

# READINESS AS A DEFENCE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR

**Ivan Okromtchedlishvili**

PhD Student in Business Administration,  
International Black Sea University;  
Associate Lecturer, MA Programme in Defence Management,  
Ilia State University; Tbilisi, Georgia

## **Abstract**

Understanding the limits of a nation's ability to build and deploy mission-ready armed forces is a fundamental element of national security. The determination of optimal defence (military) capabilities to be developed and maintained, along with the associated states of readiness, is the major challenge to defence planners. Those involved in security and defence policymaking and planning processes usually stress the importance of keeping a state's military capabilities ready. While they generally agree that every function of the defence enterprise should directly or indirectly support the formation of a mission-ready military now or in the future, their views on what readiness is, and therefore, how to manage it and use it as a resource management and performance measurement tool, often diverge. In this article, the use of readiness as a defence performance indicator has been discussed, and a performance framework for a major force program has been proposed as well. Despite its shortcomings, it is very important to include the "readiness level" as an output indicator in the defence program structure of the Ministry of Defence. The target readiness levels of the military units should also be specified in the defence strategy and planning documents, as well as procurement objectives and descriptions of acceptable risk. Evaluation of the performance of managers at all levels should be directly related to the achievement of the specified (planned) levels of readiness or to the contribution to the achievement of the latter. The Ministry of Defence is only successful to the extent that it produces one primary output: military capability - organized, equipped, trained, and sustained mission-ready defence forces that can be verified and confirmed by using readiness assessment methods. Therefore, military readiness should be of great importance to the Ministry of Defence, the Government, and the Parliament of a state as a key factor in determining defence funding needs when debating on defence budget issues.

## **Keywords:**


Readiness, output, efficiency, effectiveness, performance, capability

## INTRODUCTION

Junor noted that “there will never be enough resources to be ready for everything, especially everything at once.”<sup>1</sup> Understanding the limits of a nation’s ability to build and deploy mission-ready armed forces is a fundamental element of national security. Policymakers and members of the defence community usually stress the importance of keeping military capabilities ready. They also largely concur that every defence enterprise function should directly or indirectly assist in the development of military forces that are prepared for missions now and in the future. However, they often have very different ideas about what readiness is and therefore how to manage it and use it as a resource management or performance measurement tool.<sup>2</sup>

According to Betts, the term “readiness” has often been used in two senses: one too broad, merging the concept with that of military capability as a whole, and one too narrow, much more focused and technical. The latter usage refers not to capability in general, which includes the desired size and types of forces, but to the status of whatever forces do exist, that is, their immediate capacity for combat. Are they provided with means and up to efficient employment in battle, or do they need time to be organized, supplied with essentials, repaired, or retrained?<sup>3</sup> For many purposes, e.g., for the tactical needs of commanders who could face battle in a short time as well as measuring the performance of the defence program and subprogram managers, this more specific concept of readiness looks like the most appropriate one.

As Van Dooren et al. noted, “Performance can be defined as outputs and outcomes.”<sup>4</sup> There are two distinct aspects to the activities of the defence sector. The first relates to efficiency (“doing things right”) and is concerned with the products and services (outputs) created by defence organizations through the use of resources. Effectiveness (or “doing the right things”) is related to the second aspect, which is concerned with the influence of the generated products or services (outputs) on the defence objectives (outcomes) established (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1.** Visualization of Efficiency vs. Effectiveness

As Webb & Angelis noted, “to measure efficiency, we must understand the relationship between the cost of inputs and the amount of outputs [...] to measure effectiveness, we must understand the relationship between the organization’s goals and objectives [or outcomes] and its outputs [...]”<sup>5</sup>

In the case of defence organizations as well, the proverb “you can’t manage what you can’t measure” holds true. It is impossible to assess the success of the defence sector without defining and monitoring success. Only with clearly defined primary defence outputs and outcomes as well as specified success metrics can progress be measured and the process adjusted to deliver the intended outputs and outcomes. Defence organizations run the risk of becoming mired in a state of perpetual uncertainty without clear and measurable objectives.<sup>6</sup>

In this article, the use of readiness as a defence program performance indicator has been discussed, and a performance framework for a major force program has been proposed as well.

Due to the general lack of detailed information and limitations in obtaining primary data on the defence sector in terms of the secrecy of information, especially on the main output of the defence program, namely, military capa-

1 Laura J. Junor, *Managing Military Readiness*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, February 2017), 3, <https://tinyurl.com/mvzdx8p>.

2 Ibid, 1-2.

3 Richard K. Betts, *Military readiness: concepts, choices, consequences*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 25-26.

4 Wouter Van Dooren, Geert Bouckaert, and John Halligan. *Performance Management in the Public Sector*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2015), 20, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315817590>

5 Natalie Webb and Diana Angelis, “Improving Performance Measurement in Defence Organizations,” *The Journal of the American Society of Military Comptrollers*, (Winter 2009): 16-21, <https://tinyurl.com/4ufr9zrz>.

6 Ivan Okromtchedlishvili, “Performance Measurement Issues in the Defence Sector in the Face of Global Security Challenges,” FROM A SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS “GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF THE WORLD”, Publishing House Technical University, (2022): 285-292, <https://doi.org/10.36073/978-9941-28-871-5>.

bility and its indicators – readiness levels of units – the study mainly relied on information and data available from open sources.

## Readiness: Definition and Concepts


Readiness is a very broad topic. The term “readiness” is formally defined as “the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions” in Joint Publication 1 by the U.S. Department of Defence (DOD).<sup>7</sup> The ability of such forces to fight and prevail anywhere and at any time is the broader background for this term, which highlights the DOD’s emphasis on military forces.

The ability of the United States to develop, deploy and maintain armed forces that will perform well in war is referred to as readiness. The goal of readiness is to create “ready” military forces.<sup>8</sup> Since at least the 1830s, the DOD and its predecessors, the Departments of War and Navy, have used the term to describe the condition of military personnel, supplies, training, and other associated activities.<sup>9</sup>

DOD states that military units carry out assigned missions in support of the implementation of the approved national strategy of the United States of America, which from a military point of view, includes three strategic documents: (1) National Security Strategy (NSS), (2) National Defence Strategy (NDS), and (3) National Military Strategy (NMS).<sup>10</sup>

The readiness production process is complex, differs across various circumstances, and consists of three main parts:

1. **Building initial readiness.** This includes initial training and testing and adequate funding (resourcing) to enable warfighters to progress to a higher level of training.
2. **Increasing readiness.** This includes advanced individual and unit training, testing and adequate resourcing so that warfighters have the qualifications and resources to deploy with their operational units.
3. **Sustaining readiness.** This includes ongoing training and supply of units before and after deployment to ensure that units remain ready for their assigned missions in the future (see Figure 2).



**Figure 2.** Unit Readiness Production Process.

<sup>7</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013): GL-10, <https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1.pdf>.

<sup>8</sup> G. James Herrera, The Fundamentals of Military Readiness (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020): Summary, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46559>.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 3.

Source: G. James Herrera, *The Fundamentals of Military Readiness*, 15.

Military readiness is of great importance to Congress and is often at the center of much of the defence budget debate. In particular, Congress often uses the “readiness levels” reported by the DOD as a key factor in determining defence funding needs.<sup>11</sup>

### **Reporting Readiness**

Information related to military unit readiness is reported to the senior leadership of the US Department of Defence using two interconnected systems: Department of Defence Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and Chairman Readiness System (CRS).

The aforementioned systems report the capability of the military to carry out the tasks (complete missions) required to execute national strategy. Typically, this includes an assessment of the resources of units and their ability to carry out essential tasks, whether as an individual unit (for example, an army battalion, a naval destroyer squadron, or an air force squadron), service, or other component/agency of the DOD, or their combination.<sup>12</sup>

### **DRRS Processes, Indicators and Ratings**

DRRS makes extensive use of two separate but related readiness assessment processes that involve several separate assessments, each of which uses different metrics and measures to determine the overall readiness of units. Unit commanders can also use an overall mission capability evaluation, also known as the “rating system,” to combine the two assessment procedures and meet OSD information requirements.<sup>13</sup> Together, they ensure a miscellaneous view of the unit’s readiness status.<sup>14</sup>

### **DRR/SORTS**

The first assessment process, which is based on “inputs or resources”, is reminiscent of the older Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS). It enables unit commanders to assess their units’ capacity to carry out intended missions in light of the unit’s available resources. The “C-level ratings” provided by this assessment process convey the units’ overall readiness while evaluating resource deficiencies.<sup>15</sup>

### **DRRS/METs**

The second assessment process, based on “output or mission/task”, allows unit commanders to assess the ability of their units to perform both designed and assigned missions based on the unit’s ability to perform tasks. It focuses on the mission-essential task list<sup>16</sup> (METL) construct, where commanders evaluate the unit’s ability to perform a set of METs for which the unit was created. This DRRS/MET evaluation process includes the conditions under which each task must be performed and a set of standards that reflect success.<sup>17</sup>

### **Assessing Resources**

Four input resource categories (referred to as “resource areas” in DOD doctrine) make up the SORTS-derived process within DRRS. Each is initially evaluated individually and then collectively: people (P), equipment availability (S), equipment readiness (R), and training (T). Unit commanders oversee the DRRS/SORTS evaluation process and evaluate readiness levels in accordance with the guidelines established by the Service Regulations.<sup>18</sup> When it comes to training assessment, the rules sometimes demand that the commander use a lot of professional military judgment; in other situations, the commander’s latitude is considerably more constrained.<sup>19</sup>

### **Overall Resource Availability (level C)**

The C-level rating - or the overall DRRS/SORTS readiness rating - is derived from the ratings of the four previously discussed resource areas (P, S, R, and T) and is equivalent to the lowest of the four levels. However, the

---

11 Herrera, *The Fundamentals of Military Readiness*, 2.

12 Ibid, 18-19.

13 Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010), 13-18, <https://tinyurl.com/4bwc5pxj>.

14 Junor, *Managing Military Readiness*.

15 Ibid.

16 A mission-essential task is a collective task on which an organization trains to be proficient in its designed capabilities or assigned mission. A mission-essential task list is a tailored group of mission-essential tasks. (FM 7-0) [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/ARN32648-FM\\_7-0-000-WEB-1.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN32648-FM_7-0-000-WEB-1.pdf)

17 Department of the Army, *Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021), 2-1, [https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR\\_pubs/DR\\_a/ARN32648-FM\\_7-0-000-WEB-1.pdf](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN32648-FM_7-0-000-WEB-1.pdf)

18 Department of the Army, *Army Regulation 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies*.

19 Herrera, *The Fundamentals of Military Readiness*.

commander has the option to upgrade or downgrade based on his professional military judgment. The rating is intended to reflect the unit's ability to perform its core functions, deliver on its planned capabilities, and accomplish its designed missions based on an aggregate resource estimate.<sup>20</sup> Table 1 provides an explanation of each C-level.

**Table 1:** Understanding Readiness Ratings in DRRS, “C-Level” Ratings

C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	C-5*
The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the <b>full wartime missions</b> for which it is organized or designed.	The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake <b>most of the wartime missions</b> for which it is organized or designed.	The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake <b>many, but not all, portions of the wartime missions</b> for which it is organized or designed.	The unit <b>requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime missions</b> , but it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime missions with resources on hand.	The unit is <b>undergoing a</b> Service, Combatant Commander, Defence Agency, or other <b>DOD-directed resource action</b> and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime missions for which it is organized or designed. However, the unit <b>may be capable of undertaking nontraditional, non-war-time related missions</b>
The status of resources and training in the unit <b>will not limit flexibility in methods</b> for mission accomplishment.	The status of resources and training in the unit <b>may cause isolated decreases in flexibility in methods</b> for mission accomplishment.	The status of resources and training in the unit <b>will result in significant decreases in flexibility</b> for mission accomplishment		
The status of resources and training in the unit <b>will not</b> increase vulnerability of unit personnel and equipment.	The status of resources and training in the unit <b>will not</b> increase the vulnerability of the unit <b>under most envisioned operational scenarios</b>	The status of resources and training in the unit <b>will</b> increase the vulnerability of the unit <b>under many, but not all, envisioned operational scenarios</b> .		
The unit <b>does not require any compensation</b> for deficiencies.	The unit <b>would require little, if any, compensation</b> for deficiencies.	The unit <b>would require significant compensation</b> for deficiencies.		

Source: Joint Staff, CJCSI 3401.02B, Force Readiness Reporting,

Note. \*There are several C-5 unit restrictions listed within CJCSI 3401.02B.

### Assessing Missions

Unlike DRRS/SORTS, created to evaluate designed missions, the DRRS/METs process allows commanders to evaluate both designed and assigned missions. It is a two-stage assessment process that starts with individual MET assessments and ends with a unit METL assessment.

There is a three-tiered assessment used by commanders to rate each MET and METL as well as their Service's own established rating system to determine the readiness of a unit to complete the assigned mission (s).<sup>21</sup>

Unit commanders assign each MET a “Yes” (Y), “Qualified Yes” (Q) or “No” (N) rating (Table 2).

**Table 2:** DRRS Three-Tiered Readiness Assessment

Rating	Definition
Y	Unit can accomplish task to established standards and conditions.

<sup>20</sup> Department of the Army, Army Regulation 220–1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies.

<sup>21</sup> IBid.

Q	Unit can accomplish all or most of the task to standards under most conditions. The specific standards and conditions, as well as the shortfalls or issues impacting the unit's task, must be clearly detailed in the MET assessment.
N	Unit cannot accomplish the task to prescribed standards and conditions at this time.


Source: G. James Herrera, *The Fundamentals of Military Readiness*, 48.

### Readiness Inputs

Although readiness is frequently associated with training, other important readiness inputs include people, equipment, supplies, and maintenance. Because a mission-ready force requires units with a sufficient number of qualified military staff, people are a critical component. Additionally, units must have enough equipment and supplies on hand, including key weapon systems, ammunition, and support equipment. This equipment must be able to fulfill the missions and match the threats that the forces are expected to confront. To keep the equipment functioning reliably and effectively when needed, periodic maintenance is also required. People need training to be able to use their equipment and complete their tasks under actual circumstances.

As illustrated in Figure 3, practically every component of the defence budget makes some kind of contribution to increased readiness. As a key element of readiness, Use of Goods and Services accounts provide money for supplies, equipment upkeep, and training. Accounts for Compensation for Employees and Social Benefits provide the funding for wages and benefits required to attract and keep a sufficient pool of skilled (qualified) personnel. The acquisition of supplies and equipment is funded by the Use of Goods and Services, Increase in Nonfinancial Assets, and Other Expenses accounts, which provide the forces with weapons that are both numerous and effective enough to support them. These financing sources work together to supply the fundamental components needed to develop armed forces that are mission-ready.

**Figure 3:** Mapping Budget Lines to Readiness Inputs




The challenge for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is to balance readiness inputs while trying to meet the resource constraints required by law and still support the strategy. When the inputs to readiness are out of balance, the result is what General Edward C. Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army (1979–1983), called “hollow force”. In his 1980 testimony to Congress, General Meyer used the term to refer to the insufficient number of soldiers available to reinforce army divisions, but the use of the term has expanded since then.<sup>22</sup> A force element must possess an overall balanced mix of capability components (DOTMLPF) otherwise, it risks to “go hollow”. Figure 4 depicts the mapping of capability components to readiness inputs.

<sup>22</sup> Andrew Feickert and Stephen Daggett, *A Historical Perspective on “Hollow Forces,”* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42334.pdf>



**Figure 4**

Mapping Capab



Inputs to readiness are non-linear variables working together to produce mission-ready forces. For example, a brigade conducting field exercises may improve readiness in terms of its personnel and their ability to fight, but at the end of the exercise, the equipment will be less readily available, requiring repair and maintenance. The same goes for naval ships and aircraft returning from combat deployment. Conversely, forces that stow all of their equipment pending deployment will reduce their operational readiness as they cannot train on said equipment and combat platforms.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, defence program managers who are accountable for the resources provided must monitor the balance of inputs to readiness and the state of readiness achieved.

However, it should be noted that, despite best efforts, readiness metrics are not, and likely will never be ideal measures. Measuring the effectiveness of troops in realistic combat scenarios is not a perfect substitute for effectiveness in real combat. In a war, results are determined not only by the readiness of forces, or, more specifically, by the performance of the mission essential tasks. For example, in ground combat, success may depend on many factors besides the readiness of the ground forces, such as the discipline, morale of the soldiers (both friendly and enemy), weather conditions, etc. In addition, in times of war, forces are often assigned tasks for which they were not designed and may not have been adequately prepared. The results of hostilities can only be assessed in the course of actual warfare, and readiness is only one of many factors contributing to this. The best achievable with peacetime readiness assessments is a rough estimate, excluding actual military operations.

Thus, readiness metrics can never accurately predict the performance of troops in real combat. Efforts should be focused on developing effective metrics to measure relevant force characteristics, continually improving and refining these metrics over time, and with respect to the most important criteria for readiness metrics: They should (1) measure outputs, not inputs, (2) be related with a strategy, (3) be quantifiable, and (4) avoid subjective assessments (especially self-assessments) as much as possible. It is most important to develop readiness indicators to help answer the question: How can armed forces most effectively achieve the readiness required by their strategy?<sup>24</sup>

In addition to the metrics mentioned above and measures, commanders can also use the information on staff turnover, language qualifications, professional military education completion, and other additional qualifications. They can also take into account factors such as discipline, morale, and certain aspects

<sup>23</sup> Daniel Sukman, "Military Readiness: Thinking About the Three Big Questions," Real Clear Defence, (July 03, 2019) <https://tinyurl.com/4zm3bdw4>

<sup>24</sup> Todd Harrison, "Rethinking Readiness," Strategic Studies Quarterly 8, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 38–68, <https://tinyurl.com/e3fea6wn>

of leadership. Insight into the best way to resource readiness is provided by improved metrics and a better understanding of the relationship between inputs (resources) and outputs (readiness). With this understanding, inputs can be adjusted to create more capable and mission-ready forces for a given level of resources.<sup>25</sup>

## Performance Framework for the Major Force Program<sup>26</sup>

“How many and what types of forces (and ground, air, sea, space, cyber, and other capabilities) are called for, and why?”<sup>27</sup> Answering this question is the burden of defence planning, which uses analytical, planning, and programming efforts to determine which armed forces are right for the state. The goal of defence planning is to translate national security and defence policy, as well as related defence strategies and guidance documents, into a set of realistic and affordable capability requirements, spending priorities, and ultimately into a comprehensive and capable force structure that will allow the execution of the designated defence tasks as well as the achievement of the country’s security and defence objectives.

Betts articulated the main policy and strategy questions that need to be answered in order to develop achievable and acceptable capability requirements, prioritize defence spending, and create a comprehensive and capable force structure with an appropriate level of readiness as follows:

- Readiness for when? What about the time available for conversion? Should we focus in peacetime on active units or reserves?
- Readiness for what? What kind of war and enemy should the forces be ready for? What about the conditions and strategy?
- Readiness of what? What are the time requirements for the marshaling and deployment of the Air Force, Navy, Ground Forces, and their various elements, since they all have different tasks to achieve or maintain readiness?

<sup>28</sup>As Omitoogun et al. state, “The determination of optimal defence [military] capabilities to be developed and maintained, along with the associated states of readiness, is the major challenge to the defence planner.”<sup>29</sup>

According to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) for 2021-2025, the GDF must be able to ensure deterrence; support civil agencies to handle various emergencies; and contribute to strengthening regional and international security. If deterrence fails, the GDF must be capable of providing defence against the enemy.<sup>30</sup>

To ensure the availability and combat capability of the Defence Forces, based on capability requirements (1 in Figure 5) and resource constraints, the government through the Ministry of Defence allocates budgetary funds (2) to the defence programs (in our example, the Major Force Program). The allocated funds are spent within the framework of subprograms (3) to develop the capability inputs/components (4) of force elements (5) and provide resource inputs in readiness (6). The performance (efficiency) of the subprograms can be measured through an assessment of overall resource readiness (C- level) (7) and a three-tiered assessment (8) of the force elements.

However, it should be noted that, as stated above in the study, due to the “fog of war”<sup>31</sup>, readiness metrics can never accurately predict the performance of troops in real combat, and the best that can be achieved with peacetime readiness assessments is a rough estimate, excluding actual military operations. Efforts should be focused on developing effective metrics to measure relevant force characteristics, continually improving and refining these metrics over time and with respect to the most important criteria for readiness metrics such as: measuring outputs, not inputs; be

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Proposals for an updated structure of the defence program (including the Major Force Program) are presented in the article “PROPOSALS ON Defence PROGRAM STRUCTURE: THE CASE OF THE MINISTRY OF Defence OF GEORGIA,” *Journal of Defence Resources Management (JoDRM)*, Volume 13, Issue no. 1 (24): 88-105, [http://www.jodrm.eu/issues/Volume13\\_issue1/06\\_OKROMTCHEDLISHVILI.pdf](http://www.jodrm.eu/issues/Volume13_issue1/06_OKROMTCHEDLISHVILI.pdf)

<sup>27</sup> Michael J. Mazarr, Katharina Ley Best, Burgess Laird, Eric V. Larson, Michael E. Linick, and Dan Madden, *The U.S. Department of Defence’s Planning Process Components and Challenges*, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2019), 1, <https://tinyurl.com/2524uxw8>

<sup>28</sup> Betts, *Military readiness: concepts, choices, consequences*, 33.

<sup>29</sup> Wuyi Omitoogun, Eboe Hutchful, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Budgeting for the military sector in Africa: The process and mechanisms of control*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 43, <https://tinyurl.com/2prert7v>

<sup>30</sup> Ministry of Defence of Georgia, *Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2021-2025*, (Tbilisi: Ministry of Defence of Georgia 2021), [https://mod.gov.ge/uploads/2021/november/Strategic\\_Defence\\_Review\\_2021-2025.pdf](https://mod.gov.ge/uploads/2021/november/Strategic_Defence_Review_2021-2025.pdf)

<sup>31</sup> A phrase now much used to describe the complexity of military conflicts (The Fog of War was the title of Errol Morris’s 2004 award-winning documentary about Robert S. McNamara, US Secretary of State during the Vietnam War). Fog of war is often attributed to Clausewitz, but is in fact a paraphrase of what he said: ‘War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.’ <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095826962#:~:text=Fog%20of%20war%20is%20often,>



tied to the strategy; be quantifiable and avoid subjective assessments (especially self-assessments) as much as possible. Most importantly, readiness indicators should help answer the question: How can the GDF most efficiently and effectively achieve the readiness required by the strategy? <sup>32</sup>

Positive results (9) assume that the mission-ready Force Elements/Capabilities (10) and, therefore, the mission-ready Defence Forces/Military Capability (11) have been created, the resource inputs in the Major Force Program have been purposefully expended to produce the required capabilities (1) and the desired efficiency (12) has been achieved. Mission-readiness of the GDF implies their availability and capacity (13) to carry out their assigned tasks (14) and achieve or contribute to the achievement of the outcomes/national defence objectives (15) and high-level outcomes/national security objectives (16), which means the impact of the produced defence outputs on the objectives set for the defence and relates to effectiveness (“doing the right things”).

Negative results of the assessment (17) mean that the “production” of the mission-ready Force Elements/Capabilities (10) and, therefore, the mission-ready Defence Forces/Military Capability (11) has failed; the resource inputs in the Major Force Program to produce the required capabilities (1) were not sufficient, or were wasted leading to inefficiency (18) and ultimately ineffectiveness (19) - unavailability and incapacity of the Defence Forces.

The confrontation (20) of required capabilities (1), produced capabilities (outputs) (10, 11) and outcomes (15) allows assessment of the sustainability and utility of the defence program or the defence organization.


In conclusion, it should be noted that the final assessment of the effectiveness of the Major Force Program can only be carried out in the event of a crisis: Were the Defence Forces (force elements/capabilities) available and capable of providing defence successfully in the event of an attack on the country? Did they effectively support the authorities during natural disasters? Were they available and capable of participating effectively in international security operations when needed? It is also crucial for defence decision-makers to choose and apply the right mix of the Major Force Program’s subprogram outputs (force elements/capabilities) to perform the assigned tasks and achieve or contribute to the achievement of the outcomes/national defence objectives and high-level outcomes/national security objectives, as inefficiencies in the output mix may lead to reducing the overall effectiveness of the Defence Forces (or the Major Force Program). Moreover, according to the Law of Georgia “On the Defence of Georgia”<sup>33</sup>, in times of crisis, the Chief of Defence Forces is authorized to create, depending on the objectives, temporary operational or tactical groups for completing assigned operational- or tactical-level tasks.

---

32 Todd Harrison, “Rethinking Readiness,” 52.

33 Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Defence of Georgia (Tbilisi: Parliament of Georgia, 1997), <https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/28330?publication=20>

Figure 5 Performance Framework for the Major Force Program



## CONCLUSION

The fundamental element of national security is understanding the limits of a nation's ability to build and deploy mission-ready armed forces. Those involved in the security and defence policymaking and planning processes usually stress the importance of keeping a state's military capabilities ready. While they generally agree that every function of the defence enterprise should directly or indirectly support the formation of a mission-ready military now or in the future, their views on what readiness is, and therefore, how to manage it and use it as a resource management and performance measurement tool, often diverge.

In this article, I discussed the use of readiness as a defence program performance indicator, as well as proposed a performance framework for the major force program.

Despite the shortcomings of "readiness" mentioned in the study, I consider it very important to include the "readiness level" as an output indicator in the defence program structure of the Ministry of Defence. The target readiness levels of the GDF units should also be specified in the Defence Program Guidance (DPG) and other planning documents of the MOD (in the secret part of the documents), as well as procurement objectives and descriptions of acceptable risk.

Defence program and subprogram managers who are accountable for the resources provided must monitor the balance of inputs to readiness and the state of readiness achieved. Evaluation of the performance of managers at all levels should be directly related to the achievement of the specified (planned) levels of readiness or to the contribution to the achievement of the latter.

Military readiness should be of great importance to the MOD, the Government and the Parliament of Georgia when debating on defence budget issues. Parliament should request from the MOD information regarding readiness and use it as a key factor in determining defence funding needs.

In conclusion, as mentioned above in the article, the MOD is only successful to the extent that it produces one primary output: military capability - organized, equipped, trained, and sustained mission-ready defence forces that can be verified and confirmed by using readiness assessment methods.

### Disclaimer

The views represented in this paper are those of the author and don't reflect the official policy or position of the Ministry of Defence of Georgia.

## REFERENCES:

1. Betts, Richard K. Military readiness: concepts, choices, consequences. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995.
2. Department of the Army. Army Regulation 220-1, Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010. <https://tinyurl.com/4bwc5pxj>
3. Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2021. <https://tinyurl.com/23z34a4d>
4. Feickert, Andrew, and Stephen Daggett. A Historical Perspective on "Hollow Forces." Congressional Research Service, 2012. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42334.pdf>
5. Harrison, Todd. "Rethinking Readiness." Strategic Studies Quarterly 8, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 38–68, <https://tinyurl.com/e3fea6wn>
6. Herrera, G. James. The Fundamentals of Military Readiness. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46559>
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013. <https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp1.pdf>
8. Joint Staff. CJCSI 3401.02B, Force Readiness Reporting. Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 2011. <https://tinyurl.com/ycyuaz6f>
9. Junor, Laura J. Managing Military Readiness. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National

Defence University Press, 2017. <https://tinyurl.com/mvzdex8p>

10. Mazarr, Michael J., Katharina Ley Best, Burgess Laird, Eric V. Larson, Michael E. Linick, and Dan Madden. The U.S. Department of Defence's Planning Process Components and Challenges. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2019. <https://tinyurl.com/2524uxw8>
11. Ministry of Defence of Georgia. Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2021-2025. Tbilisi: Ministry of Defence of Georgia, 2021. <https://tinyurl.com/ya6bbe3p>
12. Okromtchedlishvili, Ivan. "PROPOSALS ON Defence PROGRAM STRUCTURE: THE CASE OF THE MINISTRY OF Defence OF GEORGIA." *Journal of Defence Resources Management (JoDRM)*, Volume 13, Issue no. 1 (24), (2022): 88-105. [http://www.jodrm.eu/issues/Volume13\\_issue1/06\\_OKROMTCHEDLISHVILI.pdf](http://www.jodrm.eu/issues/Volume13_issue1/06_OKROMTCHEDLISHVILI.pdf)
13. Okromtchedlishvili, Ivan. "Performance Measurement Issues in the Defence Sector in the Face of Global Security Challenges." *FROM A SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS "GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF THE WORLD"*, Publishing House Technical University, (2022): 285-292. <https://doi.org/10.36073/978-9941-28-871-5>
14. Omitoogun, Wuyi, Eboe Hutchful, and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *Budgeting for the military sector in Africa: The process and mechanisms of control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. <https://tinyurl.com/2prert7v>
15. Parliament of Georgia. *Law of Georgia on the Defence of Georgia*. Tbilisi: Parliament of Georgia, 1997. <https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/view/28330?publication=20>
16. Sukman, Daniel. "Military Readiness: Thinking About the Three Big Questions." *Real Clear Defence*, (July 03, 2019). <https://tinyurl.com/4zm3bdw4>
17. Van Dooren, Wouter, Geert Bouckaert, and John Halligan. *Performance Management in the Public Sector*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315817590>
18. Webb, Natalie, and Diana Angelis. "Improving Performance Measurement in Defence Organizations." *The Journal of the American Society of Military Comptrollers*, (Winter 2009): 16-21, <https://tinyurl.com/4ufr9rzt>