable force in Europe.⁵⁵

Conclusion

The most influential countries in the European Union's security and defense policy are Germany, France, and Britain. They lead the European security system. While Britain and France played a vital role in establishing security, Germany was the key player who cooperated and partnered with both. Germany showed willingness for shared leadership, both politically and economically, which became a turning point in the establishment of security. Together, the three countries launched joint security and defense initiatives that were significant from the beginning to the formation of the European Union Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).⁵⁶

In 1999, Germany played a crucial role in the formation of the ESDP/CSDP after the St. Malo meeting. Over the years, the most high-profile collaboration has been the E3+3 negotiation process with Iran regarding its nuclear program. This negotiation led to the formation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Officials believed that if the Big Three (Britain, France, Germany) reached an agreement among themselves, the chances of success would be high." The process of negotiations and agreement has become more complicated since Britain is no longer a member state of the European Union. National interests play a vital role in the development of security policy, making the process even more difficult. It is easier to reach an agreement with one partner than with two partners simultaneously, especially if they are equally powerful. While it may be easier to agree with Luxembourg on some issues, it is more challenging to reach a consensus between France and Germany on certain matters.⁵⁷

Cooperation and partnership between countries depend largely on frequent and intensive contacts between their foreign and defense ministries, as well as at the highest levels of government. There are institutionalized and semi-institutionalized formats of interaction, such as the Franco-German Security Policy Council, which was announced in February 2014 after the first deployment of Franco-German brigade elements to the EU mission.⁵⁸

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been successful in fostering cooperation and partnership, particularly between France, Germany, and the other big players. The establishment of the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the EU Battlegroups were important steps in achieving this cooperation, as was the inclusion of the Mechanism for Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of Defense (PESCO) in the Treaty of Lisbon. The concept of the battle group was first introduced in 2003 after a small EU force was deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Operation Ar-

53 Towards the National Security Strategy - the process - <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/nationale-sicherheitsstrategie> (10.25.2022)

54 Drafting the National Security Strategy: Conclusion of the citizens' forum in Erfurt with Foreign Minister Baerbock - <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/national-security-strategy/2554354> (10.25.2022)

55 Germany presents new national security strategy: The German government has pledged a one-off investment of €100 billion to modernize its armed forces following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. - <https://www.dw.com/en/german-foreign-minister-annalena-baerbock-presents-germanys-national-security-strategy/a-61169197> (10.25.2022)

56 Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics In the New National Interest (palgrave macmillan, 2009)*, 130-145.

57 Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State (Oxford University Press, 2008)*, 55-60

58 Frédéric Mérand, *European Defence Policy Beyond the Nation State (Oxford University Press, 2008)*, 60-70

temis).⁵⁹

The joint initiative aimed to create a small and easily deployable rapid response force that can operate autonomously during crisis management operations. The objective was to improve the effectiveness of the EU in defense and security, with the development of battlegroups serving as a tool for achieving wider goals. These examples demonstrate how Germany, France, and Britain are collaborating to promote specific initiatives or policy objectives in the CSDP, particularly in the areas of security and defense.⁶⁰

Small EU member states often face resource constraints that limit their participation in the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) working groups and committees. Germany and France benefit from relatively rich resources, including qualified personnel and access to information, which provide them with certain structural advantages. They are able to fully represent and articulate their views and perspectives⁶¹ in all policy and issue areas. Germany, in particular, is adept at supporting and accommodating the security interests of small states. Meanwhile, France is highly focused on enhancing the EU's role and significance in security and defense matters. Therefore, the support and involvement of Germany in EU security and defense policy is crucial for the Eastern European states.⁶²

The "Big Three" countries within the EU have different approaches to security and defense. France wants to strengthen the EU's military resources and increase its autonomy, while Britain, as a non-member state, wants to work with NATO to create a security and defense architecture in Europe. Germany, as the country with the largest population and economic power, is willing to take the lead in securing the continent. It sees its armed forces as the cornerstone of Europe's conventional defense and aims to have the best-equipped force in the region.⁶³

The guiding principle of the strategy process should be centered around the idea of European and EU sovereignty, which has been made a part of the coalition agreement of Germany's ruling parties. According to their interpretation, European sovereignty means creating and maintaining military capabilities, as well as acting independently to protect the interests and values of Europe and the EU. It is crucial to align the security interests of EU member states and the EU, and Germany's security and defense policy should be interconnected with the EU to act in unison. However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has revealed that Russia remains the primary threat to the European continent. The Russian governing body considers it acceptable to engage in military conflict with another sovereign country to achieve its goals. As such, the primary threat to the European Union and Europe is Russia. The next question that arises is who should act as a mediator from the EU in the negotiations with Russia.⁶⁴

The role of a mediator, based on multilateralism and protection of the interests of small states, is exemplified by Germany. The concept of Germany as a mediator has been explored in various contexts. For instance, Adomite (2000) developed the notion of a mediator or "bridge" in his study of German-Russian relations. In matters of foreign and security policy, EU decision-making is built around consensus-building, which is particularly useful to consider. Additionally, this policy area has traditionally been dominated by two states, France and Germany. As another "big" state, Germany feels ideally suited to play the role of mediator or balance. A member of the German Bundestag stated in Berlin that "we always respect the security policies of small states and protect their interests, making us natural mediators."⁶⁵

After the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, it is evident that the EU will face a significant loss of power in various aspects, including potential security and defense policy benefits. Although Great Britain is no longer part of the EU institutionally, it still maintains security relationships with EU member states. With the UK's departure, military cooperation with France and Germany could become one of the most constructive areas of collaboration between the UK and the EU. Following Britain's withdrawal from the EU, representatives of the 27 governments made specific commitments to enhance the security and defense policy of the European Union. EU foreign and defense ministers approved new proposals for EU security and defense policy based on practical Franco-German

59 Extraterritorial Collective Security: The European Union and Operation ARTEMIS - <https://academic.oup.com/book/2909/chapter-abstract/143547787?redirectedFrom=fulltext> (10.25.2022)

60 *ib.*,

61 German-French cooperation Article In terms of cooperation among the 27 EU member states, the German-French partnership holds a particularly prominent position because of its history, intensity and special institutional architecture. - <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europe/cooperation-in-europe/german-french-cooperation/228748> (10.25.2022)

62 Franco-German Defence and Security Cooperation - <https://academic.oup.com/book/34803/chapter-abstract/297656164?redirectedFrom=fulltext> (10.25.2022)


63 The United Kingdom's Joint Delegation to NATO is the link between the UK government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. - <https://www.gov.uk/world/uk-joint-delegation-to-nato> (10.25.2022)

64 Germany takes a new security and defence policy course together with its partners in the EU and NATO. - <https://www.deutschland.de/en/topic/politics/security-and-defence-germany-eu-and-nato> (10.25.2020)

65 Germany and European Security and Defence Cooperation: The Europeanization of National Crisis Management Policies? - <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26299640> (10.22.2022)

proposals. Currently, Britain is among the EU's main security and defense policy partners, and Franco-German relations are a significant pillar within the union. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council on nuclear weapons, France has a unique sense of responsibility for global security and is willing to act unilaterally if necessary. Germany, on the other hand, acts only in coalition with others.⁶⁶

France prioritizes making the EU security and defense policy more intergovernmental rather than focusing on symbolic integration in the future. The reason behind this is that for Paris, the EU is the ideal platform for carrying out military operations and missions. Strong collaboration between France and the UK is crucial for European security. This is not only due to their combined military power but also because it enables Europeans to contribute more to NATO, which is a priority for the UK, and act autonomously when necessary, which is a priority for France. Please refer to the graph below for a visual representation of the German-French-British security and defense policy compass.⁶⁷



Graph N 1.

It is hoped by the British government that the member states of the European Union will fulfill their defense promises after leaving the EU. There are three reasons to support this argument. Firstly, some EU operations are effective in addressing the security challenges faced by Europe. Relying solely on NATO is not a feasible option for Europeans, not because NATO is unreliable, but because it has to deal with bigger challenges across the globe.⁶⁸

The EU has carried out military operations beyond its territory, covering a vast geographical area from the Western Balkans to the Indian Ocean. The purpose of these operations is to combat piracy, terrorism, and human trafficking.⁶⁹

To improve their military capabilities and make better use of their defense budgets, Europeans need to take certain measures. For instance, EU institutions in Brussels can offer financial assistance for defense research, allow access to protected national markets for military procurement, and provide incentives for more efficient multinational equipment programs. By implementing these measures, both taxpayers and the military will benefit.⁷⁰

Thirdly, the EU and NATO need to enhance their practical cooperation to establish and safeguard the European security framework. Through the collaborative efforts of these two organizations, the entire continent of Europe can be ensured of its security. The EU and NATO can establish connections between internal police and intelligence networks and external military operations, providing a comprehensive approach to security.

Following Britain's exit from the EU, there will be closer alignment of European security and military cooperation with the national priorities of Germany, France, and Britain, while EU and NATO work towards synchronization of their relations. In Europe, military cooperation is primarily led by national governments. Countries collaborate more closely through regional formats such as Baltic, Nordic, and Visegrad (Central Europe) cooperation. Ultimately, the Germany-France-Britain relationship

66 Strategic autonomy and European security after Brexit - <https://www.iris-france.org/135189-strategic-autonomy-and-european-security-after-brexit/> (10.22.2022)

67 France and the European Security and Defence Policy: A leadership role among equals, Vol. 19, No. 2, Themenschwerpunkt: Auf dem Weg zu einer Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) (2001), - <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24231260> (10.24.2022)

68 How France, Germany, and the UK can build a European pillar of NATO - <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/how-france-germany-and-the-uk-can-build-a-european-pillar-of-nato/> (10.22.2022)

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still forms the basis of European security and military cooperation, regardless of whether it is under the auspices of the European Union or NATO. The EU finds it easier to develop a security and defence policy when the “Big Three” have already agreed on certain issues and then rise to the level of EU institutions.⁷¹

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